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


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East of the IRON CURTAIN

By William van Narvig



CHICAGO



NEW YORK

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Foreword

ON THE VOLGA, BELOW BATTERED STALINGRAD, I CAME upon a Russian fisherman, pulling in his nets with the help of a giant turnstile, to his gay singing of *Oi, doubinushka, oukhnem*. He grinned, shook hands, offered a piece of black bread, sat with me on an overturned skiff, told a funny story about a soldier who met an old woman on the highway, and laughed uproariously. There was in him all the friendliness, gregariousness, and humorous abandon of the Russian peasant. The talk touched upon the war, and he proclaimed proudly, "*Nasha vzyala!*" (Our side has won!) A moment later he stood up. There was a terrible change in his expression. The lines of his face were grim, his eyes blazing with a fanatical fire. He lifted his forefinger prophetically to the sky and proclaimed: "*Nachalo tolyko! Pokazhem vsemu meeru!*" (This was only a beginning! We'll show the entire world!)

There have been an endless number of books written on Russia; voluminous treatises by almost everyone who went to Russia for a few weeks or months, and by many who have never been there. The alarmists and the fanatics, the critics and the one-hundred-per-cent apologists for Stalin and all his works, the "sob sisters" and the peddlers of war psychosis, the revilers and the extollers, have all had their say, over and over. At times I wondered who read all these books.

When my friends suggested that I write a book on Russia I vehemently protested, "What, another! No, thanks, the traffic won't bear it."

Foreword

Then, one day over the luncheon table, Edward Maher, editor of *Liberty* magazine, after listening to my experiences, said to me: "This is so different from what we Americans have been led to believe. If what you say is correct, there must be a strange duality in the Russian nature. The whys and wherefores of it ought to be explained." And right then and there, the Volga fisherman came back to my mind.

Shortly afterwards, while pecking away at the typewriter keys and mulling over the strange duality in the Russian's makeup, the idea for this book was conceived.

Some, no doubt, will say that I am too factual; that I do not give enough consideration to the human element, and to the effect of the Nazi onslaught upon the Russian mind.

I am purposely factual. It seems to me there have already been too many "pros" and "antis." The "sob sisters" writing under the immediate influence of the war have given their version. The past is gone; our thoughts belong to the future. The past remains of value only insofar as it bears upon the future.

The Politburo--the actual wielder of power over all the Russians today--is not composed of idealists or humanitarians. Its members are the starkest realists in the world. Strictly human considerations are ruled out by them; only political realism counts. It is their fetish. I wrote this book from the point of view of the Politburo.

I humbly present this book, believing as I do that it fills a deep gap in the many writings on modern Russia.

WILLIAM VAN NARVIG

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Part I

THE RUSSIAN WORLD

"Two worlds face each other as irreconcilable and deadly enemies—the world of Capitalism and the world of Socialism."

V. Y. VYSHIINSKY

Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs

CHAPTER I

The Average Russian

IN A MEDIUM-SIZED INDUSTRIAL TOWN IN WESTERN SIBERIA I first came upon Ivan Agafonovich. He was typical of the average Russian. His cradle had stood in an industrial suburb of St. Petersburg, now called Leningrad, when the Czar was still the undisputed ruler of the Russian realm. A great many things happened to Ivan Agafonovich since the days of the cradle—the same things which countless millions of his countrymen experienced. And so he found nothing unusual in them.

His parents were of the working class; his father a guard at a textile mill and his mother running a battery of spindles at the same mill. Ivan Agafonovich was given a schooling of sorts. He learned to read and write and to wrestle with the simpler problems of arithmetic. But most important, he was taught that the Czar, ruler of all the Russias, was the appointee of God on earth and, therefore, had to be obeyed implicitly. He could still remember fishing in a creek called Zhdanovka and picking apples in a church orchard—and getting soundly licked on both counts. He resented the licking. Both the creek and the church were for the people and, consequently, the apples, too, belonged to the people, of which he was one. Besides, the priest and his family could not possibly eat all the apples in the church orchard. He thought of complaining to the Czar about it; the Czar was steward of the people's properties and he should know about such goings-on. The only trouble was, he did not know how

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to reach the Czar, or even the Czar's representative.

When he was fourteen, Ivan Agafonovich went to work in the same textile mill in which his parents were employed. His father and mother were simple people who believed in the primary ends of marriage. Therefore, it was not unexpected that Ivan should have a goodly number of younger brothers and sisters. As soon as each was physically able to do so, he was obliged to find work - to join in the ever-present struggle for food and shelter.

Then the war came. The Czar's armies needed all the young men that could be pressed into service, and Ivan Agafonovich was one of them. The Germans wanted to take Russian land, and there was no reason why they should have it. But the Germans had better guns and more shells. Ivan Agafonovich, young as he was, told himself that the situation would have to be radically changed. The Russians were a great people who should have better things, and more of them, so they could show those confounded foreigners where they stood. It was something else about which the Czar, as steward of the people, should be told.

But Ivan Agafonovich never had a chance to tell the Czar. The Revolution came too quickly. The Czar was deposed and a Provisional Government took his place. Ivan Agafonovich was stunned when he heard the news. It made no sense. He had never heard of such a thing as a Provisional Government. Mother Russia belonged to the people, and there had to be an incorruptible steward who managed her for the people. There certainly was no room for any such monstrosity as a Provisional Government consisting of idle talkers each of whom could be bribed by foreigners at almost any time. It was rank absurdity. It was definitely un-Russian and he wanted no part of it.

And then Ivan Agafonovich heard something which confirmed his worst fears. He learned that the Provisional Gov-

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ernment was recognized by certain foreign powers, and that it was the same foreign powers which had had a hand in the overthrow of the Czar. This was the end, so far as Ivan Agafonovich was concerned. He certainly would not fight for any Provisional Government supported by foreigners. He would go back home. He took his rifle, and also a machine gun which he had acquired. His soldier comrades expressed the same sentiments—no more fighting for someone they didn't know. They commandeered a train, and on their way home they stripped the cars of all hardware, mirrors, upholstery, and everything that was usable. It all belonged to the people, and since they were the people it belonged to them; they certainly weren't going to leave it to any Provisional Government.

When Ivan Agafonovich reached home, he was told about a man named Lenin. This man Lenin, it seemed, harangued the people every day. He was telling the people that Russia belonged to the working masses. The Russian working masses, Lenin said, should refuse to produce for the interests of foreign capitalists. They should do away with the Provisional Government which had sold itself to foreign interests and which was prepared to spill new streams of Russian blood for these same interests.

The next day Ivan Agafonovich made a pilgrimage to Trinity Square and heard Lenin talk. Lenin was Russian and what he said made sense. Ivan Agafonovich went to Bolshevik headquarters. He offered his rifle and his machine gun, and he also offered himself. Of course he was accepted.

Together with other compatriots, Ivan Agafonovich marched against the Provisional Government. It was a great day. He stood on the great square in front of the Smolna Institute and listened to the proclamation which established a Council of People's Commissars. Lenin was chairman of this council, and he was also the new steward who

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was going to run Russia for the Russian working masses and for no one else. All foreigners were mortal enemies unless they joined the Russian masses in a common cause. That was as it should be.

But Ivan Agafonovich discovered that the expected millennium was not easily achieved. He was called upon to fight for it. He listened to a fiery speech by a man named Trotzky who told the men that a group of reactionary generals and other traitors had sold themselves to foreigners. Subsidized by foreigners, these generals had attacked the Russian People's State from all sides in order to reimpose the hated foreign yoke.

Again Ivan Agafonovich fought, this time to expel the foreigners. Eventually peace came, but it was a peace that left Russia's physical assets in ruins. Moreover, the foreigners had hacked off large pieces of her richest provinces. From these slices they forged a barrier of buffer states from behind which they refused to have any dealings with Revolutionary Russia and continued plotting her downfall. Ivan Agafonovich was not going to forget that.

Time passed and Ivan Agafonovich found himself the foreman of a plant near Kharkov, in the Ukraine. The plant made tractors and tanks. Meanwhile, Lenin had died and his place as steward of the Russian people's properties had been taken by Stalin. Ivan Agafonovich did not know what kind of man Stalin was. But so long as he kept running Russia in the interests of the Russian working masses, he was all right. Just so long as Stalin had no dealings with capitalistic foreigners.

One day Stalin visited the plant and exhorted the workers to greater effort. They were to build more and better tractors and tanks; they were to outproduce all other countries. The foreigners, Stalin said, still were plotting the downfall of the Russian Soviet State. They could not be trusted, and

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they should not even be talked to because they were seeking traitors who would betray Russian interests to them. The only way to meet the foreign threat was to outproduce all foreign countries in machines of war as well as implements of peace. Only when Russia did that would she be able to put a stop to all capitalist plotting against her. Ivan Agafonovich decided that Stalin was the greatest steward Russia ever had. Here was a man who knew what he was doing.

More time passed. Ivan Agafonovich, an eager reader of Soviet newspapers and an equally eager listener to the Soviet radio, learned that the foreign plotters were busier than ever. They had contrived to get a man by name of Hitler into power in Germany. All the capitalist countries were helping Hitler because he had promised to go to war against the Russian Soviet State. Russia was facing the greatest foreign plot in history. She had to be prepared to ward it off. All foreigners were spies. No Russian was even to speak to a foreigner.

That plot eventually became a reality. Powerful German armies, supported by legions of Italians, Rumanians, and special corps of anti-Communist Spaniards, Frenchmen, and other foreigners from all over Europe, invaded Russia along the entire western front. Threatened by the unchecked enemy advance, the Kharkov plant had to be dismantled and transferred to a Western Siberian town. It was a tedious process which took the better part of eight months to accomplish. But then Ivan Agafonovich, together with his fellow workers, threw himself into the task of producing tanks at a rate he had never believed possible.

At the age of fifty-two Ivan Agafonovich found one of his guiding principles once again confirmed. All foreigners were sworn enemies of his country. They were spies and traitors. None could be trusted. It did not require the exhortations of Stalin and the Soviet radio to distrust all for-

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eign elements. The distrust was deeply rooted in Ivan Agafonovich; had, in fact, become part of his blood. He had brought up his children in the same distrust.

When I first met Ivan Agafonovich, he evaded my questions. He warned me that if I persisted in talking to him he would call the police. It required a great deal of coaxing on my part to elicit from him the information of his origin. He considered this so ancient a matter that it could not possibly do any harm to discuss it now.

And then Ivan Agafonovich had the surprise of his life. It turned out that I was born in the same city as he, and at about the same time. I knew of the textile mill in which his parents had been employed. I had fished in the same Zhdanovka Creek, had stolen apples from the same church orchard. I recalled the name of the priest who had been the indirect cause of Ivan Agafonovich's corporal punishment. I even remembered a few young girls at the spinning mill whom I had known, and it turned out that one of these girls had become Ivan Agafonovich's wife.

Ivan Agafonovich was visibly stumped. He was faced with the problem of whether or not I was to be considered a foreigner. He compromised by deciding that, all things considered, I could not very well belong to the type of foreigner that was continually plotting against his country. He agreed to discuss matters over a bottle of vodka, if I would provide the vodka.

A few glasses of the fiery liquid brought us to comparing philosophies of life. "There is only one," said Ivan Agafonovich, "and that is work. We must work because we want to eat. We must eat because we want to live. We must live because--well, there isn't anything else, is there?"

It was then that Ivan Agafonovich acquainted me with his life's history which I have given in the preceding pages. With an eloquence astonishing in a man of his simple origin and

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pursuit of life, he pointed out all the sufferings which his country had endured from foreigners. He insisted that the root of all evil lay in the exploitation designs of foreign capitalists. Until they were eliminated from the face of the earth and all foreign workers had accepted Soviet ideas there could be no real understanding between the Soviet peoples and other nations. Only after the foreign workers had disposed of their capitalistic exploiters and become converted to the Soviet way of life would there be eternal peace, because then all would be comrades.

I assured him that he was mistaken, that Russian distrust of foreigners should not apply to Americans. I said the American people as a whole were genuinely desirous to be friends with the Russian people. I pointed to the enormous quantities of supplies which the United States had sent, and still was sending, to Russia under Lend-Lease.

Ivan Agafonovich shook his head knowingly. "That has nothing to do with friendship," he insisted. "It was shrewd capitalistic calculation. You wanted us to hold out. If we had not held out, Hitler would have turned around and conquered your country. You knew it and that is why you sent us the supplies."

He went on to say, "Of course we took them. Why shouldn't we? After all, we fought part of *your* war and we paid with *our* blood. Besides, it really is no sin to exploit a man who you know is out to exploit you."

Probably under the influence of the vodka I said things which I shouldn't have mentioned. In Russia, if you're a foreigner and know what is good for you, you don't talk; you just listen and form your own conclusions.

I went on to give Ivan Agafonovich a lucid description of the average American worker's life. I spoke of the high standard of living in the United States; of radios, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, electric refrigerators, and other

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labor-saving devices in practically every American worker's home. I told him of American workers' wives wearing fur coats, wrist watches, and fairly expensive jewelry, to say nothing of their nylon stockings and their constant patronage of beauty parlors. I dwelt on the American family automobile, on regular week-end trips to the country, on vacations at the seashore or in the mountains. And I emphasized that all this, and a great deal more, was accomplished by individual effort and not by centralized government planning or other Communistic devices.

Like every Russian, Ivan Agafonovich let me speak to the end. Then he pounded his fist on the table and said, "I think I was mistaken in you. I think you are not what you claim you are. I think you are a counter-revolutionary, a foreign spy and an *agent provocateur*. I have a notion to turn you over to the Secret Police."

I told him that I was neither a counter-revolutionary, nor a spy, nor an *agent provocateur*. I pointed out that if I were any one of the three, his government certainly would not have allowed me to enter Russia. This proved to be the convincing statement. Ivan Agafonovich believed implicitly in the sagacity of his government. But he insisted, all the same, that I was the world's greatest liar.

With the help of a few more glasses of vodka, I satisfied him that I was speaking the truth. He asked if all American workers had their own homes and cars. I conceded that quite a few did not. He gave me a knowing look and said, "Now I get it. Some of your workers live the way you described. Of course it is nothing but a bribe. They are bribed this way by your capitalists to prevent their joining up with the exploited part of the workers. By thus splitting the workers' ranks, the capitalists manage to stay on top. Your American workers must be pretty stupid. We Russians would not fall for that kind of trick."

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Manifestly, there was nothing more to discuss. When we parted, Ivan Agafonovich told me: "Be careful what you say. I talked to you because you were born in the same town with me and knew some of the people I knew. Others will not be so lenient. If you talk to them the way you did to me they will have you arrested for seditious activity."

His warning, while appreciated, was hardly necessary. A foreigner traveling in Russia today finds his movements everywhere restricted. Obtaining a permit for travel over wide sections of the country is a heroic achievement in itself. In fact, it can be achieved only by someone on friendly terms with a member of the higher Soviet hierarchy. Even then, when traveling from city to city, one is practically being handed over from one police chief to another. One's movements are strictly supervised by the Secret Police—the NKVD—and as a rule, all interviews with Russians are conducted in the presence of a member of this police. There are exceptions from this rule, but they are very rare. The talk with Ivan Agafonovich was one such exception.

Though no Russian myself, I was born among the Russians. I lived among them during the most impressionable years of my life. I traveled from one end of the vast country to another—north, south, east, and west. I talked, ate, and slept with people from Tikhonovka, Troitzk, and Baranovo, cities and towns which correspond to an American's conception of Oshkosh, Hickstown, and Centerville. I broke black bread with Russian peasants in their huts, loved Russian women, led Russian peasant soldiers in battle. To know the Russians well, you must have lived among them half a lifetime.

I witnessed the sordid Rasputin era when Russian disgust with everything foreign reached unprecedented heights. I heard Lenin talk to the masses from a hastily erected wooden platform in the center of Trinity Square and then talked to

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him across a table. I saw members of the ill-fated Constitutional Assembly mowed down by Bolshevik bullets. I visited Russia many times during the fateful quarter-century that followed. To understand the Russian, you have to keep up with him.

In his human pursuits, the Russian is like any other people. He likes to eat, drink, and dress up on holidays. He likes to hear people talk if they have something to say. He also likes to hear himself talk. He enjoys spectacles; the gaudier the trimmings, the more his eyes sparkle with unspoken delight. He is an inveterate gambler and accepts his losses philosophically. He likes a good fight and bestows enthusiastic acclaim upon the victor. He can love and hate with equal ease. He likes salacious stories; the more salacious they are, the more he enjoys them. He has a sense of humor and laughs with abandon. He weeps when the occasion compels, but does not relish being caught at it, especially by watching eyes.

But he also has a philosophy of life which more often than not refuses to blend with that of his neighbors. The American's prime considerations are his job, his family, his home, and having a good time, in the order named. The American's structure of life depends on filling his job expertly in a highly competitive society. He wants to equip his children with all the facilities that will enable them to fill their places in this society. It is part of his personal pride to have a better home than that of his neighbor. He is imbued with the spirit of saving up money in quantities sufficient to provide the fullest enjoyment of life for himself and his dear ones. All of which tends to make the American strictly individualistic.

The Russian of today has no worries about his job. "According to his conception of life, the Government provides him with a job—in fact, makes him work at that job. Essentially, it makes no difference what he knows and how he can

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apply this knowledge—the Government will always put him where he belongs. This does not mean that he does not want to improve his lot; the Russian is as ambitious as the next fellow. But at no time does he have to go out and seek a job; the Government fits him into one. The Government insists that he go to work if he wants to eat, and it shifts him from one job to the other without consulting him. As an individual he has nothing to say about the work to which he is assigned. He does not have to worry about his daily bread tomorrow or the next day because the Government sees to it that he gets it in the measure which the Government deems he deserves.

The Russian acknowledges the family tie. Like every other parent, he loves to see his children romp and play. But the concern of fitting his children into life is not his. The Government attends to that, and his personal preferences in this respect are definitely discouraged. The children are taken in hand by the Government from an early age. Since both parents have to work, the children are cared for in government nurseries and kindergartens. From there they graduate to government schools where they learn the things the Government decides they should know. They are organized in groups of *Young Pioneers* and indoctrinated with the philosophy of life which the Government intends them to have. From there they advance into the *Komsomols*, or Young Communist Leagues, where they receive their final indoctrination. The Government fits them into its scheme of things. The parents have very little to say about it. In consequence, family ties tend to be weakened.

Moreover, the Russian family has been subject to violent disturbances over a long period of years; much longer, indeed, than any contemporary can remember. Russia has been subject to numerous enemy invasions, and to even more disruptive civil strife. Families were broken up by force,

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with its various members sent to widely separated parts of the vast country. All too frequently, they never heard of one another again. New family ties were formed, and they, too, were, in time, forcibly disrupted.

The government policy of resettlement works in the same direction. New territories in outlying districts must be opened up. This is done almost exclusively by young people. The parents usually remain in their home towns or villages. A great divergence of interests results. There is the mail, of course, but frequently it is subject to police censorship which prevents you from writing all you might wish to say. Eventually you stop writing entirely. The transportation system groans under the strains of reconstruction; unless you have a friendly acquaintance among the powers-that-be, visits with the home folks over great distances are impossible. The Russian would like to see the family tie preserved, but he also understands that practice militates against it.

The conception of home is getting more and more blurred in the Russian mind. Life in this respect has been cruel. Destruction of housing property, together with plain deterioration, has proceeded at such a terrific pace that the housing shortage is by far the most acute problem in Russia today. To the average Russian, the conception of home is one of cubic feet. So and so many cubic feet of dwelling space are allotted to each person. If your apartment happens to have more cubic feet than the official allotment for yourself and your family, other persons—perfect strangers—are moved in to occupy the excess space, and there is nothing you can do about it. Home life in the American sense has become virtually extinct except among the few fortunates who stand in solidly with the party hierarchy. The average Russian eats either in government mess halls that have become an inseparable part of every governmental office, factory, and collective farm, or in the municipal kitchens of apartment

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houses. His children are cared for in government nurseries. His hours of relaxation are spent in workers' clubs which provide facilities for reading, conversation, and play. His longer vacations, if he is considered eligible, are given to excursion parties arranged by the government. At home he is incredibly cramped, and practically his only facilities are for washing, dressing and sleeping. As a result, home to him approximates a sort of modified barracks in which to spend the night.

The Russian, like any other national, loves a good time. The great difference is that the Russian can have his strictly allotted share of good time without virtually spending a cent. He can attend the free shows, concerts and motion pictures provided by his factory or collective farm. He can go swimming in the creek without bothering about a bathing suit. He can go dancing in the open or in factory dance halls to the tunes of an accordion. He need not save money toward a good time, and as a rule he doesn't.

The time-honored American custom of packing the folks into the family automobile for a vacation at a place of their own selection in the mountains or at the seashore, or simply sight-seeing around the country, stopping wherever you please, is as alien to the Russian mind as is a trip to the moon. In the first place the Russian does not have the automobile. In the second place, if he had, there are no privately run places of recreation and entertainment where he could spend his money as he pleased. And in the third place, if there were, the Secret Police would not let him go.

All of which tends to make the Russian strictly collectivist.

The Russian as a national is completely self-contained. In the company of his own he can go to any emotional or rhetoric excesses. But he shies away from all foreign elements. He has always done so.

I distinctly remember an incident from my young days.

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We used to have a summer residence in the vicinity of a village near the Volkhov River—the same river that stopped the advance of German armies on the Leningrad front. I mingled with the young folks from the village, was accepted as one of their own. In those days, like today, young folks listened to what their elders had to say, then went out and did quite as they pleased.

One of our favorite pastimes was to band together and go into the woods to gather mushrooms. These mushroom-gathering expeditions usually took two or three days. We set out with big baskets on our backs and other baskets on our arms and did not return until they were filled. The mushrooms were cleaned, dried on long strings over a stove, and then stored away for the winter.

We hiked through the woods in a long line, shouting at one another and having a hilariously good time. When night fell, we came to a clearing in the forest where there were several hay barns. We built fires in the clearing, fried some of the mushrooms, and ate them. Then we sang and danced.

On one occasion a party of Englishmen, hunters who had lost their way in the forest, appeared. They came to ask for directions, which were grudgingly given. But with their appearance a complete hush fell upon the young people. A young woman seated next to me on the ground whispered, "They're foreigners. They're up to no good. Don't talk in their presence."

Throughout the centuries the Russian national mind has perpetuated itself in a deep distrust of everything foreign and imported. It has become an ingrained characteristic of the Russian people. Rulers combatted it and got nowhere. Peter the Great tried to eradicate it and had to give up. Lenin made an attempt to do away with it and acknowledged failure. Stalin, a product of the Russian soil himself, under-

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stood it, catered to it, and became the most successful ruler Russia ever had.

Perhaps it is a result of the countless foreign invasions of Russian soil. Tatars, Turks, Poles, Swedes, Frenchmen, Germans, Englishmen, and others, each took their frequently repeated turns in attempting to counteract the continued expansion of the Russian colossus. Throughout the ages there hardly was a generation of Russians which did not have to defend the native soil against a foreign invader.

There were also many attempts of foreign powers to dominate Russia by other means than outright invasion. Marriage into the ruling dynasty, bribery of Russian ministers and generals, financial domination by foreign interests, have all had their turn in Russia. Peter the Great started it two hundred and fifty years ago when he imported an army of foreign experts and put them in charge of the things that spell wealth and power. That act met with the most bitter resentment on the part of the people.

Russian czars kept marrying foreign princesses to a point where the Romanoff dynasty had scarcely a drop of Russian blood left in it. Some of Russia's rulers were absolute foreigners who could not even speak the Russian language. They imported their ministers and other high officials from abroad and invested them with wealth and titles. Russia's nobility was honeycombed with foreign names which the common man could not even pronounce.

When the era of industrial development dawned, Russia had the raw materials, but she had neither the money nor the tools with which to exploit them. Foreign capital and tools—principally French, German, English, and Belgian—came pouring into Russia, and before the Russians knew it they found themselves exploited by foreigners. Before the Revolution almost 80 per cent of Russia's privately owned industries were controlled by foreign financial interests.

Nor did the foreigners stop at exploiting Russian raw materials and labor. They came to regard Russian workers, even Russian intellectuals, as a sort of inferior breed. While lapping up the cream of Russia's economic life, they looked down on everything Russian with ill-disguised contempt. They formed a superclass of their own. In their eyes, Russian workers were just stupid enough to be exploited, and Russian officials just dishonest enough to be bribed. Both of which they promptly did.

The Russian folk soul smarted under the twofold insult. To the inherent Russian distrust of foreigners as such was added the resentment of exploitation by foreign capital. The terms "foreigner" and "capitalist" became synonymous and anathema—in the Russian mind. Both had to be expurgated from the Russian scene if the folk soul was to have its way.

I remember once, in 1915, talking to a Russian foreman of the Cold Arms Factory at Zlatoust, in the Urals. Said he, "What do we work for? Wages? Bah! We want our work to be of benefit to our country, our people. But what do we find? The lion's share of profits is raked in by foreign capitalists and taken abroad. What is left our pro-foreign grand dukes and other nobles toss away in Paris cabarets and in the gambling halls of Monte Carlo, or they shower it upon their foreign mistresses. So long as this keeps up, our Russian country will remain poor and our people gray." By "gray," he meant uneducated.

Then, he added prophetically, "One day we shall have a government of men from the people. We shall have a ruler from the ranks of the people. That will be the day of reckoning. We shall chase all foreigners and their mercenary Russian lackeys from Russian soil, and those who won't go we shall put to work digging ditches. We shall cancel all foreign debts, as they have already been paid tenfold in the form of interest and profit. Our work will be for the benefit

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of the Russian people and no one else. And we shall post signs at our frontiers reading, 'Foreigners keep out!' "

The foreman expressed the true sentiments of the Russian working masses before the Revolution. The Russian soil was plowed and sown, ready for the seed to sprout. When Stalin combined Communism with Russian nationalism he made a ten-strike.

As the Russian people saw it, the Communist Party put an end to foreign exploitation. It put an end to foreign contempt and abuse. It re-established Russian self-respect. It took Russia from the hated hands of foreign exploiters and returned Russia to the Russians. No Czar had ever done that.

The Communist Party is of the Russian people. It is the vanguard of the Russian working masses. It is the collective manager of the nation's wealth. It is also the dispenser of all jobs, of the soil and its fruit, of all rewards for personal devotion and effort. It is the only ladder to a better living, to greater distinction and prominence. And so the cherished aim of every Russian today is to become a full-fledged member of the Communist Party.

CHAPTER II

The Party

I CAN VIVIDLY RECALL THE TWO TIMES WHEN LENIN AND I talked across a table. It was before the October Revolution. Lenin was still the political agitator, the rabble-rousing demagogue who kept telling the Russian people to follow him and throw off the foreign capitalist yoke.

The conversation took place in the palace of Madame Kshessinskaya, a former ballerina of the Imperial Ballet and ex-mistress of the last of the Russian czars. When Nicholas II had been forced to abdicate, Lenin and his handful of followers simply seized the palace for their own use. It had been built with the people's money, they contended, and therefore belonged to the people. Ex-mistresses could pack up and go. In front of the palace, on Trinity Square, a wooden platform was erected, and from this Lenin harangued the people twice daily, mornings and afternoons. In between, Lenin granted personal interviews to non-party fellows who wanted a clearer understanding of his views. I happened to be one of the fellows.

Seated across from me and stroking his barbered beard with a nervous hand, Lenin told me, "What I and my comrades propose is what the Russian working masses, the real people, want. Capitalism is something utterly un-Russian; it is a belated foreign importation which never took real root in our country. It is a hothouse plant pure and simple, nursed along by hothouse methods. Expose it to the Russian winter and it will die instantly, perish from the face of Russia. Capitalism will be wiped out in Russia because it never be-

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longed." He banged the desk as he spoke.

Asked why he stressed the national aspect of his coming revolution when some of his colleague orators represented it as a world movement, Lenin replied frankly, "Dust in other nations' eyes. Appeal to their working masses to prevent the capitalist governments of their countries from intervening here. While we are still weak, we do not want to become embroiled with strong militarist powers."

He added, "Of course I am a nationalist. I am a Russian. I am also enough of a realist to know that our brand of revolution is typically Russian, is attuned to the ardent desires of the Russian people and no other, at least not now. About 150,000 estate owners have ruled Russia for centuries and look at the rotten job they've done. Look at the way they've contrived to turn the country over to foreign capitalist exploiters. Why cannot two hundred thousand Bolsheviks seize the power, rule the country in the interests of the Russian working people alone, and do a real job of it? Of course they can, and they will."

On the occasion of our second conversation I pointed out that the Communist Party (or Bolshevik Party, as it was then called) really represented only a small minority of the people. There were a number of other political parties in Russia. Taken together, these other parties commanded more than 90 per cent of the votes, as against less than 10 per cent for the Communist Party.

With typical frankness, Lenin countered instantly. "You are quite correct. But you are correct only from a purely mathematical point of view. The other parties have the votes. What they completely lack is the courage to seize the power and use it ruthlessly for the eventual good of the Russian people. You and I both know that the concepts of western democracy, including the multi-party system, cannot be applied to Russian conditions. They would be poison.

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"They would only serve to strengthen the chains which foreign capitalism has thrown around this country. The overwhelming majority of the Russian people do not want that. They want to break these chains forever. The Russian mind is totally different from the Western mind. You have lived long enough among the Russians to understand that."

The corners of his mouth twitched in a sardonic smile when he added, "Personally, I have nothing against other political parties. The only prerequisite is that the Communist Party should be firmly in power and all other parties should be in jail."

Lenin converted his opinion into practice as soon as he had seized the power. He went even a step further. He was not satisfied to put all other political parties in jail; he sent them to concentration camps in the northern wilds of Russia and saw to it that they never came back. And so the Communist Party became supreme and unchallenged.

In its organizational setup, the Communist Party is not very different from the major political parties in the United States. It has its Central Committee in Moscow which roughly corresponds to the National Committee of either the Democratic or Republican Party in the United States. The Central Committee branches out into district committees which correspond to our state committees. Farther down the line there are local committees, the equivalent of our county committees.

In short, the Communist Party practices the same system of political party bosses as we know it in the United States. Perhaps the only organizational difference lies in the fact that as a rule it is not the committee chairman who is the actual party boss, as in the United States, but rather the committee secretary. The chairman is a mere figurehead; the secretary is the real ruler, since he holds the power of appointments. And whereas the chairman is an elected official, the secretary is an appointed one, and his appointment is dictated from Mos-

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cow. Thus the Communist Party is ruled directly from the top. Its discipline is incomparably stricter than that of the political parties in the United States; in fact, it is ironclad.

Not only are all other political parties proscribed in Russia, but also dissenting factions within the Communist Party itself are equally interdicted. This does not signify an utter absence of conflict among party leaders on important questions. The Communist Party is not, as many people in the United States assume, a one-man affair. But all such conflicting opinions are discussed and ironed out, sometimes compromised upon, behind closed doors. Not a word about these differences is allowed to leak out. To the Russian people, and even more to the outside world, the Communist Party presents an absolutely solid front.

On one occasion a number of dissenting leaders, including Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotzky, defied the rules of party discipline and carried their conflicting opinions into the open. The rule which Lenin had set up toward opposing political parties was promptly applied to them. The dissenting faction was liquidated, purged from the face of the earth. There have been no open dissenters since.

The occasion, however, led to a tightening of party discipline in the hands of two top control juntas. One of these is the Organizational Bureau, or Orgburo, of the Communist Party. It handles all political patronage throughout the vast Soviet realm. It appoints the secretaries of all district and local party committees, and these in turn appoint the minor political job holders. In the case of elected officials the Orgburo passes on all the names before they may be placed on the electoral ballot. Since there can be no opposition ballots, such selection is tantamount to election.

The other top control junta is the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, called Politburo for short. The Politburo decides the policy of the Communist Party, both domestic

and foreign. Since there is no other political party in Russia, the Politburo decides *all* policy of the Soviet Government. Its decisions are final. There can be no appeal. And inasmuch as all political job holders appointed by the Orgburo are pledged to carry out the policies of the Politburo, and no others, the Politburo emerges as the supreme arbiter of every phase of Russian life.

Under the present setup of the Communist Party, any political opposition in Russia is not only impossible but also utterly unthinkable. The controls are drawn so tight that no opposing line of thinking can emerge anywhere. And if by some miracle it did, it has no chance of any kind to make itself heard. The Communist Party controls everything.

Some foreign observers have labeled the Communist Party a racket. Perhaps at one time it was. But every racket, once it reaches the higher brackets, clothes itself with the cloak of respectability and becomes big business. The Communist Party in Russia is not only big business, it is gigantic business. As a matter of fact, it is the most titanic business in the world today.

Like the ruling political party in the United States, the Communist Party in Russia dispenses all political jobs. But unlike anywhere else in the world, the Communist Party dispenses *all jobs of any kind* through its absolute control of the country's entire economic life. You cannot be a physician, lawyer, bookkeeper, factory foreman, locksmith, garage mechanic, reporter, farm worker, or anything else, except through the Communist Party. You either support the policies of the Communist Party unreservedly or you do not eat; meaning, you die. And no one is greatly concerned about it. The economic power of the Communist Party penetrates every nook and cranny of this country of nearly two hundred million people. It is absolute and unchallenged.

It is only human that people should want to improve their

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economic lot. In this respect the Russian is no different from any other national. And since the only way to economic improvement is through the Communist Party, the dream of every ambitious Russian is to attain party membership; to join the elite.

But this is by no means easy. Actually, it is so difficult that only a very small minority of the people achieve it. In the United States, if you want to join any political party, you simply state your preference on the party ballot at election time. That is all there is to it. It automatically entitles you to vote in the party primaries and thus participate in the election of local party officials and delegates. From there on your voice is carried to the top. In short, American party politics is ruled from the bottom. It is the American concept of democracy—rule of the people, for the people and by the people.

The Russian concept of democracy is something entirely different. Russian party politics is ruled from the top. It is the top which decides whether a Russian can become a Communist Party member or not.

Theoretically, anyone over eighteen years of age is eligible to apply for party membership. But this remains just a beautifully sounding theory. In practice the vast majority of Russians never dare apply for fear they might get themselves or their loved ones into serious trouble.

The applicant must bare his entire life to the minutest scrutiny by party officials and the Secret Police. He must be able to account satisfactorily for every action in his life. If at any time he has been openly critical of party policies or has committed anything out of tune with established party principles, he is automatically ineligible. His relatives and close friends are likewise subject to a careful investigation lest anyone among them might be in a position to influence the applicant adversely. If they do not stand up under the investi-

gation, the applicant is rejected as completely ineligible.

But all this is a mere beginning. If everything turns out to the fullest satisfaction of the party authorities, the applicant becomes a *candidate* and must serve a period of apprenticeship, usually two years. During this period he is carefully watched by the Secret Police who compiles a minute dossier of all his activity. This applies not only to his official life but to his family life as well. His conduct toward his wife and children must be open to investigation at all times. In short, his conduct during the apprenticeship period must be exemplary in every respect.

When he has passed these tests, the candidate is admitted to full party membership. But this does not mean that he is accepted once and for all. As a party member, his life must remain an open book to the Secret Police; and the higher he climbs on the ladder of party hierarchy the closer is this scrutiny and the more detailed becomes his dossier. Though the general public is not allowed to know anything about him except the mere facts of his existence and the office he occupies, the Secret Police knows everything. Any infraction of party discipline brings a stern warning; a repetition usually results in expulsion from the party. Among the principal infractions are: unauthorized association with foreigners, unauthorized speeches, loose talk resulting in a betrayal of party secrets, open criticism of party policies, acceptance of bribes in any form, nepotism, drunkenness, and profligate living.

A party member's family life must likewise be exemplary. If, for any reason, he can no longer get along with his wife, he may ask the party for permission to divorce her, stating his reasons. If the reasons are considered valid, the permission is usually given. But if he is caught in intimate relationship with another woman before the divorce has been granted, it is just too bad for him.

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Russians, even Russian Communists, have their human failings like all other peoples. Expulsions from the party are only too frequent. Though no authoritative record is obtainable, it is well known that over the course of the past ten years they have run well over the two million mark. Under these circumstances, a man must be exceptional to reach the higher brackets of the party hierarchy; and once he gets there he is very careful not to fall. This is what makes Russian domestic and foreign policy such an impenetrable secret.

The Communist Party has taken every possible precaution to maintain itself not only as the ruling class but also as the coveted goal, the elite of the land. Though no detailed figures are available, it is officially conceded that party membership at no time has exceeded the five million mark. Among a population of almost 200,000,000 it means that only $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent are admitted to the ruling class. Ninety-seven and one-half per cent must remain the common herd.

CHAPTER III

Little Father Russia

THE TRIBE OF RUSS LIVED IN THE VAST COUNTRY TO THE north, and their capital was Novgorod. The people could not agree among each other. So they sent envoys to the Varyag princes across the sea and told them, 'Our land is vast and rich, but there is no order in it. Come and reign over us.' "

The above is a quotation from the first page of an old textbook on Russian history. It is the textbook from which I was taught when I went to school in Russia. And the brief quotation tells more about the Russian national character than any number of analytical essays will.

The Russians like to debate things that concern themselves. They like to thresh out matters volubly, thoroughly, and exhaustively—even to the point of fisticuffs. But they are also shrewd enough to understand that this sort of thing does not get things done; that it is actually nothing more than a much-needed outlet for their emotions. Therefore, when the debate is over, they want someone to give them implicit orders, and they are perfectly willing to carry out these orders, whatever they may be. The someone must be a neutral person who did not participate in their debate. He must be more than their equal; they want a ruler, a symbol of supreme and unquestioned authority. But they also want this ruler to be smart enough to make it appear that he orders what the people want him to order, even if it is not so. It is their idea of being governed; an idea to which they have steadfastly

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clung through centuries of violent ups and downs.

In ancient days the method of popular debate was the *vyeche*. Whenever a matter of importance had to be acted upon, the ringing of a bell summoned all male citizens to the market square. This assembly was called the *vyeche*. The elders placed the question before the *vyeche* and a general debate ensued which had little semblance of orderly procedure. Men talked to one another, tried to out-shout one another, and as a rule never got anywhere. Frequently the *vyeche* broke up in a free-for-all. But the question had been put before them; they had been given a chance to air their views on it; and that was the way it should be. No one had expected them to reach a decision; that was the function of the Prince.

The *vyeche* over, the Prince issued his orders. His advisers were expected to keep their ears glued to the debates of the *vyeche* and inform him accordingly. If his order conformed with the majority opinion of the *vyeche*, so much the better. If not, it was carried out just the same. The Prince knew best; that was why he was there to officiate.

As history progressed the *Prince* became the *Czar*. The name changed, but the symbol remained the same. The Czar was the most autocratic ruler in all the world. But with all his autocratic power, he had to pay heed to people's inherent craving for public debate, however futile. The institution of the *vyeche* became obsolete. Its place was eventually taken by the council of *boyars*, which later was changed to the council of the *nobility*. There also were the various peasant councils. All these assemblies remained consultative and debative in character only; the decisions were made by the ruler, the symbol of unquestioned authority. It was the Russian way of doing things.

For centuries Russia was divided into two classes—the nobility and the peasants. Both had opportunity for public

debate. The peasants lost this opportunity during the period of serfdom, but it was restored to them upon the emancipation of the serfs. Came the era of industrialization, and a new class sprung up—the industrial worker. The law of the land did not provide him with the debating opportunity to which he felt himself entitled as a Russian. He pressed for the introduction of workers' soviets.

The small Russian intelligentsia—one per cent of the Russian population at best—completely mistook this demand. Its members had traveled abroad, had witnessed the workings of Western parliamentary government, had come to like them. They wanted the same system in Russia for the simple reason that it would take the power from the hands of the Czar—the symbol—and place it into their own. The fact that this would be in complete opposition to the age-old traditions of the Russian people did not even occur to them. Nor could it occur; for, having accepted foreign customs as well as a foreign way of thinking, they had lost all mental contact with the Russian people.

The intelligentsia took up the demand of the industrial workers. It urged the workers into a revolution which it could not accomplish of its own strength. It did this for no other reason than to bring Western parliamentary government to Russia and thus lift itself to the leadership of the country. It wanted to abolish the symbol.

When the Revolution came, the intelligentsia found itself completely vitiated. It was attacked, and soon disbanded forever. It had tried to impose something which the Russian people never wanted. The people had no use for Western importations or innovations. The Russians wanted to preserve something which, as they express themselves, *pakhnet russkim doukhom* (smells of the spirit of Russia).

Lenin, and after him Stalin, knew what the people wanted; they were of the people themselves. When Lenin told me,

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"The Communist Party must be in power and all other parties must be in jail," he knew what he was talking about. He knew that the Russian people wanted no part of Western parliamentarianism. His task of seizing power was rendered incredibly easy because he gave the Russian people exactly what they wanted. He gave them the soviets as debating councils, and he gave them a new symbol—himself. A pure Russian, and a man of the people, Lenin made a greater symbol than the Czar, a product of foreign blood, could ever hope to be.

Lenin made only one mistake. The Russians want their symbol to be a supreme leader in war as well as in peace. Not that the Russians exactly want war as such. But Russia has had more wars than any other nation on earth. Ever since the dawn of Russian history there has not been a generation of Russians which was not involved in several wars. In the nineteenth century, for instance, while the United States fought three foreign wars, Russia was heavily involved in fourteen, or an average of one about every seven years. And so the Russians have come to consider war as an inevitable part of their existence.

When the *War of Intervention* broke out, Lenin, instead of assuming personal command of the Russian armies, turned it over to Trotsky. On Lenin's death, Trotsky, as the military leader, regarded himself the logical successor. But Trotsky, his great talents as an organizer notwithstanding, was not a Russian at heart. He was an internationalist. His avowed aim was world revolution, and he was prepared to let the Russian people bleed to death, if necessary, to achieve that aim. The Russian people wanted none of that. Trotsky was eliminated. Stalin, who knew even better than Lenin what the Russian people wanted, became the new symbol.

Stalin did not repeat Lenin's mistake. When Russia was plunged into the most disastrous war of her entire history

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in 1941, Stalin assumed personal command of all Russian armed forces. He led them to victory. He frustrated every attempt of the Western Powers to impair even the smallest part of Russia's victory. Russia's interests came first and foremost. Today there is not a Russian alive who does not regard Stalin as the greatest leader Russia ever had. He is their symbol in fact, not just in name.

Communists and fellow travelers outside Russia love to indulge in endless dissertations upon the relative merits of Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. They run up high blood pressure and go into ecstatic spasms by pointing out where Lenin interpreted Marx as he should be interpreted, and where in turn Stalin interpreted Lenin as he should be interpreted. All of which is plain, unadulterated nonsense so far as Russia is concerned. Stalin himself has said as much on repeated occasions.

To dispute that Stalin is a Communist would be stupid. Of course he is; he has acknowledged it. He is the undisputed leader of World Communism as well as Russian Communism. But Stalin knew that pure Marxism was for a highly industrialized society exclusively. It could not possibly succeed in an overwhelmingly agricultural country such as Russia was at the time of the Revolution. He also recognized the impossibility of imposing upon 200,000,000 people something for which they weren't prepared and which they definitely did not want. He likewise knew that even under the Czars, Russia had practiced a certain brand of local Communism which was an intrinsic part of the Russian national make-up. If any sort of Communism was to succeed in Russia, it had to be a typically *Russian Communism* and no other; a Communism adapted to the traditions and national inclinations of the Russian people. It was a brand of Communism that would not work in any other country except Russia.

In a conversation I once had with a prominent member of

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the Soviet hierarchy, the latter admitted frankly, "Looking back at it now, it is quite obvious that we could not have succeeded in any other country but Russia. And here we succeeded only because we were ready to compromise at all times, willing to adapt Communist principles to the traditions and national character of the Russian people."

Not that Stalin and his associates have tossed the idea of world revolution completely overboard. They still hold that Capitalism is doomed and the world to come will be built on Communist principles. But that, they concede, will not happen in their lifetime and, consequently, it is nothing for them to become excited about now. Their task is to complete the structure of practical Communism in Russia. It will be up to the next generation to carry the blessings of Communism to the rest of the world. Naturally, when that time comes, it will be the kind of Communism that has succeeded in Russia. In other words, Russian Communism.

Joseph Vissarionovich Djughshvili is the "symbol's" real name. It is a name that the average Russian could not pronounce without breaking his tongue. Therefore it was changed to Stalin, which in Russian means *Man of Steel*. Stalin's program calls for the transformation of Communist Russia into the mightiest industrial nation in the world, and modern industrial might is based on steel.

The Russian soul craves a living figure that personifies Russia's might and greatness. It cannot fathom life without any such sign. During the short period between the departure of the Czar and the advent of Lenin, most Russians were completely lost, wandering in a sort of psychological fog. I was there and witnessed their blind groping for something that was an irreplaceable part of their psychic make-up and which had suddenly disappeared. I remember how an otherwise intelligent peasant, whom I had known for years, walked up to me on the station platform of Severskaya and asked,

"What are we going to do now?" If the sun had deserted the earth, it couldn't have been worse.

The Czar used to be the hero god of Holy Russia. With the cry, "For Czar and Fatherland!" the Russian peasant soldiers of my regiment flung themselves into battle. Russians must have a national hero who in their eyes represents everything that is perfect and great, simply because the average man cannot be either perfect or great. The Czar was that hero. Now the Russians have Stalin, and in their eyes he is the greatest of all heroes.

The Stalin cult in Russia is unique; frankly, it is beyond American comprehension. To the Russian mind today, everything belongs to Stalin, as in bygone days everything belonged to the Czar. Russian fliers are *Stalinskiye Yastreby*, meaning Stalinist falcons. The Russian soldier is equipped with Stalinist rifles, and the Cossack is armed with Stalinist sabers. Stalin tanks paved the way for Russia's victory and Stalin guns made rubble out of German fortifications. And above everything else, there is Stalin the Father. Like the Czar and Russia before, so Stalin and Russia now are one and indivisible. He is *Batyushka Rossiya*---Little Father Russia.

Communism and the Soviet State reject both gods and heroes. But Russian Communism is a thing entirely apart. To get a people of 200,000,000 solidly behind it, Russian Communism considers it only fair to give that people their great national hero and their godly symbol. If the symbol were any other than the Communist leader, the symbol would have to be destroyed, as was the Czar. But so long as both are the same person, it is very much in order; it rallies the people solidly behind Communism. If Stalin would order the Russian people to go out and conquer the world for Communism, they would say, "Father Stalin has commanded. It shall be done!"

Naturally, Stalin understands only too well the great value

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of this cult in that it considerably enhances his personal prestige as well as that of the Communist Party. When once asked whether it met with his personal approval, he simply answered, "If the people want it, I can see no harm in it."

World-important decisions are made in the inner councils of the Communist Party, and more often than not they are not Stalin's personal decisions. He could veto them, but he prefers to accept the combined wisdom of his principal associates. However, when these decisions are announced to the people, they carry Stalin's signature and have the tremendous prestige of his name behind them.

The Russian people accept the decisions without objection. Are they not handed out by Stalin, and is he not the symbol?

CHAPTER IV

Fourteen Hierarchs

MANY AMERICANS WITH WHOM I DISCUSSED THE RUSSIAN situation surprised me with their impression of Stalin as just another Hitler, an absolute dictator who runs Russia in accordance with his personal preferences and whose very whim is law. I had to assure them that such was not the case in the Russia of the Czars, and it definitely is not the case in the Russia of today. Though Stalin is the living symbol of the Russian people and also of Communist rule, and though he wields a potent voice in many important decisions, he does not run anything even resembling a one-man show. In many directions his authority, although not his personal prestige, is even more restricted than that of the President of the United States.

Stalin himself said, "The decisions of single persons are always, or nearly always, one-sided." It was not a hypocritical phrase but an expression of honest conviction.

Communist rule as practiced in Russia today is essentially government by committee. It does not delegate individual responsibility but relies on the combined judgment of a body of practical experts. Theoreticians, visionaries, and dreamers are not wanted, no matter how brilliant their minds.

Local soviets are elected all over Russia from election lists prepared by the Communist Party. In other words, no man's name can appear on the ballot unless he is a member of the Communist Party or at least approved by the Party. The soviet thus elected meets and selects an executive com-

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mittee, or Presidium, from among its membership. Needless to say, the members of the Presidium are all party members. This done, the soviet adjourns and from there on the Presidium carries on in the soviet's name. The soviet then may be called into session only at the request of the Presidium, which may happen once a year or perhaps even once every two years; it is a matter entirely up to the Presidium. In other words, the Presidium attends to all matters of actual administration and the soviet attends to the matter of debate, but only when called upon by the Presidium.

This soviet system spreads through all the autonomous areas and constituent republics of the Soviet Union and reaches its top in Moscow. Under the Soviet Constitution, the highest organ of governmental power is the Supreme Soviet. It is elected by popular ballot throughout Russia. In theory, this looks like genuine democracy. In practice, it is something entirely different; since the ballots must receive the full approval of the Communist Party before being submitted to the electorate, no one but a party member can appear on them.

The Supreme Soviet exercises the legislative power. It consists of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. Like the local soviets, the Supreme Soviet selects its executive committee, which in this case is called the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

This Presidium, in theory at least, supervises the affairs of the nation. Its chairman is titular head of the State and all foreign diplomats are accredited to him. It appoints and dismisses the members of the Council of People's Commissars, meaning the Cabinet. However, such appointments and dismissals are done only on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council, or Premier, currently Joseph Stalin. This procedure actually concentrates all executive power under the Constitution in the hands of the Premier. Thus the Supreme

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Soviet is in reality relegated to the role of a sounding board, or glorified debating society.

Stalin himself has said, "No important political or organizational problem is *ever* decided by our soviets without definite directives from the Communist Party. Thus the dictatorship of the proletariat is, essentially, the dictatorship of the Party as the only effectively guiding force."

This is absolute fact. Above everything in Russia stands the Communist Party. The Constitution itself provides that candidates for election to the soviets can be nominated only by Communist Party organizations. Thus the Constitution makes the Communist Party the super-power in Russia. Everything in the vast land, down to the very bottom, is controlled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and the Central Committee in turn is controlled by the Politburo.

There are thousands of committees which carry on governmental work in Russia. But no important decision of any of these committees can be put into effect without the explicit sanction of the Politburo. The Politburo determines everything that goes on in Russia. The Politburo decides the attitude of a strictly organized one-fifth of the world toward the loosely associated other four-fifths. The Politburo is the very top of the Communist Party hierarchy and its powers are enormous.

All decisions of the Politburo are made in strictest secrecy, then communicated to the respective committees for direct execution. Although it is the actual directorate of Russia, the Politburo never emerges officially anywhere. But for the fact that its existence as well as the names of its members are known, it could be classified as a secret society with unlimited dictatorial powers.

The Politburo consists of fourteen members, five of whom are alternates. How they are selected no one knows except

the members themselves. Unless they are purged for treasonable activity—as happened in the cases of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Yagoda—theirs is a life tenure. It is, however, an established fact that no one ever reached the Politburo unless he was first a member of the Central Committee. This committee includes in its membership representatives from all nationalities in the Soviet Union, and they are there only because of their long-proved efficiency and strict party loyalty. Naturally, it is the cherished dream of every member of the Communist Party to enter the secret portals of the Politburo. But the road to the top is very hard and tortuous.

The most widely known member of the Politburo is, of course, Stalin himself. He is sixty-seven years old. He kept his post as Secretary General of the Communist Party, meaning its actual boss, which he held ever since the early days of the Soviet regime, until 1943, when he delegated it to Zhdanov. He is Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, or Premier of the Soviet Union. He is also Commander-in-Chief—in fact and not just in name—of all the Soviet Union's armed forces.

Taking the Politburo in alphabetical order, there is Andrei Andreyevich Andreyev. His age is fifty. At one time his party status was somewhat beclouded. That was in the early days when he opposed both Lenin and Stalin in that he wanted the labor unions to run Russian industry and be free of Communist Party control. But he relented and ever since has been one of Stalin's most loyal supporters. Prior to the Revolution he was an agricultural laborer and then a railway switchman. During the Revolution, he took a leading part in organizing the railway workers' union and became its boss. His current functions are of much greater importance. As Chairman of the Party Control Commission, he wields an important voice in the distribution of political patronage. As People's Commissar for Agriculture he carried out the

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collectivization of farm lands and thus insured the food supply of the Soviet Union. He is director of all state and collective farm groups.

Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria is in his early fifties. He is a vice-chairman of the Central Committee. More important, he is People's Commissar of Interior Affairs and as such head of the NKVD, the dreaded Secret Police. Like Stalin, Beria is a Georgian, and Stalin trusts him implicitly. When in 1936 Yagoda, then head of the police, was executed for his participation in the plot against Stalin, Beria took his place,¹ and he has since developed the police power to a degree of all-pervasiveness hitherto unknown in the annals of history. The tremendous police apparatus which controls the life of every Russian is firmly in his hands.²

Then there is Lazar Moisseychovich Kaganovich, the builder of the Moscow subway. He is in his late fifties and the only member of the Politburo who is a Jew. He is also the tallest member, towering considerably above Stalin. When Russia's transportation system became completely snarled, Kaganovich took over and whipped it into shape. It was largely due to his efforts that the Soviet Union's railways and canals were able to carry the tremendous transportation load imposed by the war. He is also People's Commissar of Heavy Industry.

Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, seventy, is the oldest member of the Politburo. He comes from peasant stock and in pre-revolutionary days was a tiller of the soil. He is Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and, as such, titular head of the Soviet State. All foreign diplomats are accredited to him and he appears at all official state functions. People refer to him as the Grandfather of the Revolution.³

¹After a brief interval during which Yezhov headed the NKVD, Yezhov was purged—executed.

²In April, 1946, Beria delegated the direct supervision of the NKVD to Colonel General Kruglev, but he has retained overall control.

³In May, 1946, Kalinin resigned from the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet in favor of Politburo member Shvernik. Two months later Kalinin died.

Fourteen Hierarchs

Communist Party leader in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is Nikita Sergeyevich Krushchov. In his late forties, Krushchov is one of the younger Communist leaders who came into prominence after the Revolution. As the Ukraine is the second largest political unit in the Soviet Union, Krushchov is one of the key men in the political setup. It was largely his zeal and energy, strongly helped by the Secret Police, that defeated all separatist tendencies in the Ukraine during the Nazi invasion. He is head of the autonomous Ukrainian Government and a vice chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Malenkov is vice chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. An old-time Bolshevik, in his late fifties, he knows the membership of the Communist Party as does no other man in Russia. An erstwhile factory worker, his activity as Bolshevik organizer started long before the Revolution. As head of the Orgburo, he controls all political patronage and is also in charge of the tremendous bureaucratic apparatus extending into every corner of Russia. He is reported to have the life history of every important party member at his fingertips.

Comparatively well known abroad is Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, forty-nine, a native of Armenia. One of the younger members of the hierarchy, he rose to his present position as organizer of Russia's great food industries. It was largely due to his efforts that Russia escaped wholesale starvation during the darkest months of the war. Mikoyan is also People's Commissar for Foreign Trade and in this capacity negotiates all trade agreements with foreign nations.

Vyacheslav Molotov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, is almost as familiar a figure abroad as is Stalin himself. In his early fifties, rotund and rather dapper in his brand-new diplomatic uniform with gold trimmings, he is the traveling salesman of the Soviet Union. An old hand in the diplomatic game of give and take, and a repeated visitor in

Washington and London, he is Russia's official mouthpiece abroad. He carries out Russian foreign policy as dictated by the Politburo.

Alexander Sergeyevich Shcherbakov, fifty years old, is boss of the Moscow party machine. With a general's rank, he is also head of the Political Department of the Red Army, and it is his job to hold the army strictly within the lines of party policy. Furthermore, he is high chief of all Soviet propaganda, with dictatorial powers over the press, radio and motion pictures.

The name of Nikolai M. Shvernik is practically never heard abroad, but it has become a virtual byword with every industrial worker in Russia. In his late fifties, an old-time Bolshevik, Shvernik used to control all organized labor in Russia. He is now a vice-chairman of the Supreme Soviet and is believed to be due for the chairmanship in the event of Kalinin's death. He has charge also of Russia's financial set-up.¹

Marshal Klementi Yefremovich Voroshilov, sixty-seven years old, has his name engraved in Russia's revolutionary history. A sailor of the Baltic Fleet in pre-revolutionary days, he organized the sailors into a strong unit at the head of which he marched against the Provisional Government in 1917, which he deposed at Lenin's command. His subsequent rise is well known. During the war he was one of Stalin's closest military advisers. After the German surrender, he headed the Red Army of occupation in Hungary.

Nikolai Ivanovich Voznessensky, in his early forties, is the youngest member of the Politburo. He is one of the new party men who came into prominence after Lenin's death. In spite of his relatively young age, he carries heavy responsibilities. As chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, he is in charge of all state planning, including the Five-Year Plans.

¹ In May, 1946, Shvernik succeeded Kalinin as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

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Alphabetically, Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov is last of the Politburo members, but this is no indication of his real importance. Forty-nine years old and now a Colonel General, Zhdanov is considered *the coming man*. His duties are numerous, and the powers connected with them are great. He did not become a Politburo member until 1934, but from then on his rise was rapid. He is boss of the Leningrad party machine. Most important, he is Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. All political control of the Red Army is centralized in his hands. In this capacity, he is responsible for the coordination of party and army policy, in which task he is assisted by his brother-in-law, Shcherbakov. Furthermore, he is vice-chairman of the Orgburo and has a potent word in the distribution of political patronage. In 1943, Stalin relinquished to him the powerful post of Secretary General of the Communist Party.

These are the top ranking members of the Communist hierarchy. These are the men whose combined word is law throughout the Soviet realm and far beyond its borders. Together, they control every important phase of Russia's political and economic life. And their secret decisions, current and future, will gravely affect the destiny of the entire civilized world.

Who are these men? What is their background, their family life, their human qualities and inclinations? What are their final aims? How do they feel toward the rest of the world?

There is no answer. The plain fact is that nobody knows except themselves, and they do not tell. Beyond the general information just given about each of them, nothing definite is known. They keep their secrets. And the powerful apparatus of the Secret Police—the NKVD—sees to it that these secrets do not leak out. No Great Mogul, emperor, or dictator, was ever guarded so closely as are the members of the Politburo.

* Their names are known, and so are the respective positions they occupy in the Communist Party and the Soviet State. Beyond this, they are unapproachable. They never give any press interviews. (Molotov, during his attendance of conferences abroad, is the only exception, but that is outside Russia.) No foreign correspondent could ever get near any of them. They do not meet foreign diplomats, except in the cases of Stalin and Molotov, and occasionally Kalinin, the latter only at official state functions. They live in the Kremlin, but no foreigner has ever entered their private apartments. Practically all of them are family men, but no foreigner has ever seen their wives or children, and the Russian press is not allowed to carry any stories about their private lives.

American editors have shot all sorts of questions at me with regard to the Politburo members—questions that seem logical and reasonable in the eyes of every American. Are they wealthy? How do they live? What are their hobbies? How do their wives look? How are their children being educated? What are their favorite methods of relaxation? Where do they go and whom do they see?

Silence is the only answer to these questions. At one time I brought up the subject of personalities with a high Russian official, and this is what he told me: "There was a time, many years ago, when Russian ministers and other high officials could be bribed to promote the interests of a foreign power. That will never happen again. The men who rule Russia today are unapproachable and unbribeable. We have seen to that."

As to the question of personal wealth, the Politburo members do not need it—they control all the wealth of Russia. None is wealthy in the accepted sense of the word, and it is doubtful that they have any personal investments. The State sees to it that they have everything they need. For

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themselves and their families they get the best living quarters the country can afford. The State provides them with food, wine, and clothing in abundant quantities; and they can have all the relaxation they want. They are furnished with the best in the way of offices and automobiles. Their children are enrolled in special schools. When they go on longer trips, special trains or planes are at their disposal. In short, they have no economic worries of any sort. But they do not accumulate personal wealth. They have no use for it.

This much can be said. All these men are hard and tireless workers, without a weakling among them. For no weakling could attain their ranks. They are from the people and they all have come up the hard way. They have gone through the vagaries of bitter struggle, have seen death strike so often beside them that human life has lost its meaning. They are neither dreamers nor humanitarians. They are outright materialists. Like Stalin, they consider themselves men of steel, and they hold to their Communist tenets.

They drive themselves as they do others. They judge only by results achieved. They are ruthless and completely impervious to idealistic conceptions. They are probably the starkest realists on earth today. They believe in the *logic of things* and nothing else. Their creed was, is, and remains, Communism. They are Russian patriots because their patriotism is in the interests of Communism. They have dedicated their lives to the Communist State and to the greater tasks ahead. Even family ties do not count with them—some have seen their relatives executed or confined to concentration camps without being emotionally overwhelmed.

Such are the fourteen hierarchs who rule one-fifth of the world today. What their decisions are, nobody knows until these decisions are transformed into action. But that these decisions will affect the entire world, there cannot be the slightest doubt.

CHAPTER V

The Secret Police

LET US SUPPOSE THAT YOU ARE A RESIDENT OF NEW YORK City. You are informed that your mother, residing in St. Louis, is gravely ill. Naturally, you want to be with her. In that event, you would have to go to the New York police to apply for a permit to leave New York, stating where you intend to go and giving your reason for the trip. The New York police would take the matter into consideration. Then they would tell you that, since you aren't a physician, your presence wouldn't help your mother to get well. If, on the other hand, your mother died, nothing would be gained by your presence at her deathbed. People die every day, the police would tell you, and it doesn't mean a thing; others are born every day to take their places. It is more important from the point of view of the State that you stay in New York and attend to your job. Your application for departure is denied.

But let us suppose now that you're one of those fortunate persons who have a bit of party influence. The police would check up with the party leaders you gave as references. The latter would vouch for your political reliability. In that event, the police would give you a permit to depart. They would notify the police in St. Louis of your coming. If you failed to show up in St. Louis, or if you showed up and failed to register with the St. Louis police within twenty-four hours of your arrival, you would be subject to immediate arrest and you would have extreme difficulty in getting off without a jail sentence or at least a stiff fine. Then, when you'd return from

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St. Louis to New York, you'd have to go through the same procedure.

All this is, of course, pure supposition. You don't have to go through this sort of thing in the United States today, and let's hope you never will. But if you were living in the U.S.S.R., it is precisely what you'd have to do.

Let's do some more supposing. Suppose the F.B.I. were to be increased a thousandfold and given the power to enter any citizen's home without a warrant and arrest him, likewise without a warrant. It would round up all members of the Republican, Socialist, Labor, and Communist parties, send them to vast concentration camps in Alaska and keep them there, at least until they renounced their affiliation with any of these parties. It would arrest any man or woman who dared to come out against the Democratic Party—the party in power. It would be given half a million special troops, perfectly trained in all sorts of combat and splendidly equipped with tanks, heavy guns, fighter and bombing planes, flame throwers, and even atomic bombs. These troops would take orders from no one but the F.B.I. They would be sent into any section of the country which might come out in opposition against the Democratic Party and quell this opposition by force of arms. They would be stationed all along the Canadian and Mexican borders. They would not allow any citizen of the United States to cross the border into Canada or Mexico unless he had a special visa from the F.B.I.—a visa he could not obtain unless he was a member of the Democratic Party and received special sanction from the party bosses to cross into either Canada or Mexico. These troops would prevent any Canadian or Mexican, or a citizen of any other country, from entering the United States unless he had secured beforehand a permit from F.B.I. headquarters to enter.

Visualize all this and you will have but a partial picture of the Russian Secret Police—the NKVD.

Police power is nothing new in Russia; it has always been an intrinsic part of the Russian governmental system. In the days of the Czarist regime, every man, woman, and child in Russia, whether foreigner or Russian, had to carry a passport. This passport had to be registered and stamped by the police of the precinct in which the person resided. Whenever he left town, whether it was permanently or just for a visit, his passport had to be registered-out with the police of his precinct and registered-in with the police of the town to which he went. If he neglected to do this within twenty-four hours of his arrival, he had to give an explanation to the police. However, as a rule he was let off with a stern warning never to do it again. If he moved his residence within the same town but from one precinct to another, he had to go through the same process of passport registration. By this means, the police knew at all times where any person lived.

But—and this is important—the citizen of Czarist Russia did not have to ask the police for *permission* to travel. All he had to do was to register prior to his departure and on his arrival. He could travel freely from town to town. The citizen of Communist Russia cannot do this. Unless the police allow him to leave, which they very rarely do, he must stay put. He must live where the government, through the police, tells him to live, whether he likes it or not.

So long as the average Russian stays where he is and abstains from agitation against the government and the Communist system, he remains happily unaware of the very existence of the Secret Police. But the moment he is indiscreet enough to make any utterances which can be construed as being opposed to the Communist regime, he becomes only too well aware of their existence. He is pounced upon instantly by the Secret Police, and so are all his relatives and friends. Third-degree methods in Russia are as drastic as elsewhere, perhaps even more so. As a rule, the guilty one is not seen

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again unless he survives a stretch of years in the concentration camp, and then he returns a man more dead than alive, and one whose will is utterly broken. The Communist Government has no use for people opposed to it; it is not in the least concerned whether they die or stay alive.

If you are a foreigner in Russia, you are constantly aware of the Secret Police. In the first place, you cannot get a visa for entry into Russia without NKVD approval. If the NKVD does not want you, you stay out; it makes no difference who you are. If you are admitted, you are met by the NKVD at the port of entry. Your papers and credentials are carefully examined and the purpose of your coming is gone into most thoroughly. If the Secret Police is not satisfied with your answers, you are detained until all questions concerning yourself have been cleared up. If you are admitted, news of your coming is flashed all along the route and the police at your point of destination are promptly advised. You cannot stop along the way except with special police permission.

Once you arrive at your point of destination, you must immediately register with the police. One or more NKVD agents are assigned to watch you at all times. They follow you around wherever you go. If you stop to speak to a Russian, they usually do not interfere, but the Russian is promptly summoned to the nearest police station and asked what you said to him. In 9,999 cases out of 10,000 he tells immediately; he knows the concentration camp faces him if he doesn't. If the conversation was along general lines, nothing more comes of it. But if you inquired into matters that you weren't supposed to know—and the Secret Police is the only judge of what those matters are—you are promptly summoned to the police office and given a stern warning to desist. If you ignore the warning, you are invited to leave the country without delay. So it is natural, in view of this process, that the average Russian prefers not to talk to foreigners or to have them talk

to him. He develops an anti-foreign complex.

Foreign diplomats in particular are the objects of police vigilance and are followed everywhere by NKVD agents. If they complain about it to the authorities, they are told that such is the practice in Soviet Russia. Once Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, the British Ambassador, complained to Stalin in person about the detectives who always kept on his tail. Stalin simply laughed, saying that he himself had to submit to the same thing. It was something that could not be changed. It was part of the system.

The Communist Secret Police came into being shortly after Lenin's rise to power. It was organized by the notorious Djerjinsky, a Polish Communist, and was then known as the *Cheka*. This was a contraction of its full name, *Chrezvychainaya Kommissiya dlya Borby protiv Kontr-revolvyutzii i Speculatzii* (Extraordinary Commission for the Fight against Counter-revolution and Speculation). The *Cheka* was known for its utter ruthlessness and callousness. Its victims were numbered by the million. Stories about its excesses circulated all over the world. Some of them were undoubtedly exaggerated, but the great majority were true. I was in Russia during the early days of the *Cheka* and I know.

When Djerjinsky was assassinated, his chief assistant Yagoda, a Communist from Galicia, took charge. The *Cheka* had become a byword for terrorism throughout the civilized world and Yagoda reorganized it, changing the name to GPU, a contraction of *Glavnoye Politzeiskoye Upravleniye*, meaning Chief Police Administration. But though the Secret Police changed its name, it did not change its methods. Its objective remained the ruthless suppression of everything opposed to the Communist State. The GPU merely improved on *Cheka* methods and carried on where the *Cheka* had left off.

In 1936, Stalin himself came to feel the claw of the monster

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which he and Lenin had created. Yagoda allied himself with Stalin's enemies, principal among whom were Zinoviev and Kamenev, in a plot to overthrow Stalin. For a few days it was a nip-and-tuck affair, but then the Stalin faction gained the upper hand. The opposing faction was ruthlessly purged. Yagoda, with his fellow conspirators, was executed.

Stalin was going to take no more chances. He looked for a man whom he could trust implicitly. He chose Beria, who subjected the police structure to a thorough overhauling. Once again the name was changed, this time to NKVD. This is a contraction of *Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennykh Dyel*, meaning People's Commissariat of Domestic Affairs.

Beria expanded the Secret Police beyond anything that had ever been known before. To prevent the occurrence of new conspiracies, the NKVD was given complete supervision of every phase of national life. Prohibition to travel without police permission is just a small part of total police rule. It is, of course, impossible to state the actual number of men the NKVD has at its disposal, but modest estimates go far beyond the million mark. Given a general's rank, Beria organized the pick of young Communists from the Red Army into special NKVD troops, with their own armor, artillery, and air force. These troops wear special uniforms and blue-and-red caps distinguishing them from the rest of Russia's armed forces. Their number is estimated at over 400,000. In peacetime they guard Russia's frontiers and are held in readiness to quell any possible disorders in the interior. During the war, they entered the reconquered territories in the wake of the Red Army and made quick work of any traitors and Nazi collaborators they discovered. They then proceeded into the countries occupied by the Red Army, where they helped the new leftist regimes to gain a firm foothold and organize their own Secret Police systems. They also supervised the deportation to Russia of all elements of the population considered dangerous to the new

puppet regimes. For the successful way in which his forces maintained the Communist order in Russia throughout the war, Beria was awarded the rank of marshal in 1945.¹

All foreigners in Russia are looked upon as spies, but foreign correspondents are placed in a special class—that of super-spies. Their movements are watched by the Secret Police even more carefully than those of foreign diplomats. It is the NKVD that conducts them on specially mapped tours of the country. It is also the NKVD that decides what they are to see and what must remain hidden from their inquisitive eyes. This does not always work out, and, when a foreign correspondent on his return home reports something to which he was supposed to close his eyes, the Russian Communist press is loud in denunciation. When William L. White divulged his Russian experiences in his *Report on the Russians*, he was promptly branded a traitor and enemy of the Soviet Union.

But foreigners in Russia are not the only individuals over whom the Secret Police keeps a careful watch. The life and activities of every Communist Party member are under continuous observation by the NKVD. The higher a Communist climbs on the ladder of party hierarchy, the more strictly he is watched by the Secret Police. The idea is that the higher his position in the Communist State, the more harmful he could become if he turned traitor. Hence a Secret Police dossier is kept on every party member.

Politburo members are watched more vigilantly than anyone else, even foreigners. Wherever a Politburo member moves, he is always surrounded by an invisible but nevertheless ever-present NKVD guard.² The official doings as well

¹ In April, 1946, Beria turned direct command of the NKVD over to Colonel General Kruglev. Today, Beria has the over-all task of integrating the secret police systems of the satellite nations with that of the Soviet Union.

² The Mozhaik Road along which Politburo members pass daily on their way to their Kremlin offices, is at all times guarded by more than 4,000 NKVD agents. Only persons certified by the NKVD are allowed to reside on the Mozhaik Road.

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as the private lives of Politburo members remain a jealously guarded secret to the outside world, but they and their families live in a glass house, so far as the Secret Police is concerned. The NKVD knows everything about them. This police supervision extends even to Stalin himself. It is an intrinsic part of the Communist State.

When Russia's influence extends across her national borders, so does the activity of the Secret Police. The moment the Red Army occupies a neighboring country, a Secret Police force along NKVD lines is instantly called into being. Even where so-called Democratic Front governments are formed, the man in charge of the police is invariably a veteran Communist. This happened in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Yugoslavia, and other countries. This is done in order to prevent any attempt against the Communist way of doing things.

Perhaps, when the entire world has been firmly converted to the Communist principle, the Secret Police system will be abolished as no longer required. But this is rank speculation. Thus far, wherever Communism has gained a controlling foothold in a government, the Russian Secret Police system has promptly been installed as over-all boss.

CHAPTER VI

Sons of the Soil

NINE OUT OF EVERY TEN AMERICAN FARMERS WITH WHOM I talked shot at me the identical question as soon as they learned that I knew something about Russia. The question, phrased differently on different occasions, amounted to this: How could an overwhelmingly agricultural people like the Russians, a people so firmly rooted in the native soil, go completely Communist in the course of a few years? Ownership of the productive land is the most ingrained property right because it is a strictly individual right. It is a more individual right than the ownership of a town home or of city apartments. A person firmly rooted in his piece of productive land will do almost anything in preference to giving it up. How was it possible that the tens of millions of Russian landed peasants, the backbone of the nation, so we are told, gave up their rights of ownership and accepted the Communist principle of collective exploitation of their soil?

The question is definitely logical from the point of view of the individual American farmer. However, the foundation upon which it is based is not. The point is that the Russian peasant, unlike the peasants and farmers of Western countries, *never* was an individual owner of the productive land; that is to say, at least not for the past five centuries. This was a development typical of the Russian way of life, and one which has its roots in ancient Russian history and tradition.

Because of her geographical location across the main invasion route from Asia to Europe, Russia could never become

a nation of individual farmsteads. Individual farmers would not have been able to defend themselves successfully against the periodic invasions of the vast nomadic hordes pressing from east to west. The rural population was forced to live in village communities which could be surrounded by stockades and defended with some chance of success. Harsh necessity compelled the Russian peasant to adopt a village type of life from the very beginning of Russia's history. However, though the peasants lived in villages, the arable land surrounding the villages was divided into fields that formed the property of the individual holder.

The Tatar invasion changed all that. Early in the thirteenth century, a fierce and militant nomadic people of Mongolian origin, the Tatars, swept over Russia in tremendous hordes and conquered the country. But the conquerors did not settle in Russia. They withdrew to the borders of Russia, to the vast steppes that form the frontier region between Europe and Asia, and there they continued their patriarchal, nomadic way of life. To be able to live in comfort and luxury as be-hooved the conquerors of a great country, the Tatars levied an annual tribute in kind from the Russian people. For two hundred long years, the Russians had to work first for the Tatars and only then for themselves.

The Tatar Emperor, or Khan, appointed his officials for the collection of the tribute. These officials quickly discovered that to collect from millions of Russian peasants directly would be a practical impossibility. So they made the various Russian princes individually responsible for the collection of the tribute. The princes, in turn, relegated the responsibility to their *boyars*, or nobles, in the various districts.

The collection of this tribute forms one of the darkest chapters in Russian history. The amount payable to the Tatar Khan was firmly fixed. But the Khan's collectors wanted to live, so they added their share to the total. The Russian

princes, quick to perceive the advantages to be gained, added another rich share for themselves. And, on top of everything, the nobles imposed their portion. The tribute demanded of the individual peasant grew to mountainous proportions with the result that he simply could not pay.

Whenever the peasant failed to deliver, stiff fines were imposed on him. These fines kept accumulating. When the peasant's debt reached a point where he could no longer be considered solvent, he forfeited his arable land to the nobles. In turn, the nobles hired the peasants in the capacity of common agricultural laborers to till their expropriated land for the collection of the tribute. The wages paid were so low that the peasants never could accumulate sufficient savings with which to repurchase their land. As a consequence, the standard of living of the Russian peasant sank to incredibly low levels.

At times some of the nobles, discontented with the decisions of their prince, banded together and revolted. In most cases, the prince, aided by hired mercenaries as well as other princes, defeated the revolting nobles. He exiled them, took over the land they had stolen from the peasants and added it to his own domain. Thus two classes of landed proprietors grew up side by side—the princes and the nobles. Between them, the peasants became both propertyless and penniless. By the time Russia freed herself from Tatar domination, there was not one land-owning peasant left in the country.

The Prince of Moscow proved more cunning than the others. He inveigled the nobles of other principalities to turn against their princes. With the help of the corrupt nobility, he eventually liquidated all the other princes, added their domains to his own and thus formed the Czardom of Muscovy, which later became the Russian Empire. The personal landed holdings of the liquidated princes were converted into holdings of the Crown, which thus became the owner of almost one-half

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of the productive land in Russia. The other half continued to belong to the nobles. And the countless millions of landless peasants had to work for both. They were still free to hire themselves out to whichever landed proprietor they preferred, but economic conditions worked toward a relentless denouement that was to take even this last liberty from them.

In a primitive and thinly populated agricultural country where the demand for agricultural labor greatly exceeds the supply, the value of the land stood in direct proportion to the number of permanent laborers settled on it. The landed proprietors naturally tried to attract to their estates as many peasants as possible. In this competition the larger and richer proprietors, because of the inducements they could offer, held a considerable advantage over their smaller rivals. As a result, the majority of smaller proprietors became so impoverished that they were no longer able to fulfil their duties toward the State and found themselves threatened with wholesale bankruptcy. They petitioned Czar Theodore I, and about the year 1590, he promulgated a law prohibiting the migration of peasants from one estate to another.

However, it was not the wish of the Czar to turn the peasants into absolute serfs. The law left them one infinitesimal particle of their one-time liberty. It set aside one day in the year on which the peasants were allowed to move from one estate to another. That was St. George's Day, late in autumn, when all harvesting work was done.

And so the peasant who was dissatisfied with conditions kept his eye focused on St. George's Day. It was the one day of the year when he was free to do as he pleased, when he was master of his own destiny. For weeks before St. George's Day, he kept inquiring as to which landed proprietors offered more or less tolerable conditions and which others drove their peasants like slaves. But the proprietors, too, knew what was coming. Usually, beginning a month or so before St. George's

Day, they treated their peasants with great benevolence.

Not that it helped much, as a rule. The peasant had just one prerogative left, and because it was his only prerogative, he was determined to use it, if only out of deviltry. St. George's Day found all Russian roads clogged with peasant families, carrying their meager personal belongings on their backs or in hastily hammered pushcarts, moving from one estate to another. Fully 90 per cent of Russia's population were peasants, and the peasants were on the move. For weeks thereafter, while both peasant and proprietor adjusted themselves to the new conditions, Russian agricultural life was at a standstill.

In 1762, Catherine II ascended the throne. A German princess by birth who had achieved the Russian throne via a series of intricate and not always legitimate circumstances, including the assassination of her husband, Peter III, she was never considered by the Russian masses as one of their own. In fact, the peasants called her the *Mistress of the Antichrist*. She relied for support on the nobles, who were on the lookout for their benefits as a class. Among other things they pressed for the abolition of the peasants' prerogative of St. George's Day.

And so, about 1770, without warning, there came the imperial *ukase* forbidding the peasant to move on St. George's Day. The countless millions of Russian peasants were attached for life to the estates on which they happened to live. It was the most disastrous news the peasant had had in almost two centuries. To this day, in the face of great adversity, it has become axiomatic in Russia to say, "And there, grandmother, you have St. George's Day!"

The new law, establishing as it did serfdom in perpetuity, led to great abuses. The peasants, no longer able to change their domicile and to seek new employers, practically fell under the unlimited power of the proprietors on whose land

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they resided. The proprietor became the Russian equivalent of the American slaveholder, the only difference being that his slaves were whites and constituted the overwhelming majority of the Russian people. The proprietor became the supreme law force over his peasants. He could mete out fines and corporal punishment at his pleasure. He could despoil beautiful young peasant girls without fear of retribution. He could break up peasant families at will by selling or trading his peasants to other proprietors as just so many heads of cattle. The result was an utter demoralization of peasant family life.

Slowly the realization began to sink in that this servitude could not continue without seriously endangering Russia's position as a modern power. There was much talk but little action until 1861, when Czar Alexander II undertook the drastic step which laid the foundation for today's triumph of Communism in Russia. All Russian peasants were emancipated by imperial decree. They were no longer serfs. They were free; they could go wherever they pleased.

To emancipate the peasant without giving him at the same time sufficient land of his own on which to work for himself, would have been not only folly but a national economic disaster. Therefore the Government set out to provide the land. It bought up all the smaller estates, which would have been doomed to bankruptcy under the new order. The small proprietors liked this solution because it brought immediate cash into their impoverished tills. They turned their backs on the land and went into trade and industry. The Government took also approximately one-half of the vast land holdings of the Crown and added it to the peasant land pool.

But a new complication arose. As a class, the peasant was uneducated and devoid of the spirit of enterprise. He had lived too long under the retarding patriarchal system of landed proprietors to be able to shift for himself all at once.

If the land were given to him outright as a personal possession, he would not hold it long. The more enterprising among the peasants, and also the large landed proprietors, would quickly buy it up and the vast majority of peasants would again be landless.

To guard against this, a typically Russian system was introduced. The peasant was *not* made a private landed proprietor. The only land that he received outright was the small plot on which stood his straw-thatched hut. All the rest of the land was given to the village community, and the community had no right to dispose of it. Under this system all meadowland became communal pasture. All woodland served as a communal source of timber and firewood. All arable land was turned over to the council of village elders as managers.

The arable land of a village community was divided into parcels. Each spring the elders came together and distributed the parcels among the individual peasants for that single season's tillage. Naturally each peasant wanted a parcel close to home. Therefore the parcels nearest to the village were distributed first. Then came the distribution of parcels farther away, and finally that of the parcels located on the distant periphery of the village holdings. Whatever crops the individual peasant harvested during the growing season from the parcels allotted to him were his own. From them he paid his taxes and his only too frequent debts. What was left served to tide him over the winter. More often than not, it didn't, and he had to go deeper into debt.

As each peasant was allotted several parcels which usually were located miles from one another, his agricultural work evolved into a tedious, time-wasting process. Furthermore, he never knew whether he would be allotted the identical parcels the following spring, and as a rule he wasn't. Under such conditions he could not be expected to develop any sense of

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landed property rights. The only right he understood was the community property right. Thus the system introduced by Czar Alexander II was really one of typically Russian local communism long before Communism as such emerged as a world force. The countless millions of Russian peasants were local communists without realizing it.

Naturally, since the peasant had the use of his land parcels for only the current season, he tried to get everything he could out of the land, without worrying about who came after him. Russian soil is good, but even the best soil in the world could not produce abundant crops under a system that robbed it of its fertility. The soil grew poorer and poorer, and the peasant got less and less out of it. His crops were meager compared with those of the large estates and the domains of the Crown which practiced scientific agriculture.

Then, too, the Russian peasant belongs to a highly prolific race. Many young people went to the cities to hire out in industrial work, but even at that the village population increased apace while the acreage of communal land remained the same. As a result, the parcels grew smaller and the peasant got even less out of the soil. He developed an ever-increasing land hunger. He cast avid eyes on the large estates and the domains of the Crown.

When Lenin seized power in the name of the Communist Party, he realized that he could never retain it unless he took over the Russian peasant. To accomplish this, Lenin did something utterly at variance with Communist principles. He dispossessed all estate owners without compensation. Then he told the peasants to grab the land for themselves, which they promptly did. And since Lenin had given them the land, they were all his loyal followers.

But the peasants did something else. When Lenin ordered them to grab the land, he told them that the estate owners were exploiters of the common man. Exploiters, according to

the peasant way of thinking, deserved to be put to death. Furthermore, the estate owners had practiced scientific agriculture, using modern farm machinery. These machines were foreign importations. They had helped the estate owners to enrich themselves and therefore were products of the devil. They had to be destroyed.

The peasants swarmed over the large estates. They pulled the estate owners out of bed and put them to death. They raped the women and cast them adrift. They plundered the mansions and set them afire. They broke all farm machinery to pieces and lit bonfires. In Moscow, Lenin and the Communist leaders literally pulled their hair in desperation, but the gigantic wave of destruction could not be stopped. When it was all over, the peasants had the land--and nothing with which to work it.

Overnight the Russian peasant had become an individually landed proprietor. It was something so perplexing that he did not know what to do about it. He had been brought up in the system of communal land ownership, and the responsibilities of personal ownership were more than he could grasp. And he did not have the tools with which to till all this land. He was in despair.

The disastrous result was not long in coming. One of the richest grain-producing countries in the world, the granary of Europe only a few years ago, fell victim to the most desperate famine in its long history. It is estimated that more than 3,000,000 people died of starvation.

When the combined effects of drought and underproduction, which caused the famine, were slowly being overcome, Stalin and the Communist Party decided that drastic steps must be taken to safeguard the country against any such recurrence. All farm land had to be collectivized. Also, as a result of the famine and subsequent developments, a special class of peasant had come into being--the enterprising peasant who bought

up the land of poorer peasants and hired them to work for him. This type of peasant was called *kulak*, which meant, the fist. If he were allowed to continue unchecked, he would in time become a danger to the Communist State.

For political reasons Stalin interlaced his program for the collectivization of all farm lands with the systematic destruction of the *kulaks*. Being of an enterprising nature and therefore individualists, the *kulaks* were expected to oppose collectivization. In any Western country the *kulaks* would have been considered distinct assets to society, but in the Communist State they were a menace. They were rounded up and sent to hard labor in the concentration camps of the northern wilderness, where as a class they disappeared. Their lands were confiscated and added to the collective farms.

A Russian collective farm is something of an agricultural trust. Land, labor, and machinery are pooled under expert management. The managers are appointed from the ranks of the Communist Party. The crop of a collective farm is turned over to the State after a sufficient amount has first been set aside to cover the personal needs of the peasants and their families. A considerable part of this crop represents taxes to the State, the rest goes to the State at low prices set arbitrarily by the State. The proceeds, less the operation costs of the collective farm, are distributed among the peasants in the form of wages which are based on the amount of work put in during the season. These proceeds do not exceed 10 per cent of the crop value; at times they are less. The house in which the peasant lives is his own and so is an adjoining plot of ground on which he raises vegetables and fruit for his own consumption.

When the Communist State took over, the extensive domains of the Crown were converted into state farms. These are operated on the same principle as the collective farms. The farm workers receive the same allotment of the crop for their

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personal needs and a wage which roughly corresponds to the proceeds of the collective farmers. The income bracket of the two is about the same.

All farm lands in Russia today are either state farms or collective farms. There are no individual owners of productive land. All is controlled by the Communist State.

After the *kulaks* were liquidated, the overwhelming majority of peasants accepted collectivization as the only sensible solution. For centuries the Russian peasant had known only the patriarchal system of agriculture under the proprietors and the communistic system under the villages. Both were much the same in that they relieved him of individual responsibility. His very brief tenure of private ownership had ended in disaster. Individual responsibility frightened him. He was only too glad to have the State and the collectives take over. Today he is perfectly satisfied to form the principal bulwark of the Communist State so long as the State assures him a living.

CHAPTER VII

How Soviet Industry Operates

BECAUSE OF HER HISTORY, TRADITION, AND THE MENTALITY of her people, Russia has always been a direct opposite of the United States. At all times, Russia has stood for the majesty of the State as against the freedom of the individual. At all times, Russian mentality considered human lives as a cheap price to pay when it came to the preservation of the omnipotent State. At all times, the average Russian counted for nothing and the State for everything.

At times the Russian colossus stuck its head out of the window into the strange doings of the outside world, but each time it was for the sole purpose of putting a stop to the clamor of the individual for his rights and to reassert the majesty of the State. It was a Russian Czar, Alexander I, who talked Austria and Prussia into forming the Holy Alliance with Russia in 1815. Ostensibly it was to keep a thoroughly defeated France within bounds; actually, the Holy Alliance was an instrument for the preservation of Statism, for the submerision of the right of the individual which had asserted itself in the American and French revolutions. The Big Three of 130 years ago had as their principal purpose the keeping of freedom-loving man in his place as a slave of the all-powerful State.

It was a Russian Czar, Nicholas I, who sent his armies across the Carpathians to crush the Hungarians when they attempted to assert their freedom against the encroaching Austrian State. It was the same Russian Czar who stood by

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with military help after counseling the King of Prussia to crush the revolution in Germany. It was a Russian Empress who drowned the patriotic uprising of the Poles in streams of Polish blood. Wherever and whenever the voice of individual freedom spoke up in Europe, Russia was on hand to suppress it.

American history and tradition, short as it is compared with that of Russia, has always championed the right of the individual against the power of the State. To American shores flowed the broad stream of all the oppressed peoples in Europe. It was here that they found a safe haven and a guarantee of their human rights. The American pioneer went westward and conquered a continent, not with the military might of a centralized State behind him, but out of his own initiative, with nothing but the spirit of free enterprise to guide him. American pioneers opened rich farm lands, established trading posts, spanned the continent with railroads, telegraph and telephone wires, opened schools and built up industrial empires. The State sat back, regulating matters but never superimposing itself on the spirit of the individual. And this spirit of the freedom-loving individual was responsible for the forging of America.

But it was the centralized power of the State which made Russia. Like America, Russia conquered a continent, but at all times it was the State which did the conquering. Russians did not go overseas to escape the power of an all-embracing State and to open new fields of individual endeavor. Russia developed from a very small but solid nationalistic nucleus. The nucleus spread in all directions, engulfing neighboring peoples and compelling them to the Russian way of doing things. Even when Russian pioneers ventured into the unknown they did it as servitors of the State. When Yermak and his handful of Cossacks overran Siberia, he returned to Moscow and placed the rich prize at the feet of Czar Ivan

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the Terrible as the embodiment of the State. That was where the prize belonged. Russia's greatness was accomplished by force of arms, by the armed might of the centralized State. It was and is the Russian tradition.

In the United States, pre-revolutionary Russia was believed to be part of the capitalist system, the system of free enterprise. She was nothing of the sort. Russian industry from its very inception was developed by the State. In the few instances where foreign capital was admitted, the industries which it created were strictly controlled by the State. Private enterprise was never permitted to gain a position from which it would dare to challenge the State.

In Russia before the Revolution, 90 per cent of all railroads were built and operated by the State. The remaining 10 per cent, though constructed by private (principally foreign) capital, were under the direct control and supervision of the government through the Ministry of Communications, which ran the government-owned lines also. The entire telegraph network was built and operated by the State. All public utilities such as streetcar and bus lines, telephone networks, power plants, and waterworks were, in almost every instance, owned and operated by the municipalities. All harbor and port facilities throughout Russia belonged to the State.

The entire munitions industry of Russia, whatever the location of individual plants, was owned by the State. A government bent on continual expansion of its borders by force of arms could not allow private enterprise in this important industrial branch. All such factories belonged outright either to the Ministry of War or that of the Navy. The Sestroretsk Rifle Factory near the Finnish border, the Zlatoust Cold Arms Works in the Urals, the Kazan Powder Works on the Volga, the Motovilikha Gun Arsenal on the Kama, the Tula Arsenal near Moscow, to mention just a few of a great number, were all run by army officers. Likewise, all naval yards,

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gun arsenals, and shell loading plants were run by naval officers. Locomotive works were run by government officials, and so all along the line.

Private capital was admitted to mining and certain heavy industries, but invariably the State demanded a block of stock in exchange for the concession and appointed government inspectors to take care of the State's interests. The only phase of the country's industrial apparatus open to private enterprise was light industry and the production of consumer goods; excluded was the entire liquor industry which was completely State-owned, including even all retail liquor stores. But even in the field of consumer goods, the enterprises had to be licensed by the State and were at all times subject to its control and seizure. There was no phase of Russia's industrial life where the Government did not have its say.

Under such a setup, it was a simple matter for Lenin to nationalize all industry as soon as he had seized the power, especially since the greater part of privately invested capital represented foreign investments. The miracle of it was that this nationalization had not happened before.

Today all Russian industry without exception is owned and operated by the Communist State. The various plants and factories are run by government-appointed directorates and managers; these jobs are among the juiciest plums of the Communist Party. At the higher level the plants are organized into gigantic state trusts, each along its line, such as the Textile Trust, the Electric Trust, the Steel Trust, the Paper Trust, and others. The directorates of these trusts, likewise Communist-appointed, are responsible to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and its counterpart, the People's Commissariat of Light Industry.

All trade is likewise owned and operated by the State through the People's Commissariat of Domestic Trade, and

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with all agriculture also in the hands of the Government, through its state and collective farms, there is no job in the whole of Russia which is not controlled by the Communist Party.

It is not only impossible but utterly unthinkable for a private individual to open and run a factory, a shop, a wholesale business, or even a retail store in Russia.

CHAPTER VIII

What Are Russian Labor Unions?

RUSSIAN LABOR UNIONS—*Professionalnye Soyusy*, AS THEY are called in Russian—were started in the last decade of the nineteenth century under the Czarist regime. They were strictly trade unions after the Western pattern. The Czarist authorities frowned upon the movement, but it made rapid progress. By 1905, organized labor had become so potent a movement that in September of that year it staged a general strike throughout the country in reply to the Government's refusal to grant constitutional guarantees. The strike was rightly described as the most remarkable political phenomenon of modern times. For days, the whole mechanism of civilized existence in Russia was at a complete standstill and all intercourse with the outside world was cut off, until at last the government yielded.

Organized labor, although still but a minor factor in a poorly industrialized country, had had its taste of power. *Zabastovka*—the Russian word for "strike"—was recognized as a potent weapon which organized labor wielded freely and which produced much faster improvement in the lot of the organized workers as compared with that of the unorganized peasants.

When Lenin prepared to seize the power, he knew that only organized labor could make his seizure a *fait accompli*. Russian Communist leaders, probably the greatest opportunists in the world, do not miss a single trick. In return for its support, Lenin promised organized labor a virtually au-

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onomous status within the new State, just as he had told the peasants to grab the land; although both promises were diametrically opposed to the Communist conception of things and the revolutionary leaders had not the slightest intention of abiding by them. But the labor unions believed in the promise, and accomplished the revolution for Lenin.

A Government of the Workers and Peasants, as the Communist regime called itself, could not very well plunge into wholesale reprisals against its workers and peasants, at least not from the outset. And so organized labor, like the peasants, was given a breathing spell. As a matter of fact, Russian labor unions attained their greatest prominence during the first years of the Soviet regime, and labor leaders hobnobbed with Communist leaders on almost equal footing.

But as with the peasants, the honeymoon between labor leaders and Communists did not last long. The Communist Party leadership learned quickly that politically active labor was largely unproductive labor. When Stalin began his industrialization drive and introduced piece wages instead of the hour wages which organized labor had gained for itself during the Czarist regime, the big war was on. The independent trade unions rose like one man and strikes spread throughout the Soviet Union. It was in those days that A. A. Andreyev, now a prominent member of the all-powerful Politburo, had his differences with Stalin when he advocated trade union independence from the Party.

However, Andreyev submitted. The independent labor leaders were ruthlessly purged. The Secret Police stepped in. Wherever striking workers refused to return to their plants, they were stood up against the wall and shot, or sent to concentration camps for terms ranging from ten years and up. Communist bosses were put in charge of the trade unions, and all recalcitrant elements were turned over to the Secret Police for liquidation. It was the end of Russia's independen

trade union movement—in fact, its death knell.

Today 90 per cent of Russia's workers are on a piece wage scale. The only industries still adhering to the hour wage are those where a piece scale is technically impractical. Moreover, the prevailing method of wage computation is that of *progressive piece rates*. It is a method virtually unknown today in this country and one which no American labor union will ever permit so long as it has a voice in the matter; that is to say, so long as it is dealing with private employers. Its very principle militates against the American way of doing things.

As an illustration how this *progressive piece rate* works in practice, let us take a skilled worker in a Russian tractor plant. Suppose his job is to produce a certain tractor part. Suppose he is paid one ruble—the Russian monetary standard, just now the approximate equivalent of twenty cents at the prevailing official rate of exchange—for each produced part. Suppose he has to turn out one such part every hour. His pay for an eight-hour working day thus would amount to eight rubles, although today practically every worker in Russia works considerably more than eight hours daily. If he produces less than one part per hour he is severely penalized. If his production drops to only six parts in eight hours, his piece rate is drastically reduced. He then receives only 60 kopecks (100 kopecks is one ruble) for each part, meaning that a 25 per cent drop in his individual production brings the punishment of cutting his pay more than 40 per cent. Should his production drop below the 25 per cent mark, he is reported to the Secret Police and may face a jail sentence for industrial sabotage. How would an American labor union enjoy anything like that?

However, there is also a brighter side. If the same worker produces ten parts within eight hours, his piece rate per part shoots up to 1.5 rubles. If he manages to produce twelve

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parts within the same period of time his piece rate becomes 2 rubles. In short, the more parts he produces within the specified time, the higher is his piece rate. Under this system, a particularly efficient worker may earn two and three times the regular pay.

It would seem that efficient workers could easily reach a high income bracket. Actually this is not the case, for the simple reason that they work under the Communist system. Piece rates in Russia are fixed arbitrarily by the plant management acting under the directives of the Communist Party. As soon as a few efficient workers in a plant have succeeded in increasing their individual performance consistently, the plant management raises the performance standard—called the *norm*—of all workers to the figure attained by the few. Thus not only does the efficient worker find himself put back to his former piece rate, but all his colleagues are faced with severe penalties unless they keep up with his production pace. Neither the labor union nor the individual worker has any voice in the fixing of piece rates and production standards. It is one of the most ruthless driving devices of the Communist Party.

Today there are labor unions all over Russia. All workers belong to them. But these unions have not the slightest shred of independence. They are mere tools for the strengthening of the Communist system. Their main function is political: to hold the workers in line for the policies of the government. They cannot bargain for wages and hours or negotiate labor contracts after the fashion of American labor unions. In Russia the government is the only employer, and the thesis is that it does not enter any contracts with its employees; it determines the labor policy and expects to be obeyed implicitly.

One of the principal functions of the Communist labor union is to eradicate absenteeism. Russian workers cannot

stay away from their jobs for any other reason except certified illness. If the worker is absent for any other personal reason he is immediately reported by the labor union. The first such time, he is assessed a stiff fine, and the union publicly brands him a shirker. If he is absent another time, he goes to jail. When Eric Johnston, President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, during his government-conducted tour of Russia in the summer of 1944, asked a Russian plant executive what was being done in Russia about absenteeism, the executive looked at him puzzledly and said, "You mean, illness?"

"No, just plain absenteeism," reported Mr. Johnston, and explained what he meant by it.

The Russian plant executive smiled in a condescending sort of way and said, "I don't know. We don't have any."

All Russian labor union bosses are in fact appointed by the Communist Party, although the same election method is used as in the case of the local soviets. All labor unions, representing some 25,000,000 workers, send their delegates, which are elected from lists okayed by the Communist Party, to the All-Union Trades Soviet. This Soviet elects a group of fifty-five delegates to an executive committee, in this case called the Plenum. This Plenum elects a Presidium consisting of eighteen delegates. These eighteen in turn elect a chairman, who is in fact the boss of all Russian labor unions. The repeated weeding-out process assures that only delegates handpicked by the Politburo can reach the Presidium.

All union bosses are members of the party hierarchy and receive their orders straight from Moscow. They carry out these orders along the lines of strict party discipline. All Russian workers pay union dues. Union bosses and delegates are paid from those dues; the rest goes into Communist Party coffers. Union delegates make a great show of looking after the workers' hygienic conditions at the plant, espe-

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cially the maintenance of nurseries and kindergartens for the small children while their parents are at work. That is about the extent of their authority.

On the matter of direct working conditions, including hours of work and piece wages, the plant management—and the Communist Party behind it—has the only say. Featherbedding and “made” jobs, as we have them in the United States, are entirely nonexistent.

Workers in Communist Russia are prohibited by law to strike. The government is the only employer and you cannot strike against your government. It is treason and carries the death penalty without any right of appeal. The Soviet Government remembers only too well the general strike of 1905 which brought about the Czarist regime’s capitulation to constitutional demands. There is to be no repetition of that.

Currently, Vassili Vassilyevich Kuznetsov is chairman of the All-Union Trades Soviet and undisputed boss of Russia’s labor. He is the American equivalent of Green, Murray, and Lewis merged into one. Kuznetsov, a highly educated man of forty-four, lived at one time in the United States and was graduated from the Carnegie Institute of Technology. He also worked at one time for the Ford Motor Company. Needless to say, he is prominent among the Communist Party hierarchy and is a member of the Supreme Soviet as well.

At the time this book was written, Kuznetsov was a visitor in the United States, having been invited by the CIO, and was doing intensive propaganda work in favor of the Russian Communist way of doing things. He declared at a press interview that the Russian labor unions are “the most democratic in the world, based on voluntary membership, on voluntary dues payment, and on democratic election of all officials.” He refuted American Federation of Labor charges that Russian labor unions were creatures of the State by simply stating that such charges were “made by enemies of the labor

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movement.” When asked whether Russian workers are permitted to strike, he said, “All disputes are ironed out amicably between representatives of labor and the Government. We have no strikes in Russia—they aren’t necessary.”

It is perhaps significant that Kuznetsov was accompanied by a member of the Russian Secret Police.

CHAPTER IX

The Lords and the Masses

WHAT IS THE GREAT CAUSE OF INDUSTRIAL INEFFICIENCY? It is the utopian demand for equal incomes for all, irrespective of the work performed, a demand that makes the unskilled person lose all interest in becoming skilled and in the prospect of advancement. The key to industrial efficiency is an income scale that gives a correct reflection of the difference between skilled and unskilled work, between trained and untrained persons."

These highly significant words were uttered by none other than Stalin himself. They were spoken to the delegates of the All-Union Communist Party Congress in 1931. And they were based on Article 12 of the Soviet Constitution which says, among other things, "From each according to his ability, to each *according to the work performed.*"

When Elmo Roper made a survey for the *New York Herald Tribune*, he found that more than half of the American public believes that everybody in Communist Russia receives the same income regardless of the work performed or the job held. Nothing is further from the truth. The fact is that in Communist Russia the income differential between the "big shots" and the common masses is greater than in any land under the sun today.

The big income earners in Communist Russia, the economic lords of the Soviet realm, are the plant managers and executives. Naturally, they all belong to the Communist Party; they must, in order to maintain themselves in their positions.

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But it is also fair to say that they are experts in their respective lines, and their high income is determined by the degree of efficiency with which they fill their jobs. Russian industrial efficiency is measured by two standards: reduction of production costs and increases in plant output.

Though all industries in Communist Russia are owned and operated by the government, each individual plant is run on the profit system; the greater the profit made by the plant, the higher the income which the government derives from it. And the Communist regime, like any other in the world, needs money.

Inasmuch as all wages and prices in Communist Russia are government-fixed, any reduction in the cost of production and any increase in the quantity of goods produced make for a greater profit from that particular plant. To accomplish such a profit, all plant executives are put on a bonus system. These bonuses are twofold and run on a progressive scale. For every 1 per cent in the reduction of costs, up to 5 per cent, the plant executives receive a bonus equivalent to 10 per cent of their annual salary. For every 1 per cent reduction over 5 per cent, they receive an additional bonus equivalent to 15 per cent of their annual salary. Furthermore, for every 1 per cent increase in plant output, up to 5 per cent, the executives receive a 2 per cent bonus of their salary. But if output increases over 5 per cent, their bonus jumps to 50 per cent; and if output rises over 10 per cent, they are given a 150 per cent bonus. If, for instance, the production cost should be decreased 10 per cent while production output rises 10 per cent—and the two go automatically hand in hand—under this system the plant executives would receive bonuses amounting to three times their annual salaries *in addition to these salaries*.

The average fixed salary of a plant executive, figured as of 1941, is 15,000 rubles. If he is efficient—and what execu-

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tive isn't, considering the incentive—his total income may reach 60,000 rubles or more. However, this figure is usually attained only by exceptionally capable executives; the average plant manager's total income is somewhere around 30,000 rubles per year, prewar. Considering the fact that an assembly line worker earns about 1,500 rubles a year, it means that the income bracket of plant executives is twenty times that of the worker, and on occasion even much higher, whereas, in America, an executive's pay usually is about ten times that of a worker's wages. This means that the wage differential between executive and worker in Communist Russia is twice as great as in the capitalistic United States. Needless to say, the demands of wartime pressure have in many instances driven the incomes of Russian plant executives to fabulous figures. Stalin bonuses of anywhere from 50,000 to 150,000 rubles were a common feature.

But this is not all. The American executive pays an income tax running as high as 30 per cent. The highest income tax in Communist Russia is 10 per cent, and as a rule, plant executives pay no tax at all. Virtually every plant executive has received at least one of the many orders and medals which correspond, roughly, to our E awards. These orders in Russia exempt the bearer from income taxation. Thus, while the American executive works for the United States Treasury one-third of his time, his Russian counterpart works exclusively for himself. Russian taxes are indirect, being tacked to the price of goods. And since the price is the same for executive and worker alike, the actual wage differential is in reality even greater than it looks in monetary terms.

However, money has no meaning in Russia today for the simple reason that the average man can buy nothing with it; the goods just aren't there. The only way the plant executive can spend his high income is by investing it in govern-

ment bonds which he puts aside for the dreamed-of day when money will buy plenty in the way of goods and services. In short, he is building up to a future status of Communist millionaire.

But the differential between lords and masses does not stop there. The plant executive can buy little for his money but he must live in style just the same; otherwise he cannot command the respect of the common workers. And so the plant gives him a brand-new house to live in with his family, with anywhere from six to twelve rooms. Also, the plant equips the house with the best furniture obtainable in the land. Likewise, the plant provides for the upkeep of the house and servants. Naturally, the executive is also given the very best in the way of food. Like all high Communist officials, the plant executives are provided with free automobiles and chauffeurs. Once a year, sometimes oftener, the executives receive vacation trips to seaside or mountain resorts, with their families; during these vacations everything is free, or virtually so—transportation, the best rooms in the best hotels, food, entertainment. All this, in addition to their salaries.

Nor is that all. Consumer goods, including such items as clothing, footwear, and toiletries, are practically unobtainable in Russia. What little there is of them is held in special government stores to which the common Russian has no access. These stores are for the lords exclusively. There they can purchase all such goods in reasonable quantities *at very low, tax-exempt prices*. When American Lend-Lease butter, sugar, chocolate, and similar supplies were shipped to Russia for the "starving Russian masses," they were all distributed among the leaders. The Russian masses got nothing except perhaps a pound of lard once every two months or so. The Soviet Government made it quite clear that the distribution of all relief supplies sent by the United States to the Russian sphere

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of influence—Poland, the Balkans, and elsewhere—would be at its pleasure.¹

The list of prerogatives enjoyed by the new Russian super-class is still far from complete. Perhaps most important of all is the virtual monopoly on higher education now enjoyed by the children of executives, higher government officials, and other Communist potentates. Until 1940, tuition in high schools and universities was absolutely free. Now only grade schools are free. Tuition fees in high schools, and especially in universities, are high enough to put them absolutely beyond the reach of the average industrial or farm worker. Inasmuch as in Russia only men with a university degree or its equivalent are acceptable for executive and high government positions, this educational prerogative is especially aimed at perpetuating the present Communist superclass in power.

All the prerogatives enjoyed by industrial executives apply also to the managers of state and collective farms, railroad executives, police officials, and other high administrative personnel.

In his book *Behind the Urals*, John Scott, who worked for a number of years as technical instructor in Magnitogorsk, gave a vivid description of the plant manager who had at his disposal a modern three-story, fourteen-room house containing a billiard room, music room, special playrooms, and a fully equipped library, surrounded by a fenced-in deer park. The manager and his family had three chauffeur-driven automobiles at their disposal and also a river yacht. The house had cost 80,000 rubles to build, and the furniture and other equipment set the plant back an additional 170,000 rubles. The combined total amounted to more than what

¹ Actually, the UNRRA directors in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, for instance, are Russians, in spite of the fact that Russia has made no contribution to UNRRA. American relief supplies in these countries are allotted to supporters of the Communist party line exclusively; others get nothing.

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170 assembly workers could earn in the course of an entire year. All this, in addition to a salary and bonus that would make an American executive's eyes bulge!

It is only natural that the industrial, agricultural, and other executives would want to perpetuate their position as lords. This can be done only through membership in the Communist Party. Therefore virtually all of them are party members of excellent standing. In fact, the executive group is one of the largest in the Party, surpassed numerically only by that of the Secret Police. On the other hand, the number of plain industrial or agricultural workers on the party roster is extremely small, although the two form the two largest population groups in the country. The Communist Party is becoming more and more of a closed club from which the plain people are excluded.

The Russian Communist executive lives a lordly life, it is true; but it is not a life accorded to him because of any privilege of birth, class, or race. It is a life that he must earn, and he must earn it the hard way. He must produce, or else. All the good things he and his family enjoy—big salary, prodigious bonuses in money and goods, excellent living quarters and furniture, automobiles, yachts, a privileged education for his children, and all the rest—are not his perpetually. They are his only so long as the job is his. And the job is his only so long as he produces.

Local Communist Party bosses and the Secret Police keep an eagle eye on every plant and on every state or collective farm. They can remove executives overnight. The executives are highly rewarded while their plant keeps producing above the official plan determined by the heads of the state trust to which it belongs. The main features of this plan are set by the central Communist Government. Moscow simply says that so-and-so-much of such-and-such must be produced

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within such-and-such a period. The central trusts then allot a quota to each plant. If the plant keeps within or above its quota, well and good. But if it falls below the quota, its executives face many years of hard labor in a concentration camp. A drop in output or a rise in production costs is a criminal offense under the Communist system for which the plant executives are personally responsible. It is strictly their business to get every ounce of effort and efficiency out of their workers.

The Russian executive must be something of a big-time gambler. With the stringent controls exercised by the Communist Party and the Secret Police all about him, ready to be brought to bear against him with accusations of sabotage the moment he relaxes and allows something to go wrong, he simply cannot play it safe by sitting back. Operating under a political system that makes individual initiative practically impossible, he must always shoot the works. He must be venturesome by trying out new ideas and processes in order to increase the productivity of his plant. If he wins, he is greatly rewarded for his gamble; if he loses, he has only himself to blame.

Under this system, the executive has no other choice but to be consistently ruthless, to consider human values as nothing and material achievement as everything. Not for one moment can he consider the rights of the common man. He is given a certain quantity of human material and he must derive every ounce of production out of it. He is the boss; he alone is responsible. He can have no workers' committee or labor union tossing monkey wrenches into his machinery by telling him what he can do or how far he can go. He must at all times keep the common herd on a sufficiently low level where it cannot get any exaggerated ideas about its own importance in the Communist scheme of things.

I have seen the dreadfully low living standard, the barest

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subsistence level, of the Russian masses and the patient, fatalistic way in which they accept it. It has not astounded me in the least. I have known Russia too long. I know that this condition has always existed and the Russian masses have always accepted it with the same patience, the same fatalism.

Having spoken to many American official observers, military and civilian, who have returned from Russia, I have found them unanimous in saying that they were shocked by the low living standard of the Russian masses. It was up to us Americans, they said, to raise the Russian living standard even if we had to go on denying ourselves quite a number of the things to which we have been accustomed. It was our sacred duty to humanity to do so, they contended.

I asked them one question: "How are we going to do it?"

They admitted they had not the faintest idea beyond the fact that we just have to send all the necessary supplies to Russia. It would then be up to the Russian authorities to distribute them properly.

That's just it. We have to let the Soviet Government do the distributing as it sees fit and be content with the faint hope that at least a tiny bit will, somehow, trickle through to the masses. In all fairness to the Soviet Government, it should be said that it cannot have any other division than that between lords and masses unless it wants to undermine its own existence, sap the very foundations of its power. The Communist principle demands that the Communist Party be the superpower, the overlord of the masses. Ironically enough, this kind of autocratic overlordship is also in the Russian tradition which stubbornly refuses anything in the way of change originating in the West. That is why it is *Russian Communism* all the way through.

CHAPTER X

A State-Controlled Church

KARL MARX SAID, "RELIGION IS THE OPIATE OF THE people." Lenin repeated it after Marx, and Stalin reiterated it after Lenin.

I have no way of knowing just how Marx arrived at the conclusion. But I can understand how Lenin and Stalin, being Russians and knowing much of what was going on in Russia in the way of what was then believed to be religion, reached the conclusion. And in all fairness to them, I must say that there were certain irrefutable elements in favor of their contention.

I can vividly remember how one time in my young days when I was invited on a hunting trip by friends who were members of the then Russian upper class, we found ourselves lost with the descent of darkness. It was in a forested region adjoining a tributary of the Volga River, some 200 miles from Moscow.

We looked for some sort of cover where we could spend the night. We came upon a fairly big opening in the hillside, entered it and stretched on the ground. After perhaps an hour's sleep—we had no opportunity to consult our watches in the dark, and luminous dials were unknown in those days—we found ourselves awakened by strange noises coming from below. We looked down and were utterly dumbfounded by the fantastic scene we witnessed.

We discovered ourselves on a ledge formed by the steep walls of what we found was a vast subterranean grotto. In

the center of this grotto was a large granite block resembling a sacrificial stone. I have since seen such sacrificial stones in the ancient open-air Aztec temple near Teotihuacan in the vicinity of Mexico City.

A tunnel led into the grotto from the side opposite the high ledge. From the mouth of this tunnel emerged a long procession of barefooted men and women—about a hundred, we estimated—apparently clad in nothing but flowing white cloaks. The white figures chanted a monotonous song the words of which we could not make out. Quite a few were torchbearers. They swarmed over the grotto and stuck the torches into holders on the walls, illuminating the vast space with an eerie light. The white-cloaked figures settled on the ground, forming a circle around the sacrificial stone.

A tall figure, whom they called the prophet, left the circle and stepped up to the stone. He raised his voice in weird-sounding incantations which were repeated from time to time by the congregation. Then, at a signal from him, two white-cloaked figures led a third up to the stone. This third figure shed the cloak and turned out to be a well-proportioned girl apparently in her late teens. She stood there, completely in the nude, endowed with large, taut, beautifully formed breasts.

At a signal from the prophet, the girl climbed the stone and lay flat on her back. One of the prophet's aides produced a large metal tray, the other a sharp knife, both of which they handed to the prophet. The prophet drew nearer to the stone and quickly amputated part of one of the girl's breasts. His aides stood by and skillfully applied bandages to the ugly wound. The girl otherwise seemed none the worse from the mutilating operation.

The prophet proceeded to cut the amputated part into small pieces. He took one. Then the tray was passed around the congregation, each member swallowing a piece. The prophet started another series of mysterious incantations,

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with the congregation standing up and joining him. Then he climbed the sacrificial stone and, in plain sight of all, proceeded to deflower the virgin.

While this went on the rest of them indulged in a fantastic dance. It was not dancing in the proper sense of the word but rather a whirling motion, round and round. Like whirling dervishes the white cloaks filled the space, allowing occasional glimpses of nude bodies, male and female. The torches flickered eerily from the air currents produced by the swirling cloaks. Presently one of the worshippers emitted an ecstatic shout. It was taken up by all the others and soon the floor of the grotto was a swirling, shouting, shrieking, ecstatic white mass of people working themselves up to a climax. Then, at a signal, all torches were snatched from their holders and extinguished. In the darkness, the hysterical men and women below gave themselves up to indescribable debauchery.

A few days later I learned that by chance we had stumbled upon the annual ceremony of a religious sect which called itself the *Skoptzy*. The sect, quite numerous in Russia at the time, contended they were the only true Christians. According to their utterly perverted interpretation of the Gospel, the girl on the sacrificial stone symbolized the Holy Virgin in the act of begetting what they hoped would be another Christ. Their cannibalistic partaking of the virginal breast symbolized the Holy Communion. The child eventually borne by the virgin would be brought up as a new prophet, if male, or a new virgin, if female. (What the general debauchery symbolized, I never could learn.)

I cite this personal experience merely as an example of the wide-spread religious sectarianism which literally permeated Russia at the turn of the century. The principal reason for this sectarianism was the people's complete lack of education coupled with their inherent distrust of all innovation. When-

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ever the Russian Orthodox Church instituted a new reform, there were always large numbers of people who refused to accept it. Throughout the years a great number of sects came into being which, while paying lip service to the Orthodox Church because of its great power in Russia, indulged in their own secret rituals. Most of the rituals were not so barbaric and intemperate as that of the *Skoptzy*, but quite a few approached it in unleashed fervor. These sects were the direct result of the Russian's indulgence in mysticism, his inherent leaning toward all sorts of symbolism. Naturally, the Orthodox Church prosecuted the sectarians, but that served only to strengthen their stubbornness and determination to cling to their old ways. It was estimated that at the turn of the century there were some 25,000,000 sectarians in Russia.

Indisputably, sectarianism of the sort described undermined the moral foundations of the people. Under such circumstances one could hardly blame Lenin and Stalin for contending that religion was the opiate of the people. But the Communists had an even more compelling reason, from their point of view, for virtually outlawing the Church at the beginning of their rule, and that reason was purely political.

In the Russia of the Czars, the State and the Church were one. The Czar was at the same time head of the Church and thus combined the functions of temporal and spiritual ruler. In the eyes of all Orthodox Russians, he was the representative of God on earth and all his power was conferred on him by God. That is why he signed himself: "We, by the Grace of God, Czar and Emperor of all the Russias, Czar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc."

The priests, or little fathers, were the representatives of the Czar in matters spiritual just as the provincial governors and other officials were his representatives in matters temporal. The State collected the established tithe together with other

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taxes and turned it over to the Church. From this practice the State emerged as the direct financial backer of the Church. The funds were turned over by the State Treasury to the Holy Synod, which distributed them among the various bishoprics, and these in turn paid the salaries of the priests in their respective domains. In this fashion the priests became actual paid officials of the State, dependent on it for their living, and it was only natural that they should back the autocratic power of the State in everything it undertook. If the State decided that it would be better to keep the common people in ignorance and darkness, that was exactly what the Church did. In those days the principal motto of both State and Church was: "The less the people know, the better we can rule them between the two of us."

When Lenin seized the power, one of his first acts was to decree the complete separation of Church and State. To the priests, this was comparable to a death knell. Suddenly and unexpectedly their incomes were terminated. But Lenin even went beyond that. He decreed the confiscation of all landed properties of the Church as well as all the treasures of gold, silver, and precious stones which the Church had accumulated throughout the centuries. In response, the priests throughout Russia rose in wild clamor, denouncing Lenin as the Antichrist and exhorting the people not to obey the Communist Government.

The Government's reply was a declaration of ruthless warfare on everything for which the Church had stood. In the interests of the people, religion had to be done away with once and for all. Churches throughout Russia were closed. Church buildings, the Government contended, stood in the way of civic improvements and had to be torn down. The majority of those which were allowed to remain were converted into antireligious museums and social clubs for workers. Priests were arrested by the thousand as counter-revolutionaries and

either executed or sent off to concentration camps, there to do manual labor of the lowest kind.

All this persecution, however, worked wonders for the Church. Purged from its mercenary interests and corruption as part of the Czarist regime, the Church emerged as the reflector of Christian faith and God-given principles which have survived for almost two thousand years, beginning with the early Christian martyrs. Patriarch Tikhon rose up fearlessly and issued an anathema against the Communists in which he declared, "That which you do is verily a satanic deed. For it you are condemned to hell fire in the future life and to awful curses by the coming generations in the present life. We adjure all faithful children of the Orthodox Church not to enter into any kind of association with these monsters of the human race."

The "monsters" were not slow in replying in kind. They promptly threw the Patriarch into jail, which only made him a modern Christian martyr in the eyes of all true believers. Countless millions of Russians refused to abandon the faith of their fathers. Braving the peril of being deprived of their ration cards, of losing their jobs and of being confined to sub-Arctic concentration camps, they came together secretly for worship. The Church refused to be killed. It went underground, but it survived.

The Communists were quick to note their lack of success and began to supplement their political fight against the Church with an antireligious educational campaign. Emclyan Yaroslavsky, a rabid Communist, organized the *Militant Atheist League* with the full blessing and financial support of the Communist Government. Chapters of the League were formed in all principal cities. The *Bezbozhniki* (Godless) staged antireligious parades with floats burlesquing religious subjects, even going to the extent of having an effigy of Christ carried through the streets, kicked and spat upon, to

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prove to the people that God was powerless to do anything about it and that they should cease to believe. At the height of the movement, the League claimed more than 6,000,000 militant adherents, principally among the young. It is noteworthy, however, that while Stalin consented to finance the League from State funds, he never once in his speeches commented on it one way or the other.

Then came the great shock. In 1937 the Soviet Government took a census in which one of the questions asked was about religious faith. When all the returns were compiled, the census showed that after twenty years of ruthless persecution of the Church, one-third of Russia's city population and more than two-thirds of the rural population over eighteen years of age still believed in the faith of Christ and did not conceal the fact from the official census-takers.

The Politburo faced one of its periodical problems that called for compromise. The age-old Russian tradition had asserted itself, in religious matters as in all others. As faithful disciples of Lenin, the members of the Politburo, with Stalin at their head, found themselves confronted with Lenin's often-expounded principle that *facts are stubborn things*. To perpetuate their success in Russia, the Communists time and again had to attune their ideology to Russian tradition in all matters where the stubborn Russian mass mind refused to budge. They had to make it *Russian Communism* all the way through. And so the practical realists of the Politburo began to realize that sooner or later they would have to make their peace with the Orthodox Church.

With the coming of war, a new set of facts faced the Politburo. From the Communist point of view, it was a war for the survival of their system in the face of tremendous odds. They understood that to win the war they had to make it a Russian national war. To this were added considerations of an international nature. As a militantly aggressive force, Com-

munism had either to expand beyond Russia's borders or fold up and die. But it could expand only under the banner of *Russian Communism*. The Balkans and the Mediterranean beyond had been one of the cherished objectives of Russian Imperialism for centuries. Their population was of the same racial stock as the Russians. But it was also intensely religious. So long as the Communist Government remained antireligious, the peoples of the Balkans would fight bitterly against it. On the other hand, if the Orthodox Church were restored in Russia, it would be equivalent to Russian religious occupation of the Balkans, to be followed by political domination. It would save many Russian divisions. Confronted with these facts, the Politburo did not hesitate any longer.

The ground was already paved by Metropolitan Sergei of Moscow. Originally a jurist—his lay name was Ivan Nikolayevich Stragorodsky—and then a great theological scholar who had visited the United States and been a missionary in Japan, the Metropolitan knew that throughout the centuries political tendencies had undergone constant changes, governments and ruling political parties had come and gone, but the common man's need for the spiritual was everlasting. He arrived at the conclusion that the Orthodox Church had to cooperate with political government in order to survive. And so he joined the Communists. That is, he did not *enter* the Party—the Communist Party does not accept Christians as members, and Metropolitan Sergei remained a Christian—but he stood for absolute support of the Communist Government as the national government of Russia.

Several personal meetings between Stalin and the Metropolitan were held. (Incidentally, both men are of identical height—5 feet 5 inches.) An agreement on all principal points was reached. Sergei issued an anathema against Adolf Hitler, branding him the Antichrist and calling upon all the faithful to wage ruthless war against the invader. He named the

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war the *Second Fatherland War*. (The *First Fatherland War* was Russia's resistance against Napoleon in 1812.) He sent a message to Stalin in which he said, "God bless you with success and with glory your great deeds for the sake of our country." Stalin promptly replied by accepting Sergei's elevation to the Patriarchate. A new decree allowed the printing of the Bible after it had been on the proscribed list for nearly twenty-five years.

And so the great breach was mended and the Church restored in Communist Russia. The news penetrated every corner of the Balkans and made the peoples there receptive to Russian domination. More than this, it helped to create a favorable impression for Russia in the outside world. And from a purely military point of view, the Communist Government's peace with the Church marked the real turning point of the war. The Church threw itself into a fanatical prosecution of the war and materially aided the victorious progress of the Red Army beyond Berlin and to the Alps. It saved Russia many divisions.

But lest there be any mistake about it, the Soviet Government did *not* restore the Church on terms of equal partnership with the State. Realizing the great benefits to be derived thereof, it placed the Church into the political service of the State. It also put the Church under the strict control of the State, like everything else in Russia. And it has definitely guarded against the possibility that at some future time the Church might again become the center of opposition to the Communist State. Unlike in the United States and many other Western countries where the Church is completely free, in Russia the restored Church is under the strictest supervision of the State. However, in this matter as in so many others, the Soviet Government has once again compromised with Russian tradition.

To synchronize its dual policy of Russian Communism and

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Russian Imperialism helped along by the Church, the Soviet Government created a new state office. It is called the Soviet Council on Orthodox Affairs. Its chairman—who may be regarded as People's Commissar of Church Affairs, although the name has been carefully avoided—is Georgi Grigoryevich Karpov, a veteran member of the higher Communist hierarchy who has served in a number of important official capacities prior to his present position. He is an amiable enough man who on occasion is accessible to foreign correspondents and answers their questions readily enough because he considers it good policy to do so. Like all prominent members of the Communist hierarchy, he is a shrewd politician and quite aware of the value of good propaganda.

When asked why it was necessary to have the equivalent of a People's Commissar of Church Affairs in a country where, according to the Constitution, the Church is separated from the State and thus presumably intended to rule itself, Karpov patiently explained that his status was not *exactly* that of a People's Commissar. The Orthodox Church was directed, internally, by the Office of the Patriarch in conjunction with the Holy Synod. It was only in matters of *cooperation between Church and State* that the Soviet Council entered the picture. Its objective was to prepare and promulgate the different laws of the State concerning the *proper operation of the Church*, and to see to it that these laws were *faithfully observed by the Church*. When asked if the Council was actually the supervising body of the Communist Government over the Church, he conceded the point tacitly. When asked further if the cooperation between Church and State which he mentioned was to be in the interests of the State, Karpov looked embarrassed and said nothing.

Thus there is a situation that could not be found anywhere except in Communist Russia where none of the interlacing political currents makes sense if viewed through Western eyes.

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The Soviet Constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of religious worship to all citizens. The same Constitution explicitly establishes the Communist Party as the superpower in complete and unquestioned charge of the Soviet State. None but a Communist Party member can become a high Soviet official, and the Communist Party does not admit Christians, or other religious believers, to membership. And so there emerges an antireligious Communist official as a supervisor of all Church policy. The plain fact is that the great realists of the Politburo have chalked up another astounding triumph. They have succeeded in enlisting the Orthodox Church in the service of the policies of Communist Russia, whatever these policies may be.

What happened to the *Militant Atheist League*? Emelyan Yaroslavsky, its founder, died late in 1943 and was buried with all the Communist pomp, the casket bearers being Politburo members, speeding him on his last trip, presumably to a region of extremely hot temperatures. The League was disbanded after his death. Communist Russia has no use for what had become a harassing liability when by abandoning it she could harness some 150,000,000 Orthodox believers in Russia and the Balkans to her political bandwagon.

As Stalin said, "We still consider religion the opiate of the people. But if the people want that opiate, let them have it."

CHAPTER XI

The Distaff Side

WHEN THE LATE HARRY L. HOPKINS VISITED MOSCOW on a Presidential mission in the spring of 1945 he said that "American women are pretty, but Russian women are really beautiful."

I have no intention of disputing Mr. Hopkins on questions of distaff. Everyone to his own taste, and this applies especially to men's taste in women. I have lived permanently in Russia for about twenty-three years and an approximately equal period in the United States where I expect to die and be buried. I have seen many thousands of Russian women in all parts of their great country, in all kinds of national attire, and on numerous occasions without any at all. I have been acquainted with more Russian women from all classes than I can remember, from grand duchesses to plain peasant girls. I have seen also many thousands of American women in all parts of these United States, from New York to California and from Texas to the Great Lakes, in the cities, hamlets, and on farms. I have lived among, and been acquainted with, a great number of them. I have seen them in all sorts of attire, frequently in bathing costumes which leave little to the imagination. In all humility, I believe I can qualify as a judge when it comes to a matter of comparison.

Of course there are beautiful women in Russia and there are just as beautiful women in the United States, this being said without any disrespect to Mr. Hopkins. There are pretty women in Russia and there are pretty women in the United

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States. When it comes to judging the perfection of the female body perhaps the cardinal difference is this: American women wear bathing suits on public beaches while Russian women for the most part bathe nude. Not that it makes any material difference to the experienced male eye.

When all is said and done, it comes down to a case of personal preference. If you prefer a peach as it comes from the tree, that is one thing; if you desire a peach accorded all the culinary treatment of a master chef, it is quite another. From the standpoint of natural beauty, Russian women are definitely not to be despised. But American women, in addition to beauty of face and body, possess a deftly reserved allure and display an intrinsic grace, together with their fine art of bringing out those charming feminine qualities which will forever appeal to the appreciative male—a combination I have rarely encountered elsewhere. And by that, Mr. Hopkins notwithstanding, I abide, so help me.

I have read quite a number of "sob stories" featuring the tragic fate of Russian women as a result of the war. How all their men have been killed or mutilated, and how they will have to go through life without any opportunity to satisfy their emotional and biological instincts. All of which I have found to be so much plain, unadulterated bilge.

Our professional sob sisters are wasting their sympathy on Russia's women. The latter do not need it, do not want it, and are quite capable of getting along without it. Russian girls are just as adept in the art of winning their men as are girls the world over. They know all the camouflaged pitfalls into which the unsuspecting male is bound to blunder during what he believes is a purely exploratory expedition, and they are expert marksmen when it comes to aiming Cupid's darts.

It is true that the war cost Russia many million male lives. But it is not the first time that the country has suffered such a loss. Only some twenty years ago the Communists them-

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selves sent millions of men to concentration camps in the sub-Arctic or in faraway Siberia, to say nothing of the additional millions who were mowed down by *Cheka* firing squads. Yet Russia's women managed to find their men and bear them children.

The sob sisters ask, where will the men come from? Why, they are already coming. The Soviet Government, which plans everything in Russia from hair pomade to bootstraps, is taking care of it in its own customary realistic and efficient way. It will not let the Russian women down, not while it needs millions of recruits for its armies eighteen or twenty years from today. And certainly not while it carries its method of incentive wages into the family bedroom by subjecting single men to prohibitive taxes and, on the other hand, giving lavish bonuses to families with a multitude of children.

Yes, the men are coming. To begin with, there are the 3,000,000 or more wounded soldiers. Their physical rehabilitation has proceeded apace. After being released from the hospitals and sanitariums, they were first sent to the warm climate of Black Sea resorts, then put to work in agricultural pursuits to regain their temporarily lost manhood under the healing influence of the sun. True, quite a few of them are crippled, but that proved no deterrent. All these men who had feared they would never again delight in a woman's embrace found themselves married in a breathtakingly short time.

There are the more than 5,000,000 prisoners of war and ex-slave laborers who were quickly returned from their imprisonment in Germany. The Russian Government saw to it that they were sent back to their homes without delay. Some of them were starved and emaciated, but a few months of wholesome food and care restored them to well-being. What was even more important, these men were readily able to find themselves wives; the women were right there waiting for

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them. And the women weren't choosy, either.

There are the additional millions demobilized from the Red Army. True again, they were of the older age classes, but their women were happy to have them back. The young ones cannot get their discharges because the Soviet Government believes in rule through power and is determined to keep a large standing army at all times. But they are given long enough rotation leaves so that they can do their connubial duty by their women and their country. As quickly as replacements from among the still younger ones are made available, they will go home to stay.

Last but far from least, there are close to 3,000,000 German prisoners of war captured by the Russians who are not likely to see their homeland for a good many years, if at all. True, they are Germans! They are men nonetheless. They can beget children, and the Soviet Government believes in the mixing of nationalities and races. There are the additional millions of Germans who were transported to Russia as conscript labor to repair the damage caused by their compatriots. And there are at least a million deportees from Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary whom the Russians considered inimical to their interests if left in their respective homelands, and accordingly packed them off to Siberia, where they could do no political harm, but could help to produce Russian children.

So, speaking of men, there are certainly enough to go around. And Russian women, give them every credit for it, are not particular when it comes to men. Or when it comes to the bitter things in life, either.

I shall forever remember the sight I saw from the window of a railroad car when I was a boy of fourteen. We were traveling through the endless open country of Penza Province, and the train had stopped at a siding for the locomotive to take on a fresh supply of water. It was in spring, and beside

the tracks ran a wide strip of prospective wheat land. A peasant was plowing the soil, guiding a wooden plow, and the plow was drawn by a woman. No, not a horse, but a woman. The peasant was too poor to own a horse.

I recall also an event that took place many years later—in 1918, to be exact. It was a headline in an American newspaper. It read, “Reds Nationalize Russian Women.” It created much of a stir in the United States and was to a large degree responsible for the ill feeling toward the Russian Communists held by American womanhood for a long time.

The story was untrue, of course, but it was written and sent in perfectly good faith. Communist soldiers had ransacked the palace of a Russian nobleman. They raped the women of his family, then packed them off to a brothel maintained for the revolutionary soldiery. From a few isolated occurrences of this sort, a writer arrived at his own conclusions and sent his story. Actually the occurrence was nothing new in Russia. Noblemen and others had practiced the same thing toward peasant women since time immemorial; the revolutionary soldiers merely reversed the cast of characters, just as Red Army soldiers established a practice of wholesale rape of girls and young women in Budapest, Vienna, Breslau, and other cities they occupied during this war.

But while that newspaper story was untrue in what it purported to prove, it contained a hidden truth unsuspected even by the author. Russian women *are* nationalized; they are nationalized in much the same way as the men are nationalized, and as the country's all other resources are nationalized. They are *not* nationalized in that they can be handed from one man to another, to serve the male's biological instincts. But they are nationalized in that all their thinking, their effort, and their labor must be devoted to the interests of the State, first and foremost. They are nationalized in the sense that they are put to menial tasks of a character which no

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American woman would be expected to perform. And they are nationalized in that they are ordered to produce as many children as they possibly can for the future might and glory of the Communist State. In this respect, they are as much nationalized as were the German women under the Nazis.

In the United States we have a system popularly known as the glorification of the American woman. She has been placed on a pedestal. We create a mystic aura around the concept of love; according to our popularized notion the American girl marries for no other reason than love. We endow American motherhood with a halo of sanctity. As the American woman goes through life, she is always enshrined by popular worship accorded to her exclusively. She is, by far, the privileged sex. To say that we have a matriarchy in the United States is far from being untrue.

But the life of Russian women has been hard, and still is today. When I speak of Russian women, I do not mean the mere sprinkling of female foundlings of Czarist society, nor do I mean the wives of Communist executives who enjoy all the privileges of sheltered life so long as their men contrive to stay out of the clutches of the Secret Police. I speak of the great mass of Russian peasant women whose task is toil, and more toil, and a prodigious share of the bitter side of life; all in exchange for scarcely more than a mere gratification of their biological cravings, and even that fulfillment is more the concern of the State than it is their own.

I quote from a clipping from the newspaper *Pravda* (The Truth), official organ of the Russian Communist Party, containing a dispatch written by L. Sobolev, one of its best-known correspondents, in which he warns the Russian soldier against what he calls the *demoralizing Capitalist conception of womanhood*: "You see pretty, standard-looking women with faces carefully done pale, despite the burning sunshine, with their make-up in the most complicated way and with dark

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red lips—the fashion seems to prescribe a sinful mouth. . . . Put them under a stream of water and you will know the truth. . . . You will find it is all bluff. . . . As you go through these foreign countries, a lot of tawdry brilliance will blind your eyes, Red Army men. Don't believe these deceitful phantoms of pseudo-civilization."

The writer goes on to warn against falling victim to the treacherous wiles of western women who have a conception of life entirely opposed to the laws of nature. On the contrary, the Red soldiers should attempt to teach these women "the cleansing concepts of the Soviet soul." He concludes, "In every spot where you have been, a trace will always remain in the hearts of these people because you carried with you a high culture, the great soul of the Soviet people, who shed their blood for the freedom and happiness of millions of people."

The Communist Government does not want its women to adopt the glamorized standard of womanhood in the western countries, especially the United States, and that is one of the principal reasons why it has shut off the country and its people from the inroads of any unauthorized news from abroad. It cannot afford to take any other attitude. In Russia, the women produce the country's new generations, so essential for future territorial expansion; they perform the larger share of the physical work, so necessary for building up the country's industrial and agricultural potentials. It has always been that way in a country which throughout its history has gone through several major wars in each generation, usually for reasons of territorial expansion. It is the Russian tradition. And the Communist regime, which perforce had to assimilate so much of the Russian tradition, is intent on keeping it that way.

In Russia, women perform all the tasks which in the United States are ordinarily done exclusively by men (apart,

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of course, from the recent wartime exigencies). In Russia, I wish to emphasize, it is not a case of war exigency but one of regular routine. Russian women are streetcar drivers and conductors, longshoremen, postmen, manual trench and canal diggers, merchant seamen, traffic policemen, firemen, carpenters, masons, bricklayers, street cleaners, and lumbermen, to mention just a few of their routine occupations. They form the vast bulk of unskilled industrial and agricultural labor. In addition, they are ordered to bear all the children they can.

A great deal has been written in this country about the complete freedom of Russian women under the Communist regime, and virtually all of it is nonsense. In Russia today, if a woman marries—and eventually she does because the State commands it—she stays married, and to the same man. Once again, that is in the Russian tradition. There used to be a brief time, which coincided with the militant persecution of the Church, when a divorce was obtainable by simply walking into a divorce office and signing the name on a slip of paper, but all that has been completely abolished. It vanished together with all the other Communist flimflam which deep-rooted Russian tradition refused to accept. As a matter of fact, the subject of “free divorce” was vastly over-propagandized. At no time were these divorces so numerous and popular as sensational publicity tried to make them appear.

Today divorce in Russia is so expensive that the masses cannot even dream of it; it has been placed far beyond the economic reach of the common man. Only the high-salaried executives, the Communist overlords, can think of it, but they run up against an even more powerful deterrent: immediate inquiry on the part of the Secret Police as to the whys and wherefores. And that deterrent invariably means no divorce. The Russian woman stays married to the same man until he dies. Of course, there is no law as yet against adultery, but

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she will find herself ostracized if she practices it. And so the Russian woman remains connubially faithful.

She has to bear children, but her say in their upbringing and in the charting of their future lives is strictly limited. They become wards of the State practically from the day they are able to walk. Since the mother must return to work within a specified period after childbirth, the children are cared for at the plant or collective farm nursery run by the State. She can take them home with her when she finishes her work, but these few hours scarcely compare with the predominating influence of the State's care. When they become of school age, they go to grade schools run by the State where they are indoctrinated according to the ideas of the State. When they have left grade school, they go to work, again as the State deems fit. The Russian woman is deprived of a considerable part of the great joys of motherhood, just as she is completely deprived of the sanctity of motherhood in the American sense.

Occasionally one can talk to a Russian working girl and try to learn her thoughts about the future. Being a woman, during the war she naturally complained about the shortage of men, but that was only war psychosis; with the war over, the men came back and she found herself bound to one for life. The Russian working girl will say also that life as she has to live it is pretty drab, that she would like to study to be an engineer, a scientist, a lawyer, or a physician. These desires are natural, because those professions spell economic security in Russia to the extent that security can be had in a country where the life of everyone in a higher position is at all times carefully checked by the Secret Police.

Some American correspondents have taken these occasional interviews and cited them as proofs of the complete freedom of thought and action which the Russian woman enjoys. They have arrived at an utterly false conclusion

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predicated on nothing more than wishful thinking. All known facts are lined up against it. In Russia today, all higher education is reserved almost exclusively for the children of executives and government officials by the simple expedient of making tuition fees in universities so high that the common people cannot possibly afford them, in much the same way as they cannot afford divorce. The Russian working girl's hope of becoming an engineer or physician is a beautiful illusion because it is unattainable, and like every human being she likes to dream of the unattainable. It is the only joy she has in an otherwise dull life.

Needless to say, there are women who attain positions of responsibility in Russia, in both the economic and political scenes. Art in Russia, especially on the stage, has always been a woman's stronghold. Quite a few women, too, are found in the professions, but the majority of these are holdovers from the era of unrestrained Communist society, which came to an abrupt end in 1939 when Russia returned to the imperialistic ways of the pre-revolutionary era. For instance, Dr. Rakia Kutylbayeva of the Ufa Medical Institute was recently accorded the distinction of being nominated as deputy to the Supreme Soviet. But Dr. Kutylbayeva has practiced medicine for thirty-two years and is a descendant from the Czarist era.

In order to achieve recognition, a Russian woman must compile a record of outstanding successes which must far surpass a man's in a similar capacity. Examples of such successes are Praskovia Angelina, the famous Ukrainian tractor expert; and Anastasia Restzova, holder of the Order of Lenin as the outstanding forewoman in the Youth Tractor Brigades; both were made deputies of the Supreme Soviet. But they are the exceptions that prove the rule.

Nowhere is this rule more evident than in the highest circles of the Soviet Government. All Politburo members, and

also all people's commissars are married and family men; quite a few have grown daughters. Yet these wives and daughters are kept strictly in their respective places, Russia's leading men setting an example in this respect. These wives and daughters are never allowed to attend state banquets or other public functions. Stalin's wife has never appeared at any public affair; as for his daughter, only a handful of people in Russia know that he has one. The only Russian woman appearing at public receptions is the wife of Foreign Commissar Molotov. But then Madame Molotov is a truly exceptional woman; perhaps, when current history is written in the future, she will appear as one of Russia's great women of history. In her case, once again, the exception proves the rule, for otherwise the Communist Government of Russia is the most exclusively male government in the world today.

Once, during a talk with a high Russian official, I had the cheek to ask the question why the distaff element within Russia's ruling class is so definitely relegated to the balcony seats. He retorted tersely, "You ought to know."

"But I don't, really," I insisted.

His features assumed the sternness characteristic of almost every Soviet high official when discussing a question of moment. Said he, "You studied Russian history, didn't you? You remember the Rasputin era, don't you? You recall all the Russian women in high places who succumbed to the dubious charms of foreign diplomats, to the lasting detriment of their country? It is not going to happen again, ever. In the U.S.S.R. there is no place for any sort of petticoat government."

CHAPTER XII

The Destiny of Russian Youth

RUSSIA NEEDS CHILDREN! THIS IS THE GREAT CRY OF Russia. It is also the prime commandment of the Communist Party to the Russian people today. What the plans of the Politburo are for twenty years from today, no outsider can tell. But whatever those plans are, they are predicated on a new crop of healthy, well-trained, highly disciplined boys for the armies and a fresh crop of equally healthy, well-trained, and highly disciplined girls for the factories and collective farms. The Government has announced the bearing and raising of this new generation as the country's most paramount need. It has commanded the people to marry and stay married so that they can produce more children. Lest this command be disobeyed, high taxes have been placed on couples with small families and even higher taxes on single men and women. On the other hand, the Government has announced special bonuses for fertile mothers. These bonuses begin with three children and rise on a progressive scale. A mother of six children receives a double bonus for each child, and a mother with ten or more children is awarded a special medal as *heroine mother*, together with the considerable financial benefits attached thereto.

In order to obtain this new generation, the Politburo policy wielders have tossed many features of original Communist social experimentation bodily out the window. There used to be a time, not so many years ago, when children were considered as something of a nuisance; when divorces could

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also all people's commissars are married and family men; quite a few have grown daughters. Yet these wives and daughters are kept strictly in their respective places, Russia's leading men setting an example in this respect. These wives and daughters are never allowed to attend state banquets or other public functions. Stalin's wife has never appeared at any public affair; as for his daughter, only a handful of people in Russia know that he has one. The only Russian woman appearing at public receptions is the wife of Foreign Commissar Molotov. But then Madame Molotov is a truly exceptional woman; perhaps, when current history is written in the future, she will appear as one of Russia's great women of history. In her case, once again, the exception proves the rule, for otherwise the Communist Government of Russia is the most exclusively male government in the world today.

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In order to obtain this new generation, the Politburo policy wielders have tossed many features of original Communist social experimentation bodily out the window. There used to be a time, not so many years ago, when children were considered as something of a nuisance; when divorces could

be had for a nominal fee within ten minutes; when illegitimate offspring were looked upon as a matter of course; when abortions were not only legal but absolutely free of charge and performed at state hospitals with the utmost of care. Those were the days of State-promoted atheism among the young, of free love, license, libertinism—the days of unrestrained Communist society which sneered at everything that used to be known as decent and respectable. But those days are gone forever.

The war brought the Communist leaders face to face with hard facts, and as their great teacher, Lenin, frequently said, "Facts are stubborn things." Russia, with all her tremendous population potential, was bled white; she had to recover at all costs if she was to carry out the policies which the Communist hierarchy had mapped out for her. And the most stubborn of all facts, a fact that could not be talked or experimented away, was that Russia's recovery could be staged only in the same traditionally Russian way in which the country had recovered from each of her many destructive wars of the past, and in no other. Once they had recognized this fact, the brilliant, realistic brains of the Politburo wasted no time.

In the days of unrestrained Communist society, the children were taught that, as wards of the State, they did not have to respect or obey their parents. There was a reason behind that. Inasmuch as most parents in those days dated from pre-revolutionary times and were suspected of harboring czarist or bourgeois ideas of child upbringing, something had to be done to prevent their views from influencing their children. The child had to be indoctrinated by the State. If a child expressed disrespectful views at home, he could not be punished or even scolded by the parents. If they did anything of the sort, the child was instructed to report them and they would face severe penalties.

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This policy came home to haunt the Communist leaders. When the Germans overran large parts of the country, they deported great numbers of adults for slave labor behind the lines or in Germany. But they had no use for the children. Many of these children, after months of adventure, and frequently roaming in large bands, found their way across the battle lines and into the cities of the Russian rear. During their wanderings they had lived by theft and banditry. They turned to outright hooliganism in the cities. They stole money and with the proceeds set themselves up as private profiteers. For instance, they bought up all tickets of a motion picture house and resold them to the theater-going public at a great profit. They were utterly devoid of all discipline in a land where the Government demands the strictest discipline on the part of every citizen. Of course these youthful culprits were eventually rounded up, and the ringleaders were sentenced. But that did not solve the basic problem, which went back a number of years. There was a dreadfully large number of these cases of juvenile delinquency.

In Communist Russia, everything is planned by the central authority, and this principle has been applied to the production and raising of children also. The Government went straight to the heart of the problem. To become a useful, disciplined Soviet citizen, a child must be brought up in absolute respect and obedience for its parents and elders. Inasmuch as the entire population, including the Church, was now solidly behind the Soviet Government, there was no longer any danger in elevating the parents to a position as partners of the State in the upbringing of their children. Having decided this, the Politburo took all the necessary steps toward its child-producing plan, took them with the promptness and thoroughness which characterize all its decisions.

First, abortions were made illegal and severely punishable.

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Illicit relationship between the sexes was made a matter strictly frowned upon by the authorities and in obvious cases subject to investigation by the Secret Police, which in Russia is a more potent deterrent than anything else. Marriage was made compulsory, or almost so, in that single persons were subject to prohibitive taxation. Divorce was made practically unobtainable. Common-law marriages were denied recognition. Legitimate maternity was put on a progressive bonus system. Mothers who had three children or more under school age were allowed to stay away from their jobs frequently in order to care for the little ones at home; the bonus in this case was partial compensation for the loss of pay from the plant or collective farm. Today a Russian mother of three receives 400 rubles from the Government. Rewards for maternity rise on a progressive scale to 5,000 rubles for a mother of ten.

There is no denying that the new laws are greatly beneficial. They have put an end to the immorality and chaos in personal relationships which existed during the era of unrestrained Communist society, and they have placed the family, the cornerstone of civilized existence, on a firmer basis. From the American point of view, it may seem inconceivable that a centralized government authority should enter the family relationship of its citizens to an extent that comes dangerously close to regimentation. But Russian tradition has always taught obedience to the orders of the central authority, whatever those orders might be. From this point of view, the Communist regime has merely gone a few steps further than the Czarist regime ever dared to go. And, considering the loose, licentious customs of the preceding fifteen years, the Government had to proceed with greater strictness than would otherwise have been the case. It is characteristic of the Russian people that the sudden change was accepted without demur.

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The grade school system, too, was subject to complete overhauling. The co-educational system of the preceding era was abolished. Boys and girls are now taught in separate schools. When a child enters school for the first time, he is given a table of strict rules which he must at once learn by heart. The most important of these rules are: "Obey your school principal and your teachers without a word of comment. Be polite to elders, be attentive and courteous. Behave in an exemplary way in school, on the streets, and in company. Refrain from indecent language. Do not smoke or gamble. Be clean in your habits and take good care of your clothes and footwear. Stand up when your teacher or the school principal enters or leaves the classroom."

Inasmuch as high school education was placed beyond the practical reach of the common people by high tuition fees, the grade school curriculum was revised sharply upward. Among the subjects added are elementary natural science, physics, and a sprinkling of geometry for boys; cooking, sewing, and nursing for girls. The only higher educational institutions still free for grade school graduates of exceptional ability are the Suvorov military schools, which prepare the student for an army officer's career.

Education in Russia has taken a definitely conservative turn. School girls must have long hair. Grade and high school students, boys and girls, are not allowed to smoke, in or out of school. Dancing lessons are confined to waltz, polonaise, and Russian folk dances. Jazz, rhumba, and the like are taboo. Jitterbugging is definitely out. Strict discipline for the young and unquestioned obedience to their elders are the order of the day.

After their second year in school, the children are given special intelligence tests. Those who pass the tests are selected by the *Young Pioneers*, the first step in the development of the future Communist. The Pioneers run special

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clubs where the children spend their hours of leisure after school. The clubs also stage athletic games, soccer matches, and the like. They give additional instruction that helps the child to make faster progress through school. They also teach the first principles of Communist Party loyalty and discipline. They lay the groundwork of the young Communist.

When the children become fourteen years old, they advance from the Young Pioneers to the *Union of Communist Youth*, called the *Komsomols*. It is here that the second weeding-out process takes place. Only those Pioneers who have developed great mental adaptability and a full grasp of the significance of Communist principles get into the Komsomols. For it is from among the Komsomols that the future wielders of party power are expected to emerge. Their devotion to everything that the Party stands for, or will stand for in the future, must be unquestioned. The Komsomols cover the age group of from fourteen to eighteen. When the young Communist reaches this latter age, he may apply for full party membership and, after serving his term as a candidate, become a member.

At one time any youngster who possessed the mental qualifications could get into the Komsomols. This is no longer the case. The modern candidate is expected to set an example not only in militant Communism, party discipline, and hard work, but also in educational standards, manners, and refinement. By means of the repeated weeding-out process, membership in the Komsomols is restricted largely, though not exclusively, to the offspring of the vast Communist bureaucracy. The Komsomol member today is cast in the mold that produces empire builders. If he does not measure up, he drops back into the great mass of common working people.

The Komsomols as a whole have set a record of achievement. Before the war they were largely active in the industrial and

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agricultural spheres. They inspired workers to greater production effort, to the adoption of more effective methods, to loyalty toward the Communist regime. In their honor was founded the new industrial center of Komsomolsk in Eastern Siberia on the Pacific edge of the vast Soviet realm. The story has it that this modern city, now an industrial beehive of almost half a million population, was built up exclusively by Communist youngsters. But this, like everything else in the Soviet Union, is a marvelous piece of propagandistic exaggeration. Beyond a doubt, the Komsomols have contributed a great deal to this modern pioneering success. However, the great steel mills, shipyards, and other factories of Komsomolsk employ a large number of middle-aged and even older people.

During the war the Komsomols contributed in no small measure to the success of Russian arms. Especially after the initial great advances of the Germans, the Komsomols were poured into the Red Army in large numbers. They formed special shock troops, serving as an inspiration to the Russian soldier. Their casualties ran into the millions. But they fulfilled the task for which they had been brought up and to which they were assigned.

As for most Russian grade school graduates, with the exception of the few who show exceptional qualifications and are admitted to institutions of higher learning at the expense of the State, they are put to industrial and agricultural work. First they serve a term of apprenticeship, varying in length, then they are accepted into the ranks of regular workers. High school and university graduates go into the professions, Soviet officialdom, the Secret Police, and eventually into the executive ranks.

Here, as in everything else in Russia, the central planning authority takes a strict hand. The great planners of the Communist regime do not plan just for today, or for the next

year, but for many years in advance. Nothing is left to chance. Their blueprints tell them how many new steel workers, agricultural laborers, lawyers, physicians, engineers, etc., they will need in, say, five years from today. The children are educated according to these blueprints. When the time arrives, there will be the number of new steel workers, agricultural laborers, lawyers, physicians, engineers, etc., that the central planning authority intended for that particular year. There will be no shortage in any given occupation, nor any overcrowding in it. The interests of the State will have been served admirably. In short, it is not the parents who play a determining factor in the future of their offspring, it is the State. That is how the Communist system works.

There is no religious education for the young in Russia today. In Czarist days, when the State and the Church were one, religious education in all Russian schools was compulsory. It was given by special teachers of religion who, in the vast majority of cases, were also ordained priests. For this reason, nothing like our American system of Sunday Schools ever existed in Russia; it was not necessary.

When the Communist regime took over, it immediately separated the Church from the State and prohibited all religious teaching in public educational institutions. There are no private schools of any sort in Russia today; they are not permitted. The Soviet Constitution guarantees that "*the Church is separated from the State and the school from the Church.*" It goes on to state that church buildings may be used for purposes of religious worship only, and for no others; they most definitely may not be used for purposes of religious education of children.

When the Church was restored during the war, no provision was made for the resumption of religious education on an organized scale, perhaps because the State did not want it. Likewise, no religious textbooks may be printed. Parents have

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the right to teach the Scriptures to their children at home. If a group of twenty or more parents come together, the group may rent "suitable premises outside the church buildings" for the teaching of the Scriptures to their children and may hire a priest or any other ecclesiastic for this purpose. But before doing so, the group must apply for a special permit from the Soviet Council on Church Affairs or its local representative; only after such an official permit has been issued can the group go ahead with its plans of religious education.

So far as I have been able to learn, not one such permit has been issued. The excuse given is that there is a great housing shortage throughout the Soviet Union and no building space is available for purposes of religious education. Whether the Communist regime will issue any such permits in the future is an open question.

Russian Communism has passed its period of storm and stress. It is stabilized. It commands the solid support of the Russian people. It knows what it wants and how to get it. Its primary objective, like that of every other governmental system, is to perpetuate itself. This it can do only through the young. It takes the young firmly in hand, indoctrinates them, makes them understand that the Communist State must remain supreme, that its interests are paramount over those of the individual. It drills the idea into them that Russian Communism is the best system in the world, that their patriotic duty is to place themselves unreservedly at the disposal of the Communist State. When this fresh human material has reached maturity, it will be used as the State sees fit. There is no other authority.

Meanwhile, the Communist State wants children and more children. And it is going to get them. Although Russia was at war with Germany until May, and then threw her armies against an already shell-shocked and staggering Japan, her

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birth rate for the first nine months of 1945 was up 35.3 per cent over the corresponding period in 1944. Soviet planners and statisticians have already figured out that the Soviet Union's total population will reach the 250,000,000 mark by 1970 or before. The Soviet children are coming.

CHAPTER XIII

The Soviet Press

THERE ARE NO PRIVATELY OWNED NEWSPAPERS OR MAGAZINES in Russia. They are all owned and run by the Communist Government. It owns all printing presses and every ounce of the country's paper supply. It employs all editors, rewrite men, reporters, compositors, printers, and bookbinders. If, as an individual, you hit upon the insane idea—insane in Russia—of starting a newspaper, you'd find it an utter impossibility unless the Government gave you the physical means, which it wouldn't. If, as a writer, you put down on paper any of your crazy ideas—crazy, that is, if they didn't reflect the views of the Government—you could not get them printed. The only reading matter to reach the Russian people is that which the Government decides is good for them to read.

It should be noted that strict governmental control of the press has always been in the best vein of Russian tradition. It is true that in Czarist times many Russian newspapers were privately owned, but one or more government censors were attached to each editorial staff. These censors went over the paper as soon as it left the presses and before it was sent into circulation. If it contained anything which the censor believed was against government policy, the offending portion was instantly blacked out even if it contained truth. The same procedure was followed with foreign papers coming into Russia before they were distributed. When the reading public saw the blacked-out columns, it knew immediately

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that here was something the Government did not want to become public property. Papers that refused to comply with the censor's rulings were promptly suspended by orders of the police, at times even completely suppressed, although the suppressed papers were eventually allowed to resume under a different name.

Apart from this censorship, the Russian press of those days followed in the main the pattern of other countries. Important events abroad were usually accorded front-page space. Local news was given considerable play. There was some sports and society news, although nothing compared with what American papers normally carry.

The Czar's activities and those of prominent government functionaries were among the featured items. There were occasional cartoons, but no comic strips. Political comments were restricted to the editorial page. The papers contained a fair amount of commercial advertising, but nothing like that seen in this country. The scope of advertising in Russia never approached the important position it occupies in modern American economic life.

Politically, the Russian press of those days was given a certain amount of latitude. The conservative *Novoye Vremya* (New Times), for instance, consistently came out in support of the Government's policy. The liberal *Novaya Volya* (New Will), on the other hand, consistently pressed for democratic reform. So long as these demands did not assume the tone of revolutionary propaganda, the censors did not object. The freedom of the press in Czarist Russia was greatly restricted, but nonetheless it existed.

However, it died completely with the Revolution. One of the first things Lenin did was to send his revolutionary soldiery to take physical possession of all newspaper plants. The Communists installed their own editors who wrote what the Communist Party permitted and nothing else. Since 1917

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there has been no voice in Russia except that of the Communist Party. And the Communist leaders have signified that there is not going to be.

Russian newspapers today are printed not so much for the purpose of disseminating news as to keep the people solidly lined up behind the policies of the Communist regime. Each paper is the official mouthpiece of some subdivision of that regime. Thus, *Izvestia* (The News) is the official organ of the Soviet Government. *Pravda* (The Truth) is the official organ of the Communist Party. *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) is the official organ of the Red Army, meaning the War Department. *Trud* (The Toil) is the official organ of the Communist labor unions. Because of the paper shortage in Russia during the war, all dailies were held to four pages, but some have since been upped to six. All principal newspapers are printed in Moscow. There are dailies in the larger provincial cities, but these are mere reprints of the Moscow papers, with the addition of a few local news paragraphs. There are also a few periodicals, all printed in Moscow. The principal of these is *Novoye Vremya* (New Times), formerly known as *The War and the Working Class*. All editors are appointed by the Orgburo of the Communist Party and must follow the party policy as laid down by the Politburo. In short, the Soviet press of today is essentially a huge government propaganda machine.

The entire newspaper and periodical press in Russia—and this applies to the radio as well—speaks with just one voice, the voice of the Soviet Government. From the Communist point of view, there can be but two attitudes on all major questions of policy, domestic as well as foreign—the Government attitude and the wrong attitude. The wrong attitude is not allowed to make itself heard. Any Russian who thinks otherwise is advised to keep any dissenting opinion he may hold strictly to himself. In any event, he could not make

his views known, for no newspaper would print them and he could not obtain any broadcasting facilities. All channels of mass dissemination are closed to him.

All this does not mean that there are no differences of public opinion in Russia. But all such differences are confined to the discussion of various methods by which to carry out the Government's policy; on the question of policy itself there can be no divergent views. Especially in the field of foreign policy, all Russians accept the position taken by their Government, since they have no access to any facts that would contradict that position.

A striking example of how individual opinion which is at variance with the State's is promptly suppressed, is the official rebuke given to Ilya Ehrenburg, the noted correspondent of the army newspaper, *Red Star*, in April, 1945. In one of his articles, Ehrenburg, who is none too well-disposed toward Great Britain and the United States, castigated alleged Allied softness toward Germany. Promptly George Alexandrov, the propaganda head of the Communist Party's Central Committee, took space in *Pravda* and declared: "Comrade Ehrenburg simplifies matters. His conclusions are not well thought out and visibly erroneous. . . . In this instance he does not express Soviet public opinion. . . . The Red Army never did and never will consider its mission is to exterminate the German people." Comrade Ehrenburg accepted the rebuke and immediately changed his tune.

Let us examine a representative copy of *Pravda* printed at the time of the Anglo-American drive west of the Rhine. The front page is completely covered with stories of Red Army exploits on the Oder, in Silesia, and Austria. The second and third pages contain additional army stories, editorials, news on Russian domestic affairs, and minor items of local interest. The larger part of the fourth and last page contains decrees and regulations issued by various branches of

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the Government. Foreign news is crowded into two small columns in the upper corner of the last page. The Allied drive west of the Rhine is covered by a small item consisting of twelve lines. There are no commercial advertisements, which is not surprising since there is no commercial advertising of any sort in modern Russia.

The small space accorded to foreign news in Russian papers does not mean that this news does not reach Russia. On the contrary, all political developments abroad are cabled to Moscow from all parts of the world. But they are for the consumption of Communist Party leaders exclusively. The Press Bureau of the Government edits whatever little foreign news it decides to pass on into two small columns which are sent to all papers in the country, and that is all the Russian people learn about the rest of the world.

Contrary to American press custom, the movements of government officials are never mentioned in the Russian press. This holds true particularly for Stalin and all members of the Politburo. Neither do the papers ever contain any item concerning their private lives. When Stalin's daughter was married, for instance, there was not one word of it in the Russian press. We in the United States know that Zhdanov is married and has a son, but the Russians don't, excepting, of course, in the intimate governmental circles. Everything concerning the hierarchy is clothed in impenetrable secrecy.

If the Russians themselves know so little about their leaders and their country's policy, consider how much more difficult it is for foreigners in Russia to learn anything of real consequence. Foreign correspondents, especially, have the most difficult time. The news sources to which they are accustomed in the United States and elsewhere simply do not exist in Russia. You cannot get information from a Russian when he has none himself. The few persons who have emulate the sphinx in silence. The foreign correspondent's only source is

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the carefully edited columns of official newspapers. Blocked by the Secret Police in all their attempts to secure any real information, one American correspondent after another has returned home with a sense of frustration. Russian policy remains a deep secret to us, which is exactly what the Soviet Government intends it to remain.

We know extremely little about the Russians. What do they know about us? Here is an item from *Izvestia* cabled by its correspondent, E. Zhukov, from the San Francisco Conference: "Flowery amazons, accompanied by fat pseudo-cowboys, ride horseback along the beach. . . . Girls on the beach try to free themselves from the remainder of their clothes."

The above quotation is a typical example of the way in which Russian correspondents explain the United States and American customs to the Russian people. The Russian press goes out of its way to select solitary incidents that depict Americans and their customs at their worst; the positive side of American life is never mentioned. And since the Russian press is operated as a monopoly of the Soviet Government, it is quite evident that this antagonistic attitude toward the American people is one of careful deliberation.

Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times* reported on it on November 25, 1945, as follows: "Despite the warm-heartedness of the individual Russian, the Soviet Union as an organized state does not reciprocate America's passionate devotion to the ideal of international understanding. The Soviet Union goes on coldly repeating Marxian myths about America—that we have no freedom of the press, that American democracy is formal but not real. Only the other day the Moscow *Bolshevik* was saying: 'In the conditions of bourgeois democracy, the workers do not have the minimum material requirements for actual use of the rights that are proclaimed. They do not have at their disposal printing presses and paper.

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Newspapers, clubs, theatres—all are the property of private individuals or groups.' If these old myths are not deliberately false, then they are products of the lack of a basic understanding. As a controlled society, Russia is not trying to understand us as eagerly as many Americans are trying to understand Russia."

Of special significance are Russian correspondents' views regarding American newspapermen. Wrote E. Zhukov to *Izvestia* from San Francisco: "Journalists of progressive views—especially if they work for the so-called big press—express more radical views when among themselves than they do in their printed columns. This is not their fault. . . . It is the natural result of a system."

Pravda's correspondent, N. Sergeyeva, took the American press severely to task. She wrote: "Can anything be concealed from the ubiquitous American press? Is it surprising that with the necessary . . . connections the correspondents of American newspapers succeed fairly quickly in getting wind of what is being discussed at a closed conference? But to get wind of a subject does not mean truthfully reporting and explaining it. Every day, every hour, the press . . . is full of assumptions, conjectures . . . provocation."

I can faithfully attest that Comrade Sergeyeva's opinion of the "ubiquitous" American press is fully shared by every Russian Communist in high office. American correspondents are placed by the Soviet Government in the same category as foreign spies. A few of them are admitted as an inevitable evil, but the Secret Police has the strictest instructions to watch every one of their steps and, especially, to keep them from "getting wind of what is going on." And to make doubly certain that Russians do not talk out of school, the Russians aren't told anything themselves.

Incidentally, *Pravda* is today the oldest newspaper in Russia; it was founded in 1912. One of its founders was Joseph

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Stalin, in those days still a revolutionary agitator, and its first managing editor was Vyacheslav Molotov, now People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In its first precarious years, it led the Czarist police an underground chase and had an average circulation of some 40,000. Today it has the largest daily circulation of any paper in Russia, if not in the entire world, exceeding the 3,000,000 mark.¹ It could easily achieve twice this enormous circulation if the paper were available. It is printed on twenty-one rotary presses, mostly American-made, in a modern plant the size of two New York City blocks, and appears on the newsstands at about nine o'clock in the morning. Other *Pravda* editions, printed from mats delivered by plane, appear the same day in Leningrad and Kuibyshev, the following day in Baku and Rostov, and a day later in Novosibirsk and Tashkent. Its ten thousandth issue appeared on October 1, 1945, on which occasion its sixty-six-year-old editor, David Yosifovich Zaslavsky, was awarded the Order of the Fatherland War, First Class.

Zaslavsky celebrated the day with an editorial on freedom of the press. Said he: "What some countries of the West call freedom of the press is nothing but a rope on which a capitalist publisher keeps his journalists. If the rope is long enough, freedom of the press is relatively long. If the rope is short, freedom of speech is short-cropped. Hearst, for instance, sometimes gives his pen hoodlums full freedom, releasing them from their chains in order to freely assault the Soviet people. The Soviet reporter is free because no exterior opinions can influence him. The Soviet journalist is an official worker. He gets wages for his work, but he does not work for money. . . . Abroad, the journalist's profession is a career. With us, it is a combat post."

The name of Hearst, by the way, is quite a familiar one to *Pravda* readers, as Comrade Zaslavsky rarely loses an oppor-

¹ Including its out-of-town editions, *Pravda* today has reached a daily circulation of almost 5,000,000.

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tunity to take one of his characteristic verbal shots at his pet aversion among American publishers. In his more effusive moments, Zaslavsky calls Hearst an "idiot" or a "newspaper gangster."

The Russian press, as it is constituted today, is an indivisible part of the Communist system. It is geared to tell the Russian people only what the Government wants the people to know and to conceal from the people what the Government decides they should not know. And it is equally geared to conceal the policies and intentions of the Soviet Government from the rest of the world.

CHAPTER XIV

What Ho! Concentration Camps?

THERE IS A GENERAL BELIEF IN THIS COUNTRY THAT HITLER was the originator of the concentration camp system for the muzzling of political opponents. This is a completely erroneous belief. Hitler was not a producer of anything new but a mere copyist of things existing long before him. He copied his concentration camps from the Russians in much the same way he modeled his Gestapo after the Russian Secret Police.

Concentration camp confinement for political offenders is another Russian tradition of long standing. Four hundred years ago, Czar Ivan the Terrible had all the opposition leaders among the nobles rounded up by his Secret Police, the *Oprichniki*, and banned them to a concentration camp in the northern tundra where, it is said, "they had to repent their sins while the bitter cold froze the marrow of their bones." Two hundred years later Czar Peter the Great arrested the *Stryeltzy*, who had unsuccessfully opposed him, and had them confined for life to a concentration camp near Pustozorsk on the Arctic Ocean, a fate which also befell his personal favorite and prime minister, Count Menshikov, when the latter incurred the potentate's displeasure.

During the nineteenth century, the concentration camp for political offenders became an established adjunct of Russian police rule. It became widely known under the name of "exile by administrative order." There was no legal procedure of any kind, no possibility of appeal. If the Secret Police decided

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that you were "dangerous to the interests of the State," you were roused from your bed in the dark of night, and off you went to join an echelon of other such unfortunates who, in most instances, had done no more than express criticism of certain aspects of government or, in a good many instances, had been simply framed. For all of them, it was the long, dreary trek to a Siberian concentration camp.

When I was thirteen, I lived with my family in a six-room apartment on Offitzerskaya Street in St. Petersburg, now known as Leningrad, then the capital of Russia. Across the hall from us lived a lady of about forty, the widow of a naval officer, who rented rooms to university students and other people known as the "better class." Among her roomers were three girl students from the university, all in their late teens, lively and vivacious. The youngest, Ludmila, was seventeen, a freshman. She was a beautiful girl with large brown eyes and a wealth of chestnut hair. Her parents lived in Novgorod, some 150 miles away, where her father maintained a mercantile establishment. Ludmila and I became good friends. Frequently in the evening we sat on the stoop in the courtyard, talking of idealistic things, as young people will.

One evening Ludmila was very excited. There had been a student meeting at the university. The students were dissatisfied with a new regulation that forbade the discussion of any political question within the confines of the university. A petition had been circulated asking the university head to rescind the regulation. Ludmila and her two roommates had affixed their signatures to the petition.

At two in the morning our part of the house was in an uproar. Landing and stairs were filled with agents of the Secret Police. They invaded the apartment, roused Ludmila and her roommates from their beds, and took them away. They administered a severe rebuke to the landlady, warning her not to take "suspicious characters" as roomers. They

entered our apartment and subjected me to questioning as a friend of Ludmila's. But seeing that I was only thirteen and that my father worked for the Ministry of the Imperial Court, they simply advised him not to let me associate with "undesirable persons." A few days later I learned that the three girls, together with a number of other students, had been sent to a concentration camp in the Lena gold field district in Siberia. I never saw Ludmila again.

It was not considered anything unusual. Exile by administrative order, without a court sentence, simply by a stroke of the pen on the part of a police official, was a frequent occurrence. Stalin himself spent some time in a Siberian concentration camp from which he eventually managed to escape, as did quite a few members of the present Communist hierarchy. They know from personal experience what it is all about. Yet they have adopted the same system, and in a much stricter and more ruthless form.

The first Soviet concentration camp I saw was in 1926. It was during the era of the so-called *New Economic Policy*, or *Nep*, as it was called for short. The Communist regime had found that concentration of all retail trade in the hands of the Government did not work as had been expected. Consumer goods had all but disappeared from the Russian scene, a good deal having gone into secret hoarding. To bring these hidden goods into circulation, the Soviet decided to allow a certain amount of free trade, principally retail. The free traders of that era were called *nepmen*. The policy worked as expected. Boarded-up stores reopened and goods reappeared on the shelves. But the Soviet also found that the public much preferred to deal in free stores, while government stores could not move their goods for lack of customers. Free trade quickly began making important inroads on government trade. This would not do, for it endangered the very foundation on which the Communist regime was built. And so the Secret

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Police descended on the free stores, expropriated their goods and deported the *nepmen* to concentration camps.

At the time I was aboard a train traveling from Leningrad to Murmansk. Somewhere to the south of Kem, near the Arctic Circle, the train stopped on account of engine trouble, as happened quite frequently on Russian railroads of that day. The delay lasted several hours, until another locomotive could be sent down. As I was provided with special credentials, I was permitted to get off the train and look around. A concentration camp was located at some distance from the rail line, on a stretch of dry ground in the midst of a vast arctic swampland. It consisted of many rows of wooden, barrack-like, one-story buildings, which looked like long storage sheds, with practically no windows. The camp was heavily guarded on the railroad side, but the other three sides, facing the swamp, were virtually unwatched. If any of the inmates wanted to get lost in the bottomless bog, it was their privilege.

I was told that there were more than ten thousand inmates in that camp, principally *nepmen*, ex-priests, kulaks (wealthy peasants), and members of the former bourgeoisie who had been critical of the Communist regime. The camp held both men and women, although the male element predominated. In accordance with the Soviet Constitution which says, "He who does not work, neither shall he eat," they all had to work, and work hard, from dawn to dusk. They received no pay. Their daily food ration consisted of a half pound of boiled potatoes, a dish of cabbage soup without meat and two slices of black bread. Their clothing, even that of the women, was more or less rags. Their work was draining the swamp, a preparatory operation for the building of a new rail line from Kem to Arkhangelsk. They were gaunt, stooped figures, with the movement of automatons, with lean, bony faces and sunken eyes the forlorn look of which told of their resignation.

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They were more like specters of a former life than human beings. All around them rose the foul, stinking miasma of the swamp.

Years later, I met a man who had been confined for years in one of these concentration camps. As a matter of fact, he was a distant relative of mine. He used to be an executive at one of the large machine-building plants in Leningrad and in those days owned his own home, a beautiful two-story, cut-stone building, in a residential suburb. At the time of the *Nep* he gave financial backing to a friend who opened a free store. For a while everything went well. Then, one day, the Secret Police swooped down on him, and the next day he was on his way to a concentration camp in the White Sea region. No court, no sentence. His wife and daughter almost went insane; it was not until fourteen months later that they got the first news from him, and then it was a postcard which merely stated he was alive.

Eventually his daughter married an engineer, a member of the Communist Party who occupied a responsible position in Murmansk. For years the two petitioned the Government. Finally, eight years after his arrest, the man was released and placed in the custody of his son-in-law. He was given a position as bookkeeper in a warehouse. He spent the whole day bent over his books, putting down figures in ink and not uttering a word. When he came home at night, he sank into a chair, stared into space, and still remained silent.

I had known him very well before the Revolution and even for some time after, until I left Russia and returned to the United States. We had belonged to the same club and had been on fishing and hunting parties together. He had always been the life of the party. When I saw him again after all these years, I did not know who he was. I had to be told. He was only forty-two, yet he looked like a man past seventy. His body was caved in, his face parched and

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wrinkled, his eyes glassy and expressionless. He recognized me instantly. Outwardly his reaction was just a feeble handshake. "So glad," was all he said.

One night I succeeded in getting a few words out of him. I discovered he was held in the clutches of an ever-present fear. He said, "Please, don't ask me questions. It was horrible—too horrible for words. If I talk about it, they will send me back."

How many concentration camps there are in Soviet Russia, where they are located, and how many people are confined to them, is impossible to establish with any degree of exactitude. The only ones who know all the facts and figures are the high officials of the Secret Police, and they do not divulge their information. A Soviet source both authentic and reliable estimates that at the height of the Church persecution, the liquidation of nepmen, the drive against independent labor unions, and the great farm collectivization drive—all of which more or less coincided—Russia's concentration camp population of political offenders was in excess of six million.

Concentration camp labor has been used extensively in Russia for the construction of projects of national importance, such as the draining of arctic swamps, the building of northern rail lines, and the vast irrigation projects in the deserts of Central Asia. The best-known project constructed largely by forced labor is the North Siberian Railroad, extending from Taishet near the Yenissei River to Port Soviet on Tartary Strait, across from Sakhalin Island, a distance of more than two thousand miles, for the most part through unexplored Siberian wilderness.

During the war, when the labor shortage in war plants became acute, the inmates of concentration camps were rushed to the plants and put to work. In his book, *Report on the Russians*, William L. White tells of meeting a column of women clothed in rags and makeshift sandals being

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marched, four abreast, to work in the Magnitogorsk Steel Plant in the Urals. "Marching ahead of the column, behind it and on both sides, are military guards carrying rifles with fixed bayonets," says Mr. White, leaving, somehow, the impression that this sort of thing applies to Russian workers in general. But such is not the case. What Mr. White probably saw were inmates of a concentration camp for political offenders being put to work in the steel mill.

In the years immediately preceding the war, Russia's concentration camp population had dropped somewhat. Large numbers of inmates, succumbing under the crushing burden of confinement and forced labor, had died. Many, considered purged of their erring ways, had been released to live their days as haunted specters, like the man in Murmansk. As political opposition to the methods of the Communist regime kept decreasing, so did the number of new deportees.

But the war years have witnessed another upward spurt. Nazi propaganda had something to do with it. The Nazis, pretending to be supporters of the Russian Orthodox Church, made a certain amount of headway with their religious policy in the Ukraine and other occupied Russian territories. The news penetrated the battle lines and was whispered all over Russia. The Communist regime swiftly clapped the whisperers, wherever the Secret Police laid hands on them, into concentration camps. It was also in part to counteract this religious campaign that the Communist regime restored the Church in Russia.

Then, as the Russian armies started their victorious advance, with the Secret Police right behind them, there were quite a few who were either accused or suspected of collaboration with the invader during the occupation. Needless to say, the concentration camp was their lot. This was particularly true in the Baltic countries which had been independent before the war and whose population, for the most part, was not at

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all in sympathy with the Communist way of doing things. It is an indisputable fact that about 25 per cent of the population of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, also of the eastern part of pre-war Poland, was deported, to be replaced by Russian settlers wholeheartedly devoted to Communist Party principles; the Soviet Government does not bother with half-way measures when important issues are at stake. Not all of these deportees were sent to concentration camps; quite a number were resettled—without asking their leave, of course—in Central Asia and other parts of Siberia where they were allowed to become useful members of the Soviet community. Nonetheless, the number of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles in Russian concentration camps is considerable, judging from persistent reports. And more recently they have been joined by Rumanians, Hungarians, and Bulgars. How many, is impossible to tell. The Secret Police maintains silence.¹

The muzzling of political opponents by means of the concentration camp has always been a notorious feature of Russian political life. The Communists have taken it over and have enlarged and improved on it. Nor is there any possibility of its departure from the Russian scene in the foreseeable future. It is an essential feature of a regime whose political and economic tendencies alike are strictly totalitarian and which, therefore, cannot tolerate any opposition.

I gained a great deal of first-hand information about current Russian concentration camp policies from numerous Polish soldiers in Italy. It is no secret that the Polish armies which fought on our side in Italy and France were largely composed of men who had been herded into Russian concentration camps following the Russian occupation of eastern Poland in 1939. Their only crime was that they were Poles. After Hitler had attacked Russia in 1941, Great Britain and

¹ By the middle of 1946, concentration camp inmates, or slave labor, in Russia, augmented by deportees from satellite nations, had reached an all-time high of over 20,000,000.

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the United States brought pressure to bear on Russia in favor of these Poles. As Russia's military situation was growing more acute in those days and she desperately needed Allied help, she submitted to these Allied demands. The deported Poles, or at least a large part of them, were released and allowed to proceed to the Middle East. There the men were organized into military units to fight on the side of the Western Allies, while their families were left waiting in Iran, Egypt, and other Middle East countries.

From these Poles, I gained a graphic description of their life in Russia as political deportees. Some had been put to work on irrigation projects in Central Asia, working from twelve to fourteen hours daily in the blistering desert heat. Others had been sent to work on the double-tracking of the Tashkent Railroad, between Orenburg and Tashkent, to facilitate the movement of American Lend-Lease supplies from Iran. Still others had to unload lend-lease supplies in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk at a time when German bombing squadrons were almost constantly overhead and when all mechanical harbor equipment had been destroyed. They received no pay. Their food ration was just sufficient to keep them at work. Some of the stories these men told me were so gory that my sense of propriety prevents me from repeating them.

There are altogether some 120,000 of these Polish troops. They refuse to be repatriated to the present Russian-dominated Poland. Their contention is that if they return, they will meet with the same concentration camp fate, and they want none of it. After what they endured, I do not see how anyone can blame them.

Today Russia's forced labor policy is guided by a consideration even more potent than the victims' political unreliability. The truth is that Russia some time ago scraped the bottom of her labor barrel. This development is the direct result of

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Russia's gigantic industrialization drive. In 1926, before the Communist Government embarked on this drive with its first Five-Year Plan, Russia had some four million industrial workers. By 1941, when Russia entered the war, this labor force was increased to almost twenty million. In addition, the number of white-collar men—engineers, clerks, accountants, executives, and the bulk of the vast Soviet bureaucracy, including the Secret Police—was increased by four million. This was achieved largely by forcing some twenty million farmers off the land by means of the great collectivization drive, the most radical peacetime social transformation in history. When the war came, Russia, already short of workers, had to scoop up the last crumbs in the labor barrel. Women, children, convicts—all had to work.

The war cost Russia millions of her best workers, yet she faces not only a tremendous reconstruction job but also the latest Five-Year Plan—a new great industrialization drive with the help of the vast quantities of factory equipment looted from Germany, Manchuria, and the Balkan countries. Russia needs labor desperately, and this time she cannot draw on any surplus farm labor of her own. On the contrary, her farms need additional workers until the time when the mechanical equipment destroyed or worn out during the war has been replaced, if the Russian people are to be fed during the reconstruction years.

To solve this problem, Russia is resorting to forced, or concentration camp, labor on a scale hitherto unknown in the annals of history. The reports on the masses of slave laborers Russia has herded across her frontiers from Central and Eastern Europe are by no means accurate, but in round figures they are fairly reliable. More than 400,000 Germans who had lived in Transylvania for many generations were the price Rumania paid for the return of Transylvania as a gift from Stalin, as it was officially stated. More than 250,000

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Bulgars whom the Communist-dominated Bulgarian Government considered politically unreliable were wrapped up as a gift package for Russia. An equal number of Rumanians was deported to Russia for much the same reason. Then there were more than 300,000 Hungarians whose misfortune was that they lived in Transylvania and whom the Rumanians did not want. Also, the 200,000 Austrians, deported from the Russian-occupied zone, and more than a quarter million Slovaks accused, rightly or wrongly, of having collaborated with the Nazis. Then, too, there was Marshal Tito's special present of more than 300,000, principally Chetniks and former Russian refugees who had settled in Yugoslavia after the revolution; Tito did not have the concentration camp facilities himself and so Russia was welcome to them.

From Poland the Russians obtained more than a half million Poles, sympathizers of the former Polish underground which wanted no part of the Moscow-sponsored Bierut regime. There was almost the entire German population of East Prussia, which ran to more than two million. Finally, there were the five million compulsory German workers, including prisoners of war, whom the Russians sent into bondage from the Russian-occupied zone of Germany. In all, these various contributions add up to something like eleven million slave workers, who comprise a vital work unit for Russia's future production.

How long are these millions of slave laborers to remain in Russia? Probably until they die or become too sick to be of any profitable use. No treaty or other agreement covering their return is known to exist. One thing is certain—Russia needs all the labor she can lay her hands on. And she is prosecutor, judge and jury, all in one, so far as these deportees are concerned.

CHAPTER XV

Black Markets

YES, THERE ARE BLACK MARKETS IN RUSSIA. THEY ARE numerous and all over the country, but principally in the big cities. The prices charged by these black markets are so stupendous that they would make the American black marketeer's mouth water. They are conducted with the Government's knowledge and directly under the eyes of the ever-present police. They are not just a war phenomenon, but are slated to remain for years after the war. Their outgrowth is a typically Russian feature that cannot be understood by anyone who cannot visualize the crazy quilt of Russian Communism.

To begin with, there are the black markets conducted by the *kolkhozniki*, the collective farmers. The Russian peasant, as already explained in a preceding chapter, works for the *kolkhoz*, the collective farm to which he is assigned. About nine-tenths of the produce of the collective farm goes to the Government, either in taxes or at low-pegged official prices; the remaining one-tenth is distributed among the peasants for their personal needs. They also have their individual patches of garden land to raise their supply of kitchen vegetables. They are allowed to sell to city dwellers anything which they can spare from this supply at whatever prices they care to ask.

An American farmer does not have to take his produce to market. Either he can ship it to a city wholesale house, or he can deal with commission merchants who truck his produce to the city for resale. In Russia, if a commission man got this

bright idea, both he and the peasant who sold to him would be promptly sent to a concentration camp for a period of five years or more. It would be a transaction for profit. The commission merchant, not a worker, would be guilty of "exploiting" both the peasant and the city consumer and therefore subject to severe punishment. But the peasant himself, if he carries or hauls his own surplus to the city market, does not sell for profit, no matter how extortionate his prices, because he disposes of the product of his own toil. It sounds illogical to American ears, but such is the Russian Communist system.

In Moscow, for instance, the Central Market is clogged daily with peasants from state and collective farms who sell their wares to the city dweller. The prices they ask, and receive, are positively fantastic. Translated into commensurate American values, a pound of black bread, cut from a large round loaf, sells for \$5.00. Ten eggs—in Russia, eggs are not sold by the dozen—bring \$18. Potatoes, and not very good ones at that, are sold at \$1.00 per pound. A pound of water-soaked country butter goes for \$15, a medium head of cabbage for \$3.00; a pint of milk—pretty thin and of a decidedly bluish tint—for \$1.50; a pound of *baranina* (mutton), for \$12.

One will ask, how is it that the Russians pay such fantastic prices? Is Russia a land of millionaires? It isn't, and the answer is quite simple. Again it is part of the crazy quilt of Russian Communism. Every Russian receives a ration book with which he can buy food supplies at the government-owned ration stores at low-pegged government prices. But the supply of ration goods allotted to him is not enough; it will suffice for about twenty-five days of the month. In order to eat during the remaining five days of the month, he must be dependent on the black market or, as it is called in Russia, the free market, at prices anywhere from twenty to thirty times

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those charged by the ration stores. Or else he starves.

Frequently the produce-selling peasant will not accept money at all. He reasons that money is good only so long as he can buy something with it. In Russia there is a terrible shortage of consumer goods of all kinds, especially in the rural districts. The peasant hopes to obtain these goods in the cities, and frequently he proposes a barter trade. The consumer goods offered by the hungry city dwellers in exchange are usually second-hand. Thus a pair of used and carefully mended cotton stockings will bring \$7.00; rayon hose may net the city dweller as high as \$25 a pair. A pair of men's somewhat worn shoes rates as high as \$200. Once the respective prices have been agreed upon by both parties, the barter takes place. I myself heard of a transaction whereby the peasant carted home a piano in exchange for his cartload of produce. Not that he knew how to play it, but it gave him a proud sense of possession.

But this is not all. Entirely apart from what the *kolkhozniki* sell of their personal surplus, there is a tremendous black market in Russia which is conducted by the Government itself as a state monopoly. Sounds unbelievable, doesn't it? But such is the way of Communist Russia. And the leaders have a perfectly plausible explanation for it.

In addition to the ration stores, the Government operates a large number of so-called *Commercial Stores* throughout the land. Like all prices in Russia, the prices in these Commercial Stores are fixed by the Government, and they are enormously high. In these stores one can purchase the luxury goods which are unobtainable in ration stores. The Commercial stores are open to everyone who has the money. One can buy a quart bottle of vodka for \$40, or the equivalent of ten days' wages. A pound of sugar, a very scarce commodity in Russia, sells for \$80. A pound of bologna sausage, none too appetizing visually, costs \$14; a pound of bacon, \$25.

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Eggs are obtainable at \$2.00 apiece. So-called Swiss cheese is sold at \$20 a pound. One can buy the equivalent of an American 5-cent cigar for \$2.50; and a dressed chicken, uncooked, at the rate of \$15 per pound. One can purchase apples at \$4 apiece and 4-ounce vanilla chocolate bars at \$25 apiece. A brick of ice cream about the size of our pint costs \$7, and a pint of whipping cream \$8. One can also purchase a new three-piece suit for \$1100 and a pair of men's new shoes for \$450.

If a government venture of this sort were conducted in the United States, the American people would start an angry march on Washington. But the Russians do not protest; on the contrary, they are glad that the Government makes it possible at all for them to obtain these things. They look upon the Commercial Stores as a new blessing of Communist society.

As one who was brought up in Russia in the days when living—and I mean a really good living—was cheap, much cheaper indeed than in the America of those days, I had the courage to ask an important official to explain the policy behind these fantastic prices of the government-operated Russian black market. His answer was so interesting that I repeat it verbatim.

"The Soviet Government deals with its people on a realistic basis. Our supply of foods and other goods is very limited. Therefore we are compelled to issue to each Soviet citizen a ration that will barely see him through. These rationed goods we give him at very low prices; it is his due as a Soviet citizen. But the stepped-up war production has brought more money into the pockets of Soviet citizens than they have ever had before. We understand human psychology. We know that if a man has a surplus of money and is apportioned a limited supply of goods, he will try to buy additional goods with his money at whatever price is asked of him, and no laws

Black Markets

or regulations will stop him from obtaining these additional goods illegally if the legal avenues are closed to him.

"In the United States and other capitalist countries," he went on to say, "you have the identical picture. If the people have money, they want to buy black market goods. They think it is their God-given right to spend their earnings as they please. But in your country all the black market profits—and we understand they are huge—go into the private pockets of speculators and war profiteers, who not only exploit the consumers but also cheat the State by not paying taxes on their illegal incomes. We in the Soviet State do not tolerate any such law-breaking.

"In our socialist country all profits belong to the State—they represent taxes. Since we know that Soviet citizens will buy in the black market—after all, you cannot change human nature—we make it perfectly legal for them to do so. We let them buy in a state-operated black market. In this manner we satisfy their hunger for luxury goods, and at the same time we pump their excess earnings back into the State Treasury. It is really very simple."

It did sound simple, the way he put it. But then Russian Communists have a knack for making even the most involved economic manipulation sound simple when they explain it to an outsider. Still, to pay \$2.00 for one egg and \$450 for a pair of shoes. . . .

CHAPTER XVI

The Coming Symbol

UNDER THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST SYSTEM, THE GOVERNMENT plans everything in advance, including even the production of children. The Communist leaders are stark realists who have gone through the hard school of life, and often literally fought their way to the top. They know that man is mortal. They have a great leader in Stalin, who has been accepted by the Russian masses as the living symbol of Russia. But the Politburo members know that Stalin can die, and that eventually he will die. When that happens, they must have a new leader for their hierarchy and a new living symbol for the Russian masses, and they must hold him in readiness. Being the farsighted planners they are, it is not to be expected that they have fallen short in planning for an immediate succession in the event that Stalin unexpectedly meets the final fate reserved for all mortals.

But the question of succession is a very critical problem. Stalin is Russia's national hero today, and Russians look upon their heroes as immortals. In times past the Orthodox Church elevated Russia's great national heroes to sainthood. This is hardly feasible today for a Church that was virtually driven out of existence by the same Stalin. And so the problem remains. For the Politburo even to so much as hint that the day will come when Stalin is no more, would be very impolitic. The Russian people want a living symbol. To publicize the question of succession in advance would, in Russian eyes, show disloyalty to Stalin, the symbol. Therefore the succession is

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treated as the most secret of all State secrets. No one in Russia will discuss it. And no one in Russia is worried. In the United States, the question of Presidential succession would assume the proportions of nationwide speculation. The Russians merely say, "If Stalin was wise enough to win the war, he will be wise enough to choose the right man to carry on."

We in the United States reason differently. We are now committed to a policy of cooperation with Russia, and a considerable part of our national resources is devoted to that policy. We have found it very difficult on many occasions to deal with modern sphinxlike Russia. But our national leaders have had personal contact with Stalin. They know something of the man, and have gained at least an inkling of his policies. If a new man should take the helm, who will he be and what are going to be his policies? Will he be able to sway the Politburo in a new direction? We know that he will be a Communist, but will he be an aggressive, militant Communist bent on forceful communistic expansion? Inasmuch as Russian Communism and Russian Imperialism now march hand-in-hand, will he be also a Russian Imperialist bent on territorial expansion? Or will he be the compromise type, prepared to sacrifice Communist expansion in the interests of world cooperation? The answers to all these questions are extremely vital to us, although probably no Russian will consider them as such. Therefore it is only natural that we should want to know who in Russia is next in line of succession.

As a matter of fact, speculation on the subject of Stalin's successor has been rampant in the United States ever since the Yalta Conference. In the late fall of 1945, when Stalin, then on vacation, failed to attend the anniversary of the Revolution in Moscow, this speculation assumed gigantic proportions. Rumors flew around the world that Stalin was dying or dead. The Bern radio reported that the Russian leader had died aboard a Russian warship in the Black Sea. Vienna

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claimed he was a victim of illnesses ranging from blood poisoning to cancer. The French radio at Brazzaville in Africa broadcast frantic Soviet Embassy denials, which only served to accelerate the rumors. Even government circles in Washington and London believed that Stalin was dead or dying; Russian troops in Germany, Austria, and the Balkans were reported to be restive. In fact, many U. S. newspapers prepared obituaries and held them in readiness.

Everybody in the wide world knew, or claimed to know, what was the matter with Stalin, except Stalin himself who was simply taking a rest. Nor did the rumors surprise him in the least. They were nothing new; they had constantly recurred in the past and had never caused him much concern. Once, in reply to a press query concerning rumors of his demise, Stalin paraphrased Mark Twain in replying, "I know from reports of the foreign press that I long ago abandoned this sinful world. . . . I request you believe them and don't disturb me in the calm of the other world."

The American press refused to take it as calmly as Stalin himself did. Columnists and commentators came out with the flat statement that "Premier Stalin's health is of the greatest concern to the world. The disappearance of Russia's leader from the scene might have serious consequences in the affairs of the Soviet Union, and the rest of the globe, because of the uncertainty of the Russian succession, and the impossibility to predict what the policies of Stalin's successor, whoever he may be, will entail."

At the same time the American press was running wild with speculation about that successor. Marshal Zhukov,¹ General Antonov, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Andreyev, were all named by different sources. Every known figure in Russian

¹ As a direct result of thoughtless and utterly unfounded American newspaper speculation advancing Marshal Zhukov as Stalin's appointed successor, the Marshal was in July, 1946, relegated to an obscure command post in the Odessa military district, far removed from the Moscow political scene.

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political life was analyzed as to his qualifications to succeed Stalin. Only when Moscow announced officially late in December that Stalin had returned to his duties did the welter of speculation subside, merely to wait for the next opportunity.

The principal error of logic to all this speculation is that the American prognosticators who are picking Stalin's successor never bother to say in just what posts he will replace Stalin. The fact is that throughout the war Stalin occupied a number of posts highly important in the Russian picture and retained them after the end of the war. Stalin is Premier of Russia and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. He is Chairman of the Soviet Defense Council and Commander-in-Chief of Russia's Armed Forces. He is a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the four-men Party-Secretariat, to mention just a few of his more important attainments.

A man who stands high in Soviet councils told me that Stalin continues to occupy the various high offices not because he wants to hold on to them but simply because of his great personal prestige as Russia's war leader; because of his being the living symbol of Russia. In the event of Stalin's death, the various high offices will *not* be occupied by one and the same person, unless the nation finds itself confronted by another great emergency such as the recent war. This advisor told me also that it was a foregone conclusion that Molotov, who was displaced as Premier by Stalin in May, 1941, will be reinstated in that post and at the same time will retain the office of Foreign Commissar. The chairmanship in the Soviet Defense Council will in all likelihood go to whoever succeeds Stalin as Communist Party chief. The post of Commander-in-Chief of Russia's Armed Forces, which did not exist until Russia entered the war, will be left in abeyance until Russia is faced with another great war emergency.

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All of which is of great interest, but it has no real bearing on the question of Stalin's successor. Until 1941, Stalin was neither Premier, nor Chairman of the Soviet Defense Council, nor Commander-in-Chief. As a matter of fact, he did not occupy a single official post in the Soviet Government. He was merely Secretary General of the Communist Party, and it was in this capacity that, ever since Lenin's death, he was the actual power in Russia as well as the uncrowned leader of World Communism. During all those years preceding the war, any high office in Russia was Stalin's for the mere taking; and when the war broke out it was understood by everyone in Russia that only Stalin, as actual Soviet leader, possessed the personal prestige to guide the Soviet ship of state through the great ordeal it was facing. It was as simple as that.

Therefore the question of Stalin's successor has nothing to do with who will be Premier after him, or Chairman of the Soviet Defense Council. It is simply a case of who will succeed him as the actual guiding power of the Communist Party. This man is already there, but before I name him I will indicate the various rungs of the ladder that have carried him to his position of party power.

In the first place the man who succeeds Stalin as party leader can come only from the present ranks of the Politburo, the highest arbiter of all Soviet policy. The man in question was selected late in 1942, and it is a fact that on the two occasions when Stalin went abroad, this man remained in Moscow, ready for any emergency. During Stalin's journey to Teheran, and later on to Potsdam, the only Politburo members who accompanied him were Marshal Voroshilov and Molotov, which rules them out. Others, among them Malenkov, are ruled out because of their advanced age; the Politburo wants a young, vigorous leader, one able to hold the leadership for a considerable time to come.

Soviet rule, as I have already pointed out, is essentially gov-

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ernment by committee, and the same principle applies to the Communist Party setup. Naturally, there are committees of greater and lesser importance. The strategic strength of any Politburo member within the party organization is measured by the relative importance of the committees of which he is a guiding member, and on which, therefore, he exerts the greatest amount of personal influence. Needless to say, the degree of confidence which Stalin, personally, places in a man is also a determining factor. But it stands to reason that unless the man in question possessed Stalin's full confidence, he could hardly have advanced to influential membership in the various key committees.

Next to the Politburo, which stands supreme, there are two other high juntas of power at the top of the party organization. One is the Orgburo, which controls all patronage, and the other is the Party Secretariat, now consisting of four members. Other than Stalin himself, only Andreyev, Malenkov, and Zhdanov are members of both these juntas.

Still another power indicator in the involved Communist Party setup is the position of a party leader with respect to the Red Army. The Red Army was largely responsible for Soviet Russia's new position as a world power, and whoever controls the Red Army politically stands higher than his party colleagues. Stalin, of course, as Commander-in-Chief is supreme over the Red Army, but there is yet another key committee—one very seldom heard of, but, nevertheless, one of great strategic strength for the man who controls it—and that is the Bureau of Coordination of Party and Army Policy. It entails in effect the actual exercise of party control over the army, which, like everything else in Soviet Russia, is under the supreme guidance of the Communist Party. The head of this bureau, the coordinator of party and army policy, and at the same time the high chief of all Soviet propaganda, is Colonel General Zhdanov; his assistant, who acts during Zhdanov's

absences on important matters of state, is Shcherbakov.

Going another step further, the Communist Party in Russia is organized in the form of great regional machines. The two most powerful of these party machines are those of Moscow and Leningrad. No one who does not effectively control both these machines can aspire to top leadership as a whole. Zhdanov is boss of the Leningrad party machine, and Shcherbakov is boss of the Moscow machine. Shcherbakov is not a member of either the Orgburo or the Party Secretariat, but Zhdanov is a member of both.

Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov has a potent finger in every important party pie. Furthermore, Zhdanov is very close to Stalin in a personal way, closer than any other member of the Communist hierarchy. During the war, occupied with all the pressing military problems, Stalin delegated many important party tasks into Zhdanov's hands. Zhdanov was also the key figure in the 525-day siege of Leningrad, in the city's successful defense against heavy odds, a military factor which by most strategists is regarded as the turning point of the war in Russia. But most important of all, before Stalin departed for Teheran in 1943 *he turned over to Zhdanov the post of Secretary General of the Communist Party*. It was precisely in this post that Stalin wielded his tremendous political power in the prewar period when he abstained from occupying any official position in the Soviet setup. It is thus that Zhdanov emerges as heir presumptive to Stalin's political position in Russia.

Just what sort of man is this Zhdanov who, unless circumstances entirely unforeseeable at this time interfere, will guide the destinies of one-fifth of the world in the event Stalin should die? Where does he come from? What are his antecedents, his background, his views on Russian domestic and international problems?

I met Zhdanov for the first time in 1917 when he was

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twenty-one and I was just a few years older. He was then a soldier in the Czarist Army who had fought with valor and distinction in some of the battles of World War I. He had seen the corruption and impotence of the old regime at first hand, in the trenches. This experience turned him into an ardent Bolshevik, a firm and enthusiastic believer in a new way of life. A fiery speaker, an expert handler of revolutionary slogans, he threw himself with the irresistible ardor of youth into the organization of a front-soldier's soviet and from there went on to more important tasks that for a time took him into the Leningrad Soviet, which quickly became the nucleus of the Bolshevik Revolution.

I met him for a second time in 1919, during the most critical period of the Russian Civil War when the Soviet Government realized that it was engaged in a tremendous struggle from which it would emerge either victorious or not at all. Zhdanov was a political commissar attached to a Red Army unit, and he drove the Red fighters on with the terrific energy he has since displayed in most of the undertakings with which he was associated. From that time on, young Zhdanov began his slow but steady climb up the ladder of party hierarchy.

Zhdanov is not a member of the Old Bolshevik Guard which engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the Czarist regime ever since the turn of the century. He never was a political exile, in Siberia or abroad. He joined the cause at the time the revolution was at its peak. His father, a former ecclesiastic, an able and educated man, was a member of what was then called the bourgeoisie. Young Zhdanov received an excellent education, including the study of foreign languages. During his student years, his family wanted him to become an ecclesiastic, but the war and the aftermath of political turmoil brought a change in his career. Instead, he took part in political agitation and revolutionary organization,

with all the momentous consequences attached thereto.

The Civil War over, Zhdanov returned to party organizational work. He was sent to Ekaterinburg—now called Sverdlovsk—in the Urals. Because of his educational background, his ideas excelled those of ordinary party organizers, who, for the most part, originated from the peasant ranks. He did his job well and was entrusted with an important task in Nizhni Novgorod—since renamed Gorki—which at the time was a hotbed of counter-revolutionary activity. Quickly he brought order out of political chaos and showed himself ripe for even greater tasks. During those days of intensive organizational work, Zhdanov married a woman of good education and family.

From Gorki, Zhdanov returned to Leningrad to become the right-hand man of Kirov, who was then the ranking party leader in Russia's second largest city. Kirov was also Stalin's closest personal friend, and thus Zhdanov's rise from that point on was clearly indicated. Largely under Zhdanov's influence, Kirov began urging upon Stalin the amalgamation of Communist principles with the old traditions of the Russian people. With Stalin's approval, the two initiated the first moves toward the reintroduction of Russian history in the Soviet educational system and the glorification of Russian national heroes of the past—Ilya Mourometz, Alexander Nevsky, Dimitri Donskoi, Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and all the rest. In collaboration with Kirov, Zhdanov wrote a book titled *On the Recreation of History*, which has since served as a beacon for reviving Russian historic tradition. Undoubtedly Zhdanov deserves a great deal of the credit for turning Communism into saner and more realistic channels, for making it the typically *Russian Communism* of the present era. Zhdanov also had an important hand in the lessening of antireligious activity and in eventually bringing about the restoration of the Orthodox Church in Communist Russia.

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Kirov's assassination by a rebellious faction within the Communist Party came as a great blow to Zhdanov. Taking Kirov's place, he conducted a ruthless purge among the dissidents. He adhered strictly to Stalin's view that political guidance must be centralized, that no factionalism can be tolerated, and that there should be one unified will in the building up of Communist Russia as a world power. Admitted to membership in Kirov's place in the omnipotent Politburo, Zhdanov maintained this policy through the great purge of 1937.

But immediately following the purge, it was Zhdanov who came out strongly for a healing of party wounds. The very fierceness of the purge, its reach into even the remotest corners of the Soviet Union, had left all party members with a dreadful sense of insecurity, a great fear of the party dictators at the top. A situation of this sort, Zhdanov contended, must not be allowed to continue. He declared boldly: "The most objectionable part of such mass purges is that, possessing as they do the character of a warlike campaign, they are accompanied by many mistakes, principal of which is the disregard of the Leninist principle of an individual approach to the people." He went on to say: "There have been many instances where elements actually hostile to the Party wormed their way into the party ranks where they took advantage of the purges to persecute and ruin honest people."

Largely due to Zhdanov's insistence, party rules were liberalized with a view to restoring a sense of security among surviving party members and facilitating the admission of new members. The amended rules provided that party members could no longer be expelled in secret sessions of presiding officers, but were to be accorded a chance to defend their actions in open party meetings. Furthermore, an expelled member was given the right to appeal his case all the way up to the Central Committee. After a hard struggle with old

party stalwarts, Zhdanov carried also his other point of giving youth a broader representation within the party and championed the right of *komsomols* (young Communists) to become candidates for party membership at the age of eighteen, rather than at the former age limit of twenty-three. He led a vigorous drive for the expansion of party membership, contending that to be widely respected and successful the Party must form a larger core of the people than heretofore, especially among the younger element upon whose shoulders the great task of carrying on would eventually fall.

After Zinoviev's execution, Zhdanov took the former's place on the Central Executive Committee of the Comintern. But he refused the post of chairman, insisting that it would be a wiser course to give it to a foreign delegate, and the post went to the veteran Bulgarian Communist, Dimitrov. It did not take Zhdanov very long to arrive at the conclusion that the Comintern policy of the past had been erroneous in many of its aspects and, under the circumstances, largely fruitless. As is his custom, he stated his views on the subject boldly and fearlessly. He contended that Communism's objective should be to make a great success in Russia before it undertook to expand beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. The eventual dissolution of the Comintern as a world body proved that his views had prevailed.

Thus, during the last few years of peace, Zhdanov gradually assumed a commanding position as Stalin's closest political lieutenant. On the outbreak of the war, he plunged with his customary vigor into new and greater tasks. When, early in the campaign the Red Army Staff recommended that Leningrad should be abandoned in favor of a defense line farther east, Zhdanov objected most firmly. He pointed out that the fall of Leningrad, the cradle of the Revolution, would constitute a blow to Russian prestige so tremendous that it could easily lead to the loss of the war and, consequently, the fall of

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the Soviet Government. Stalin accepted his view and personally entrusted Zhdanov with the defense of Leningrad. It was largely due to Zhdanov's driving force and strategic planning that the city withstood the grueling siege.

Again Zhdanov had proved himself right. Stalin's confidence in the man who was not afraid to speak his mind grew even stronger. Zhdanov was richly rewarded. A purely political leader ever since the days of the Russian Civil War, he was appointed to the rank of Colonel General. He was entrusted with the political control of the Red Army, which gave him additional power. Red Army marshals and generals may decide all purely military matters, but when it comes to any political decision affecting the army, Zhdanov is undisputed boss. It is his task to keep the army firmly subordinated to the Party.

Zhdanov, despite his high position, prefers to stay in the background. He never attends the sumptuous state banquets and receptions given for foreign diplomats. Although he is a moving force behind many of Soviet Russia's decisions affecting the foreign field, he remains in the background. His self-effacement in this respect is due to his utter loyalty to Stalin as the great national leader, as well as to his own political sagacity. A great student of Russian tradition and a firm believer in party discipline, he adheres to both these principles.

In his personal relations Zhdanov is thoroughly human. Like his brother-in-law and close collaborator, Shcherbakov, he is a corpulent man, short and stocky, with a double chin and small, shrewd-looking eyes. In his conversations as well as in his speeches he displays a rich, salty, typically Russian humor. Like all Politburo members, he is an exemplary family man. Tremendously occupied as he is with vital political problems, he always arranges to spend an hour or two each day with his wife and son. The latter is spoken of as a

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young man of great ability, no doubt a result of parental influence. The younger Zhdanov is a member of the Communist Youth and unquestionably will make his rise in the party ranks. But it will have to be by his own effort, his father does not believe in nepotism.

Ever since the German surrender, Zhdanov, undoubtedly in preparation for his future task, has traveled extensively throughout the sphere of Russian influence beyond the Soviet borders. Finland, which he aims to convert into a much larger unit via a union with the Finnish-speaking soviet regions, is his personal domain as Chairman of the Inter-Allied Control Commission, and he pays periodical visits there. He visited Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and the Russian-occupied zone of Germany. He even took a trip down into Iranian Azerbeidjan, the province which at the turn of the present year declared its autonomy from the Iranian Government—under Russian protection, of course. His visits everywhere, while by no means a secret, are deliberately kept from the spotlight and, especially, from the foreign press; Zhdanov most definitely does not wish to be advertised abroad as Stalin's political heir and successor.

Is Zhdanov a convinced Communist? Most definitely. His entire career is proof of it. He firmly believes that Communism is the system toward which the traditions and historical development of the Russian people have always pointed. He believes also that Communism will undergo a series of natural changes and evolutions which will make it acceptable to other peoples. A considerable part of his own activity has been, and still is, devoted to clearing the way for such a process of evolution. It was Zhdanov who launched the current Russian dogma that only Soviet Russia conforms to genuine democratic concepts, while the Western World merely pays lip service to democracy without really practicing

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it. As seasoned Russian Communist thinkers express themselves, Lenin was the father of Communism who put it to its first practical application. Stalin guided Communism through its years of storm and stress, the period of revolutionary struggle and healthful change. Zhdanov will take Communism beyond the experimental era, guide it to higher levels, at the same time building the firm foundation from which it can expand to pure Communism the world over.

Is Zhdanov a Russian Imperialist? Unquestionably so. It was he who demanded the incorporation of the Baltic States before the war, persisted in this demand through the darkest months of the struggle and finally won out against the combined opposition of the Western Powers. It was he also who insisted that Poland be reconstituted as an essentially Slavic nation, under exclusively Russian guidance and without any ties to nations historically opposed to Russia's place in the sun. It was he who counseled Russia's penetration into the Balkans, to prepare the "brother nations" for an eventual assimilation into a "Slavic Brotherhood of Nations." It was likewise he who demanded Finland's return to her previous close affiliation with Russia. It was he who pressed for Russian control over the Dardanelles and Turkey's entry into the Russian sphere of influence. Finally, it was he who insisted on a rearrangement of Asiatic matters in compliance with vital Russian interests.

Is there any basic conflict between Zhdanov the Communist on the one hand and Zhdanov the Russian Imperialist on the other? None whatsoever. In fact, for each of the two tendencies to succeed, they must complement each other. Russian Communism and Russian Imperialism today are inseparable partners. The thesis is that Communism must first succeed in Russia. In order to do so, it must have an economically strong Russia in which to work the miracle that will convince the world. It must have also a militarily powerful Russia that

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will command the respect of the world and thus remain immune against inimical foreign interventions. And inasmuch as Russian Communism and Russian Imperialism have become one and indivisible, there must be a sphere of Russian influence extending beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, to provide a fertile soil for gradual evolution in the Communist sense. Such is the thesis which motivates Zhdanov, the great evolutionist. All domestic changes, all reforms in Russia, stand in support of this thesis.

CHAPTER XVII

The Democratic Concept

DEMOCRACY IS A TERM OF VERY ELASTIC DEFINITION. FROM a purely propagandistic point of view, it can be twisted and distorted to fit almost any situation. Different men at different times have given it a widely varied interpretation. It has been served up by different nations, at different times, with different trimmings. In the final analysis it becomes a matter of individual interpretation, like almost anything in this world. But in that case everything depends on the faculty of the individual to interpret correctly. Perhaps the most telling interpretation of democracy was given by Abraham Lincoln when he called it government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

From the American point of view, Russia's government under the present Communist system could hardly fall under Lincoln's interpretation of democracy, being, as it is, government of the Communist Party, by the Communist Party, and for the Communist Party. Yet every Russian today will tell you that his is the only truly democratic regime on earth and that ours is just a "sordid pseudo-democracy." So there you are. Needless to say, I do not agree with the Russian interpretation and neither will, I am sure, the vast majority of my readers. Perhaps the trouble with us is that we do not look at democracy through Russian-colored glasses.

The average Russian will tell you that he, in common with all his compatriots, casts a secret ballot for the election of delegates to all his soviets, which is a democratic procedure,

and therefore his country is a democracy. When you point out to him that all the names on that ballot have been picked beforehand by the Communist Party, and that no other name can appear on the ballot except those picked by the Communist Party, he replies that this is quite as it should be because it is according to the Soviet Constitution. The mere fact that he casts a vote makes his country a democracy. When you go on to say that Hitler, too, allowed the German people to cast a ballot for members of the Reichstag, yet that "freedom" made Germany anything but a democracy, the Russian replies heatedly that Hitler was a devil and a cheat, and anyway, don't you dare talk to him about Hitler. So there you are again.

The average Russian becomes very touchy when you dispute his interpretation of democracy. He will tell you that Stalin has called Russia the only truly democratic country in the world today. Stalin certainly knows what he is talking about. And any man, especially a nosy foreigner who questions Stalin's wisdom and veracity, has a lot of gall.

One time, however, I succeeded in pinning a Russian down to the point, and this is what he said:

"In the Soviet Union we go to the polling place. Let us say we have to elect ten delegates from our district to the regional soviet. We are given a printed ballot with, say, twenty names on it. From these twenty, each voter checks ten names. The ten who receive the majority of votes are elected as delegates. They are then sent as the delegates from our district to the regional soviet. They meet with delegates from other districts. The soviet has, let us say, five hundred delegates altogether. This is too great a number to run the region. So they meet in a plenary session and elect a presidium of, say, fifteen members. Then the soviet adjourns and the presidium carries on all the work during the adjournment."

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"How long does the adjournment last?" I asked.

"Perhaps six months, perhaps a year, perhaps two," he said. "It all depends. You will understand that the delegates must go back home to their regular work."

"And during the adjournment the presidium makes all the decisions?" I wanted to know.

"Of course," he replied. "That's what it was elected for by the soviet."

I asked, "Who places the names on the ballot?"

"The local Communist Party organization," he answered promptly.

"In that case, whomever you voted for would still be a delegate picked by the Communist Party?" was my next question.

"Certainly," he replied. "We have only one political party in the Soviet Union."

I inquired, "How is the presidium elected?"

"That is entirely up to the delegates," he said. "They decide it among themselves."

"In that case," I persisted, "isn't it possible that the presidium was picked in advance by the Communist Party?"

"It is not only possible," he agreed, "it is a virtual certainty. But it is the people who elected them. That is true democracy."

I tried once more. "Couldn't you write any other name on the ballot than the ones printed? The name of your neighbor, for instance, or even your own?"

He looked at me with bewildered eyes. "Certainly not," he said. "That would no longer be democracy. It would be anarchy."

I asked another Russian to explain to me why the Communist Party should be the only political party in the land. The explanation he gave readily enough was typically Russian. In the first place, he said, that was what the Constitution decreed, and the Constitution had to be obeyed at all

times. When I pointed out that the Constitution had been written by the Communist Party for its special benefit, he replied that this made not the slightest difference, it still remained the Constitution. In the second place, he went on, the Communist Party was the vanguard of the working masses. It protected them from exploitation. If any other political party were allowed, the Communist Party would no longer be in a position to give protection from exploitation. Therefore, in the interests of the working masses, no other political party could be allowed in the Soviet Union. It was the only true democracy.

I did not need the answers. I had heard them repeated in hundreds of political speeches, had read them in thousands of pamphlets. They are so ingrained in the Russian's mind that he believes in them implicitly, would not hear of anything else. He regards any tampering with these political truths of his as alien heresy.

Speaking of heresy, I once asked the question: why a Secret Police? This is the answer I was given: Soviet Russia is a Socialist State operated on the principle of true democracy. The Communist Party runs Soviet Russia as the only possible representative of the masses, again on the true democratic principle. If the Secret Police did not exist, the enemies of democracy within the country and abroad might attempt a revolution against the established democratic principle. The Secret Police prevented any such possibility. Actually the Secret Police was the staunch guardian of democracy.

In the United States, such an explanation would sound fantastic. In Russia, it doesn't. It is a typically Russian explanation conceived by a typically Russian mind.

The Russian people have wholeheartedly embraced Communism. This is not at all surprising. Indeed, it would have been surprising had they not. Russia's vast peasantry has been working up to it through the centuries. It is something

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the peasant understands, something that appeals to him. The top-ranking members of the Communist Party, the real rulers of Russia today, are of the peasantry; they are of the people. And because they are of the people they are the best men to rule him, as far as he is concerned.

Of course the Russian peasant has not the faintest idea what real democracy means, as we understand it in the United States. The workings of modern parliamentary government, the multi-party system, the primary election method, the political convention system, are away over his head, even today. Besides, they are not in his tradition, never have been, and probably never will be. It has been told to him, repeated over and over again, by the men of the people who rule him now, that his system is the only true democracy. Since they tell him that it is democracy, it must be democracy, and it must be the only right kind of democracy. All other kinds of democracy, and especially all foreign kinds, are worthless, so far as he is concerned. They aren't democracy at all; they are pseudo-democracy.

You can talk to the Russian peasant for days on end, and he will still tell you the same thing.

CHAPTER XVIII

The Little Gray Cattle

WHEN WILLIAM C. BULLITT WAS U. S. AMBASSADOR TO Moscow in the early years of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Presidency, he is reported to have played a prank upon our sacred State Department. In the Embassy files, Bullitt found copies of certain reports of Neill S. Brown, U. S. Minister to Russia about a century ago, during the reign of Czar Nicholas I. Bullitt changed a few names and other details, then sent the reports to Washington as his own. They were accepted by our State Department as penetrating comments on present-day Russia. The irony of it all was that they actually were. This is what Mr. Brown reported a hundred years ago:

"The policy of Russia seems not to be based . . . on settled principles, or to be guided by any fixed landmarks. Expediency is the great test. And what may be expedient today under a given set of facts, may be inexpedient tomorrow.

"The Russian mind seems naturally distrustful, and this is especially so of Government officials. . . . Nothing is attainable but after the most provoking delays. . . . Among all the astringents put into requisition for the preservation of peace and order, none is so abhorrent as the censorial power. I may mention that the late message of the President of the United States was not regarded in all its parts as a safe document for Russian readers, and came to their hands scarred by the censor's knife.

"Access . . . by all foreigners is now difficult; it will re-

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quire but little more to render it impracticable. . . . Secrecy and mystery characterize everything. Nothing is made public that is worth knowing. You will find no two individuals agreeing on the strength of the army and navy, on the amount of the public debt or the annual revenue. In my opinion it is not intended that these things should be known."

If the State Department was fooled by Mr. Bullitt's prank, it is quite understandable; the conditions which Minister Brown then reported are as true today as they were in the reign of Nicholas I.

Speaking of Nicholas I, he once made an observation which has become a sort of Russian axiom, and which is equally true today as it was a hundred years ago. When his war minister reported on the insufficiency of the Russian army in view of the threatening attitude of England and France, before the Crimean War, Nicholas said, "We have plenty of the little gray cattle." By the *little gray cattle* he meant the Russian peasant, the fatalistic *moujik*, who since time immemorial had to carry the burden of all Russian expansionist wars.

Stalin did not repeat the same words. But in the early days of the war, when Hitler's armies were pressing forward relentlessly and there were many long-drawn faces in the Kremlin, Stalin declared, "We have the men. We will use them for all they are worth, and in the end we will win." Which, basically, meant exactly what Nicholas had said almost a century earlier. Russia and her rulers do not change much.

One day in July, 1917, I entertained D. Tereshchenko, who shortly thereafter became a member of Russia's Provisional Government during one of its almost weekly reshufflements, at my country house in Seeverskaya, some fifty miles south of what today is Leningrad. Our talk was of the man-to-man variety and during it Tereshchenko said, "Personally, I think

it would be beneficial to Russia if we lost the war. If Russia should win this war, the Government, taking all the credit for the victory, would reach out for prerogatives of omnipotency. It would present us with a *politzeiski kulak* (police fist) so all-embracing that life for any person of liberal tendencies would become intolerable."

Russia did not win that war, but Tereshchenko was arrested the day after Lenin had seized power. He had ample opportunity in jail to reflect that whether Russia won or lost a war she still had a police fist.

But today Russia *has* won a war. She has won the greatest, bloodiest war in her long history. She has won it in a decisive, overwhelming manner that leaves no reason for dispute. Victoriously, she stands astride the greater part of Europe as she has never done before. As a result of this victory, the Russian police fist has become all-embracing, as Tereshchenko once called it. And the same all-embracing police fist is settling over all the European territories in which Russia has her say. Once again, Russia and her rulers do not change.

Also as a result of the overwhelming military victory, Russian chauvinism today is riding high, wide and handsome.

The original revolutionary leaders coming from the peasantry and the working class are gradually disappearing from the Moscow political scene. The leaders now forging to the top ranks are products of the new Communist bourgeoisie—men like Zhdanov, Molotov, Shvernik and Voznessensky. For centuries Russia's bourgeois element has been the most chauvinistic of all population classes. The same chauvinistic attitude is manifesting itself among Russia's satellites whose Communist-dominated regimes owe their rise to power exclusively to Moscow. Incidents such as the shooting down of American transport planes by Marshal Tito's Yugoslav fliers, with the resulting loss of American lives, are a clear manifestation of this new chauvinistic spirit.

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And there are still the little gray cattle. The same little gray cattle whose miraculously recuperative powers pulled Russia out of every disaster, carried her through a staggering number of expansionist wars until today she is sprawled across one-half of Asia and two-thirds of Europe. There are almost 200,000,000 of them. Soviet officials estimate that with the government-promoted birth rate there will be 250,000,000 in twenty years from now. In addition, there are the little gray cattle of neighboring countries—Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia—which Russia is adding to her human strength. They represent a total population of 80,000,000 today, estimated to rise to 100,000,000 in twenty years. This will give a combined human strength of 350,000,000, all subject to the directives of one central authority. It is a terrifying strength, one to which there is hardly any equal.

It is true the little gray cattle aren't quite so gray as they used to be in the days of Nicholas I. They have all been taught to read. But they read only what the central authority decides they should read, and are told only what the central authority believes is good for them to be told. Because of this, and having no other source of information, they are all solidly lined up behind the central authority, accept everything told them by the central authority as pure gospel, and consider it a blessing when allowed to purchase a suit of clothes for \$1100 and a pair of shoes for \$450 from the same central authority.

But all this is only part of the whole. Russia is a land of virtually inexhaustible economic resources. Unlike a hundred years ago, she is developing these resources today for all they are worth. She is about to build up what looms as the greatest industrial and agricultural empire in the world. She has a Church which has placed itself unreservedly in the service of the State. Her government-owned press is

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vigorously promoting the doctrines of the State, and no others. Her militant youth is being continuously indoctrinated with the ideas of the State. Her government-controlled labor movement is at the constant beck and call of the State. Over it all she has the all-embracing Secret Police which sees to it that everything is done as the State decrees. And she has the tremendous masses of little gray cattle who distrust and reject any ideas that are not typically Russian.

When the Politburo decided to merge Communism with Russianism, it made itself actually the most powerful and the strongest ruling body of men in the world today.

How will the Politburo use this tremendous power?

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Part II

RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN WORLD

CHAPTER XIX

Which Way Goes Russia?

THAT IS THE BURNING QUESTION OF THE HOUR. STATESMEN ask it. Politicians want to know about it. The press speculates over it. The general public, utterly confused and befuddled, wants to know the answer. Which way will Russia go?

Fourteen men know. They are seated in a sumptuously equipped-conference room in the Moscow Kremlin. They have the master blueprint all spread out before them, study each sign on it as they go along, amend it wherever necessary in their opinion. They know at all times what the blueprint contains, in which direction it points. But they do not tell. They have immeasurably greater stakes mapped out. They are the Politburo.

Anyone outside the Politburo presumptuous enough to offer a positive answer as to where Russia will go tomorrow, the next day, the next year, or twenty years from now, is inviting the adjective "foolish." I have talked to some American correspondents who have returned from Russia. I have read the articles and books of many others. They reported faithfully on whatever facts they were given access to, and some of them ventured certain conclusions, as any observant and thinking person will at times. But all agreed that what few facts they were permitted to observe represented but a minute particle of a Russia otherwise hidden behind an impenetrable veil of distrust and secrecy. A prominent representative of one of the great American news services said, "I was in Argen-

tina, in France, Spain, Fascist Italy, and even Nazi Germany. At times it took me weeks, even months, to find my bearings, but in every instance I was able to dig up enough information to send fairly representative reports on the country's policy. But Russia—save me!"

There is nothing surprising in this. To a mind accustomed to the American way of thinking, Russia perforce remains an enigma. The Russian way is so entirely different from our own. The Russian mind travels along channels of its own conception which the Westerner looks upon as obscure, even sinister. He finds himself in an ancient yet to him radically new world through which he has to grope his way like one afflicted with a strange sort of blindness; he sees, but his eye nerves refuse to stimulate comprehension. To spend six weeks, a year, even several years in Russia means nothing. You have to be a Russian to really understand Russians.

My various sojourns in Russia total about twenty-eight years. I was born in Russia, went to school with Russian children, had all the details of Russian history and tradition drilled into my receptive mind. I lived among Russian peasants, associated with them, was accepted by them as almost their own. Almost, but not quite. I was not really Russian myself; my father, although in the service of the Czar, was German, my mother English, my stepmother Swedish. I had Russian peasant soldiers fighting under my command in World War I. But I must frankly admit that I do not know all about the Russians.

But even limited knowledge of the Russian peasant character, if gained through long personal association, helps considerably. There are certain trends, certain characteristics, which cannot escape being at least partially absorbed. There is Russian history and tradition, drummed into a youngster's mind. There are the discussions with leaders of Russian political thought, past and present, which reveal something,

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though certainly not everything. Last but not least, there are certain inescapable facts possible of interpretation in the way a Russian would interpret them. It is with these various ingredients that I shall attempt to paint a Russian picture as best I can. I probably shall not be entirely right, but I shall not be entirely wrong, either.

First, there are what I shall call the national aspirations of Russia. These aspirations are not always well founded; at times they rest on entirely wrong premises. But they were sold to the Russian masses, century after century, and the Russians believe in them. In this respect the Russian mind is like the American—my country, right or wrong. When something is represented as being vital to Russian national needs, that's all there is to it.

Russia was once a small country on the shores of Lake Ilmen, a territory about the size of New Jersey, with a population of less than a quarter million. That was twelve hundred years ago. It was a poor country, with a drab soil and a winter that lasted six months. Russian adventurers went beyond its borders in search of wealth. They conquered the weaker neighboring tribes of Finnish and Ugrian origin, went on to assimilate them; the fact is that most of what is the northern half of Russia today was inhabited by Finnish tribes in those days.

The old Russians were a fierce warrior people. They traveled down the Dniepr River, crossed the Black Sea in their frail boats, and laid siege to Constantinople, then capital of the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Emperor paid the wild barbaric tribesmen a rich tribute to get rid of them and also gave his daughter in marriage to the Russian Prince. When the Greek princess arrived in Russia, she was appalled at the repulsive pagan customs of her new people and persuaded her consort to accept Christianity. The pagan idols were destroyed, and the Russian people were driven into the

Dniepr River where they were baptized by Greek priests in mass ceremonies. That was the beginning of the close partnership between the Orthodox Church and the Russian State.

The Church demanded that all the alien peoples inhabiting what is now called the great Russian plain be converted to Christianity, by fire and sword if necessary. The Prince was only too glad to obey the command of the Church and at the same time extend his own power. Thus in a comparatively short period of time, all the peoples between the Polish border and the Volga River were conquered, baptized, and added to the Russian domain.

The policy of military conquest was halted by the invasion of the Tatars and their two hundred years' sway over Russia, but then it broke out afresh. First the Tatars were conquered. Then Russian Cossacks stormed across the more than four thousand miles of Siberia to the Pacific Ocean and made subject the Siberian tribes of Mongolian origin. The Russians even crossed Bering Strait, occupied Alaska, and established settlements as far south as the California coast.

Czar Peter the Great was the founder of the modern Russian Empire. He was the first Russian ruler to look westward. He wrested the territories now known as the Baltic States from Sweden and pushed his domain to the shores of the Black Sea. His successors conquered Finland and Poland, then turned toward the Balkans under the pretext of "liberating the Brother Slav Nations."

But there Russia was halted by England. Afraid that the conquering giant from the north would cut her Mediterranean lifeline, England did not hesitate to go to war, and inflicted a setback upon the greedy conqueror. Then, by shrewd diplomacy, England directed Russian attention toward Asia where Russia promptly conquered the Caucasus and the Moslem peoples of Central Asia. Here Russia arrived on India's borders and again English diplomacy went into action.

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After World War I, England erected the *cordon sanitaire* of buffer states to prevent further Russian expansion westward and into the Balkans.

Always when Russia set out to conquer neighboring countries she proclaimed herself a "liberator." From whom, no one knew, nor did anyone care. Russia's was the right of the strong, as it still is today. On numerous occasions the Russian lust for conquest resulted in disastrous defeats. But Russia merely licked her wounds, waited until they were healed and burst forth again. All the tremendous territory she holds today was conquered by force of arms. All the populations were non-Russian. Today Russia has the Balkans in a firm grip. She is reaching out for Turkey and the Persian Gulf, and England is naturally apprehensive.

Then there is Communism. As expounded by Lenin and developed by his successors, Communism is a militant, aggressive, fighting force. It is out to tear down the existing social and economic order of the world and build up an entirely different order on the ruins. In its very essence it is antagonistic to everything the Western World stands for, and it does not bother to conceal this antagonism. It is more than an ideology, it is a militant faith. If it stands still for any period of time, it burns itself out. To go on living, it must expand. And it can expand only beyond the borders of what it now controls.

Russia and Communism are very much alike in that they cannot remain self-contained. They must seek new pastures. Now they have pooled forces and have become integrated. It probably was inevitable that they unite, being so similar in outlook. And the combination is a formidable one.

Today Russia, in spite of her great victory, is weakened. She has to sit back and lick her wounds. She also has to digest the heavy meal she has consumed. Even a giant's stomach will suffer spells of indigestion if too much is

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crammed into it at one time. And Russia's new accretions of territory and populace represent quite a meal. Also, Russia must build up her resources, must raise a new generation of *little gray cattle*. Until that is done, she cannot think of a new major war.

How long will it take her? Ten years, twenty, perhaps even thirty. No one outside the Politburo can tell. No one has seen the master blueprint. An outsider who attempts even an approximate calculation must consult history. And history proves that Russia's recoveries from dreadful wounds have been miraculously quick.

Can Russia be expected hereafter to stay within her present greatly enlarged boundaries and become a peaceful, self-contained entity like the United States? On the basis of Russia's tradition, her historic precedent and—most important of all—her integration with Communism, I am afraid the answer must be in the negative.

CHAPTER XX

We Won the War!

THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION, WHEREVER THE RUSSIAN tongue is spoken, one hears the same story—Russia won the war against Germany entirely by her own effort, and whatever military contribution came from the Western Allies was so small that Russia would have won without it. I checked with other recent American observers of the Russian scene, and they have all carried home the same impression.

This is not surprising. For two years, while Hitler's armies kept pounding across vast stretches of Russian land and the Russians had to withdraw from one defense line after another, the entire government-owned press and radio kept clamoring for the Second Front. The Russian mass mind became convinced that the Western Allies were merely allies on paper, that they had no intention of ever opening a Second Front, and that their capitalist regimes secretly desired Communist Russia's defeat.

Then came Stalingrad. The German front collapsed, and for another year the Russians kept pushing the Germans back, across the Don, across the Dniepr. The Russians were actually winning the war, and still there was no Second Front. As for the bloody fighting in North Africa and Italy, no Russian outside the government offices ever heard of it. The Russian press ignored it as if it was not part of the war at all.

Finally, when after three years of the bloodiest fighting, the Red Army had expelled the invader from Russian soil

and was preparing to advance into enemy territory, there came the brief news of Allied landings in Normandy. Instantly the suspicious and always distrustful Russian mass mind decided that the Anglo-Americans had not come to help Russia win a war which Russia had already won by herself; they had come to grab as much of Germany as they could before the victorious Red Army fought its way through.

This belief of the Russian masses was carefully nurtured by the Russian press until the very end. Day after day it reported that the Germans were surrendering in droves to the Americans, while in the East they kept fiercely fighting the Russians. As late as April 11, less than one month before the German surrender, the army paper, *Red Star*, for instance, carried an impassioned article claiming that the Americans were hampered in their bloodless eastward advance only by crowds of prisoners blocking the roads. "With fanatical persistence," the paper said, "the Germans are giving themselves up. Wotan and Hitler are forgotten; the supermen are encouraging each other with the words: 'Patience, friend, the Americans are near.'"

The Russian mass mind regarded the Allied advance from the West, all the way from the Normandy beaches to the Elbe, as just one great parade march. And no Russian considered it anything else. American films showing the bloody fighting in Normandy, around Aachen and elsewhere in the West were rushed to Moscow by first available plane. There they were viewed by government officials and high Red Army officers and promptly buried in the archives. The Russian masses never got a glimpse of them. But every day they read detailed accounts and were shown newsreels of the fierce fighting in Budapest, around Koenigsberg and Breslau, on the Oder, and elsewhere in the East. And so it is Russia who won the war.

The story is much the same in the Pacific War. The Rus-

sian people knew, of course, that the United States and Great Britain were engaged in conflict with Japan; in fact, Japanese successes during the early phase of the war were publicized in Russia—why, I never could find out. But after the United States swung over to the offensive, the Pacific picture was treated by the Soviet press and radio with utter indifference. Midway, the Battle of the Coral Sea, and other important Pacific engagements were not even mentioned. The Russian people never heard of Guadalcanal, Owen Stanley Ridge, Saipan, and Iwo Jima. The Russians were told so little of the Pacific war that for months they did not know whether there was still a war going on in the East. At any rate, so far as they knew, there had been no appreciable American results.

Then, suddenly, in August, 1945, Russia declared war on Japan with great fanfare and a burst of radio and press propaganda—to help their American and British allies, so the Russian people were told. And, behold, hardly a week after Russia had gone to war against Japan, the latter surrendered. To the propaganda-blinded Russian mass mind there could be but one conclusion—Russia had forced Japan to surrender! And the Russian press and radio kept telling the Russian people just that. What the United States and Great Britain had been unable to accomplish ever since 1941, Russia did within one week. Russia had won the war in the East as well as the West.

The final stage of the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, included the usual sumptuous state banquet given by Generalissimo Stalin. The banquet this time ended with an unusual treat—a Russian motion picture called *The Defeat of Japan*, which showed the Russian campaign in Manchuria. The members of the American delegation noted that the film, widely shown throughout the Soviet Union, definitely conveyed the impression that the Russians had won the war

against Japan singlehanded. No mention of the U. S.

Nor has the average Russian the faintest conception of the enormous amounts of Lend-Lease supplies which this country sent to Russia. No detailed accounts were ever published in Russia, this being explained to us by the Soviet Government as a necessity for maintaining military secrecy. The average Russian saw nothing of American food supplies, as these went almost exclusively to officialdom and the Red Army; and the Russian soldier is not told where his food comes from, nor does he care. As for the American-made jeeps and trucks which pulled the Red Army through the mud of the Ukraine, they were Russian-made jeeps and trucks, so far as the Russian soldier knew; in fact, they were Stalin jeeps and Stalin trucks. And there was no one to correct his erroneous belief and tell him otherwise.

The same lack of clarification took place in the diplomatic sphere. Shortly after the Teheran Conference, which told the Russians for the first time in more or less concrete terms that the Western Allies were really in the war game, *Pravda* dampened every simmer of popular enthusiasm for America and England by printing a dispatch allegedly received from its special correspondent in Cairo which claimed that Great Britain and the United States were negotiating with Germany for a separate peace, without having even consulted their Russian ally. Since nothing of this sort can be printed in any Russian paper without the Government's approval, and inasmuch as no such story was ever passed by the military censors in Cairo, the false dispatch was, in effect, a warning to the Russian populace not to expect too much in the way of Anglo-American help, Teheran notwithstanding. Whenever the Soviet Government had to back down from an advanced diplomatic position, this action was represented to the Russian public as being a special concession on Russia's part merely in the interests of Allied solidarity. Such was

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the case, for instance, after the withdrawal of Marshal Tito's troops from the Trieste area following Anglo-American protests.

It is quite true that on several occasions Stalin issued brief statements in which he expressed Russia's appreciation of Allied help, but these statements as a rule were not broadcast over the domestic radio. They were printed in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, but were not sent to the provincial papers. The great Russian masses remained largely unaware of them, and the readers of Moscow papers, with a characteristically Russian mental twist, regarded them as the sort of perfunctory diplomatic gesture in which Russian statesmen must indulge from time to time for the sake of appearance.

I once discussed this subject with a Russian official. Counting on my fingers, I listed the principal American contributions to victory. The North African and Italian campaigns which pulled thirty German combat divisions and two air fleets from the Russian front. The constant invasion threat from the British Isles which kept another forty German divisions stationed in Western Europe and Norway. The large numbers of Lend-Lease trucks, tanks, and planes which greatly contributed to the Red Army's mobility. The immense quantities of guns and munitions which the Germans had to keep in the West, rendering them unavailable for their Russian front. The terrific air bombardment of Germany which immobilized two German air fleets and played havoc with the Reich's war production and transportation, thus weakening its Russian front. And, finally, the Western invasion itself.

He listened, as a Russian will, then said in effect: "All this is conceded. But what of it? For three years we Russians had to make terrible sacrifices simply because you weren't ready to do your share of the fighting. If we had made a separate peace with Hitler, where would you Amer-

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icans be today? I'll tell you where—just another defeated and conquered nation. What help you rendered does not anywhere compare with what we did. We gave our blood. For three long years we fought our war, and yours as well. It was *our* persistence, *our* steadfastness, which won *both* wars."

He spoke without gestures, without emotion, without rancor, just as a logical person gives a perfectly logical explanation. One could see plainly that it did not even for a moment enter his mind that there could be any dispute about it.

There is no one in the United States who would deny that Russia did a perfectly splendid job in fighting the war, in standing off the furious Nazi onslaught. But at the same time, it is a well-established fact that victory would not have been possible without the unprecedented American war production job. No realistically minded person can dispute it, and the Politburo members, being realists, know it to be a fact. Then why don't they tell it to the Russian masses? Why don't they enlighten the masses that the winning of the war was on a partnership basis to which each of the Allies contributed a full share?

For a very good reason. There is the blueprint.

Returning American observers have advanced a great many reasons why Russia won. The most commonly mentioned were: the great patriotism of the Russian people; brilliant military leadership; the splendid production job of Russia's women; the vastness of Russia; the severity of the Russian winter; Hitler's tactical mistakes.

I cannot subscribe to any of these reasons. From what I have seen and from the knowledge I have of Russia, the one great reason for Russia's victory was the firm determination and great organizing job of the Communist Party. When Hitler invaded Russia, he counted confidently on a quick breakup of the Communist Party, and therein lay his great-

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est mistake. The Communist Party did not break up; it stood firm. Its organizing power was everywhere. There was no genius in it, just a stubborn, unbending will to see the thing through, whatever the cost. The Party simply compelled the Russian people to win. With the aid of concentration camps, Secret Police, and other ruthless devices, perhaps, but it accomplished its purpose. Without the leadership of the Communist Party, Russia would have succumbed in six months. The Party was the mortar that closed all the gaps in Russia's defense wall. There cannot be the least doubt about it; the Communist Party won the war for Russia.

The Russian masses were eyewitnesses of this victory. It is this knowledge which has given the Communist Party such a tremendous hold over the masses. The Politburo is determined not to relinquish this hold. This unique hold must be perpetuated because it is needed for the blueprint. Therefore the Russian masses must not be allowed for even one moment to get the notion that anyone but the Communist Party was instrumental in the achievement of victory.

And so the Politburo has its powerful propaganda machine reiterate with hammerlike persistence: "We won the war!"

But there was yet another and very important reason why the Communist Party persisted in its purposely inaccurate point of view, and that reason, too, has to do with the blueprint. The Soviet Government was looking into the future. Peace treaties with the vanquished nations would have to be signed eventually, and from these treaties Moscow intended to derive all that possibly could be derived. At every international conference held since the defeat of the Axis, Soviet negotiators insisted that inasmuch as the Russian masses were fully convinced that Russia had won both wars, the Soviet Government had to show its people definite tangible benefits accruing to Russia as a result of the victories. At the

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Moscow Conference in December, 1945, the Soviet participants won their demand for an Allied Control Council for Japan, with Russian veto powers, by pointing to the Russian people's conviction that it was their country which had won the war against Japan. And at every international conference, the United States and Great Britain had to yield additional concessions to this falsely stimulated Russian point of view. By instilling in the Russian masses the unshakable belief that Russia had won both wars, the Communist Party forged a potent diplomatic weapon that could be employed successfully whenever the situation demanded. It attests to the great superiority and far-seeing vision of Soviet diplomacy.

And so, throughout the far reaches of the vast Soviet realm, the popular chant continues: "We won the war!"

CHAPTER XXI

We Want Security

IF FUTURE HISTORIANS WISH TO CHARACTERIZE BY A SPECIFIC name the immediate postwar era in which we now live, they will probably call it the *Security Search Era*. Security is the great slogan of our day. Everyone cries for security. Everyone has his own ideas of security. The only trouble is that these ideas very rarely coincide.

Security is an elastic word which more often than not is dictated by a nation's self-suggested fear of another nation than by an actual need. For this very reason the different ideas of security seldom dovetail. The United States may think that her security demands an occupation of certain areas by American forces. On the other hand, Russia may come to the conclusion that her security demands the occupation of these same areas by Russian troops. Americans may decide that in the interests of their country's security their frontier should be on the Rhine. Again, Russia may consider the Atlantic Ocean as her frontier.

Security as a slogan is very deceptive. It can be used to cover up almost anything. Under the pretext of looking out for her security, a nation can demand the whole world, the assumption being that since there would then be no more potential enemies, that nation would have achieved its ultimate security. Security can also be used as an ideal guise, by pretending to establish one's security against a certain nation, while actually trying to establish it against a completely different nation.

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Take the United States, for instance. We demand security for ourselves, claiming that we need this security against Germany and Japan. Yet Germany is crushed to dust and Japan is stripped of all power to wage war. In addition, there is the United Nations Organization which, its fanatical proponents claim, will preserve the security of all nations for generations to come. But at the same time we are determined to maintain a navy as large as the navies of all other nations combined. We are prepared to keep the largest and most powerful air force in the world. We have stored away the manufacturing secret of the atomic bomb and refuse to let go of it unless, and until, all nations submit to international armaments control. And through the Act of Chapultepec we have molded the nations of the Western Hemisphere into a large independent security system. We contend that all these are security measures directed against a thoroughly crushed Germany and a beaten Japan. If we cast diplomacy aside, we should have to admit that we are trying to establish our security against someone else.

But today Russia is the greatest claimant of security. All her territorial demands, whether in the form of direct additions to her territory, or as an undisputed Russian sphere of influence, or as outlying bases in Tripolitania and on the Red Sea, are based on her claims of security. She builds a gigantic air base on the Danish Island of Bornholm to bottle up the entrance to the Baltic Sea.¹ Through her Yugoslav ally and satellite, she establishes naval and air bases on the Adriatic. She demands military control over the Dardanelles and a privileged position in the Middle East that would actually make Turkey a Soviet satellite. As motivation for her demands, she points out that her territory has been invaded by Germany twice within a generation. This is quite true, but

¹ Bornholm was evacuated by the Russians in June, 1946, and the great air base transferred to the German island of Ruegen, in the Russian occupation zone.

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let us look at the other side of the complex security picture.

Germany is an utterly defeated and destroyed nation, due to Russia's part in the war. Russia turned back the armed might of Germany. She has today a reservoir of fighting men at least three times that of defeated Germany. She controls infinitely more natural resources than Germany. She is feverishly building up her own production potential. She has a firm military grip over half of prewar Germany. She has stripped the German factories in her zone of occupation of all machines, shipping them to her own territory, and she actually demanded additional machines from the Allied zone. She has sent German manpower by the millions to work on reconstruction in Russia. She has placed Germany so that she can never rise again except with Russian consent.

Germany has been stripped of her entire air force and will not be allowed to create a new one. Germany has been deprived of her navy and will not be permitted to maintain one. German warships therefore could not conceivably force their way into the Baltic Sea. Nor could a German navy menace the shores of the Adriatic or the Dardanelles.

Yet Russia adroitly contends she is building up her security against future German aggression. It is a good political slogan, but it remains just a slogan, nothing more. There is not a bit of substance to it; it is political camouflage, pure and simple. Under the clever pretext of building up her security against Germany, Russia is actually raising her fences and developing her offensive power against an entirely different nation.

CHAPTER XXII

Perfidious Albion

IF AND WHEN ANOTHER WAR IS UNLEASHED AGAINST mankind, it will be a war for the possession of the Mediterranean. And the curious fact about such a war would be that none of the principal contending powers would be physically *in* the Mediterranean. Neither England nor Russia borders directly on this great landlocked sea. But England has effectively controlled it for generations because it is the direct route to British imperial possessions in Africa, the Middle East, and the Orient. Russia, on the other hand, considers the countries bordering on the Mediterranean as the predestined market for the tremendous export trade which she expects to produce.

The beginning of the struggle between the two countries for control of the Mediterranean dates back over a century. Usually it was a latent struggle, but at times it flared into open combat as in the Crimean War. Thus far England has always won. But Soviet Russia today has her own ideas about future developments in this quarter.

The modern phase of this age-old struggle began in the latter part of 1939. At that time Russia had a friendship pact of almost twenty years' standing with Turkey, who all through the century-long dispute had had to play the unfortunate part of intermediary between the two principal contestants. With England at war with Germany, Russia believed the time ripe to further her own Mediterranean ambitions. She summoned the then Turkish Foreign Minister,

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Shukri Saracoglu, to Moscow and proposed a change in the relationship between the two nations. In apprehension after learning the Russian terms, Turkey promptly turned around and signed a treaty of alliance with England.

It is only fair to state that in this transaction Turkey made a deal with the highest bidder. Russia demanded control over the Dardanelles as well as territorial and political concessions that would have reduced Turkey to the practical status of a satellite nation. England, on the other hand, offered economic help and territorial additions in the form of the ex-Syrian provinces of Antioch and Alexandretta. Turkey accepted England's terms.

True to her historic tradition of waiting until the unbeatable argument of power was in her hands, Russia sat back. Then she found herself involved in a life-and-death struggle with Germany which taxed her own strength to the utmost. The Mediterranean problem had to wait. But no sooner did Russia see victory ahead than she was once more trying to gain a foothold there. With the Wehrmacht reeling back at an accelerated tempo, Moscow promptly and in unmistakable terms advised the Allies of her ambitions in the Balkans.

It was principally as a result of this statement of Russian policy that the Quebec Conference was called. Prime Minister Churchill wanted American backing to keep Russia in check, but the late President Roosevelt, who had committed himself at Teheran, preferred to stay aloof from the controversy. Churchill went to Moscow alone. His discussions with the Russians were rather pointed in character. As I heard the story, Churchill was several times on the point of walking out on the conference, and it was U. S. Ambassador Harriman who prevailed upon him to stay and see it through. In the end, Russia achieved fulfillment of her demand of an absolutely free hand in the Balkans with the exception of

Greece, which she grudgingly conceded to the British sphere of influence. The question of Turkey was deftly sidetracked by the Russians.

At the Yalta Conference, as a face-saving device for the Western Allies, Russia gave a half-hearted promise to allow popular elections in the Balkan countries, but to be held only *after the exigencies created by the war had passed*. She reserved the right to determine that time. Once again the Turkish question was sidetracked; Russia refused to commit herself. On his return from Yalta, President Roosevelt admitted frankly that there would have to be many compromises with the Russians on vital matters. What he completely failed to mention was that one of these vital matters was the century-old Mediterranean problem.

One cannot deny the Russians their great diplomatic skill, their singleness of purpose, their persistence in pressing for a solution in their favor in one way if they cannot get it in another. Their methods may vary from time to time, but their final ambition remains always the same. They had agreed to leave Greece to England. But there still was Turkey. Russia's Mediterranean ambitions could be satisfied either way. And so in June, 1945, Russia by unilateral action abrogated her treaty of friendship with Turkey and demanded a new treaty on substantially the same terms that had been presented to Saracoglu in 1939. When Turkey looked to her British ally for help, Russia promptly came forward with even more far-reaching demands, which included the cession to Russia of almost one-third of Turkey's Black Sea coast; this demand was advanced in the name of the Armenian Soviet Republic.

The Mediterranean fat was in the fire again. It still is. At Potsdam the Russians refused to be drawn into the Turkish question. When Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden protested in reference to it, "Russia is already so large," Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov replied smilingly, "Yes, but

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Armenia is very small." At the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, the Russians again vetoed a discussion of their claims on Turkey; it was a matter to be settled between themselves and the Turks, without outside interference, they contended. And that was that. Russia's ambition is the Mediterranean. Sooner or later, the day will come when she intends to satisfy that ambition.

What lies behind Russia's persistent pressure toward the Mediterranean, her almost hostile attitude toward England on account of it? I have talked with a number of Russians, trying to sound out their individual opinions on the subject. They talked freely enough. They spoke with complete detachment, presented their views in logical terms. Here is the net total of what they consider the historic grievances of their country against England:

English international policy, they contend, has always been utterly selfish, based exclusively on the perpetuation of England's imperial prerogatives. For 120 years England has shown a traditionally hostile attitude toward Russia; she has consistently blocked every step taken by Russia in the latter's pursuit of her rightful national aspirations. In 1829, England thwarted Russia after the latter had liberated Greece from Turkish domination, and disputed Russia's claim as the liberating power. In 1833, England blocked Russia's attempt to occupy the Dardanelles. In 1840, when Russia had Turkey at her complete mercy, England stymied all Russian efforts to establish a protectorate over Turkey. In 1855, England, jealous of Russian power, formed a European coalition, incited the Crimean War, bombarded Russia's Baltic coast, and inflicted upon Russia her greatest political humiliation.

In 1878, the Russians insist, England again conspired to nullify the great Russian victory over Turkey; she prevailed upon the Berlin Congress to bottle up Russian naval power in the Black Sea for more than a half century. In 1885, Eng-

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land blocked Russia's logical expansion into Afghanistan with a threat of war, and again in 1895 she checked Russia's progress in Central Asia. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5, England was an ally of Japan; she took an antagonistic attitude toward Russia throughout that conflict, compelled Russia's Baltic Fleet to circumnavigate all Africa on the way to Japan, refused to let it coal in English-controlled ports and thus materially contributed to the great Russian naval disaster of Tsushima.

English perfidy, the Russians say, reached its height in 1918, when England flouted all her obligations toward Russia under the Treaty of London, depriving Russia of her just rewards for her part in the bloody struggle against the Central Powers. Instead, England intervened in the Russian Civil War on the side of the enemies of the Soviet Union, organized the nefarious *cordon sanitaire* against Russia, and up to 1941 displayed an attitude of outright hostility toward the Soviet Union. Finally, England was secretly supporting Hitler when the latter plotted against Soviet Russia in the years preceding the war and was, indirectly at least, responsible for the war itself. In all parts of the world, at all times, England has been busy organizing coalitions hostile to Russia's vital interests.

This is an impressive list of grievances. To make matters even worse, historical facts prove that quite a few of these Russian grievances are justified. In her frequent efforts to check Russian expansion, England has given Russia some rather raw deals in the past. And the Russians seem to have very long memories.

The Russians have pointed out also that England is the principal European country opposed to Communism; that she has encouraged, and in many instances still encourages, reactionary regimes such as in Spain, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and other spheres of British influence. This adds an ideologi-

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cal grievance to the many political ones. The Russians seem convinced that a reckoning with England is bound to come. This is one of the reasons why the government-owned press of Soviet Russia has deliberately minimized British contribution in the struggle against Hitler.

Winston Churchill has always stood out as the strongest proponent of British Imperialism and the staunchest opponent of Communism. As late as May, 1945, he declared in the House of Commons: "We have not liberated Europe from Nazi tyranny to have it supplanted by a tyranny of police governments," and the Russian press took immediate issue with that statement. It took specific issue with Churchill's claim of having liberated Europe. The liberation, the Russians contend, was accomplished by them, and no one else.

Professor Harold Laski's frequent pro-Soviet tirades notwithstanding, there appears not the least sign that the British Labor Government intends to abandon the imperial position taken by Mr. Churchill. In his speech before Commons on November 7, 1945, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin stated in reference to Russia: "We agreed to give inventions to other countries. We did not have it in return. . . . Neither am I prepared to accept the position so often blared from the Moscow radio. . . . We claim the right to deal with France, Holland, Belgium, Scandinavia, or other countries for all purposes."

At the Moscow Conference, Mr. Bevin proposed a number of schemes for the settlement of the Turkish and Iranian questions. "Professors or no professors," he told Molotov grimly, "it's inconceivable that Russia, one of the architects of postwar security, should try to destroy the system we're all trying to build." To which Foreign Commissar Molotov smilingly protested, "But, Mr. Bevin, you didn't see what the Turks did to the Soviet bookshop in Istambul. It's completely destroyed." And that was as far as Mr. Bevin got with

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the Russians when he brought up the subject of their demands on England's ally, Turkey. Molotov remained evasive on the subject.

Whatever British imperial policy is going to be hereafter, Russia is firmly determined to pursue her own Mediterranean aims, whether the British like it or not.

CHAPTER XXIII

Give Us the Open Sea

RUSSIA IS A COUNTRY OF VAST DISTANCES, PRACTICALLY A continent by herself. Her territorial size is almost four times that of the United States. Yet all this tremendous land mass is virtually shut off from the open sea.

Nearly all of the southern frontier of Russia, some six thousand miles long, is a land frontier. Her northern frontier of equal length is formed by the ice-locked Arctic Sea; ironically enough it is here, in the very northwest corner of her continental empire, that Russia has her one and only ice-free ocean port—Murmansk. In the west, Russia has the Baltic Sea, a landlocked body of water frozen a considerable part of the year and accessible only through a narrow strait between Denmark and Sweden, a corridor that can be closed at will by a hostile power. And down in the southwest is the Black Sea, equally landlocked and accessible only through the Dardanelles Straits. It is true that on her eastern border Russia adjoins the Pacific Ocean, but her part consists of a rugged, largely inaccessible shore, washed by waters frozen during many months of the year. Her only port there is Vladivostok, where traffic frequently must be maintained with the aid of icebreakers. Moreover, the Japanese Islands lie across the ocean lanes leading to Vladivostok, which thus could be blockaded at will.

Russia has always contended, and rightly so, that her lack of access to the open sea greatly retarded her development into a modern nation. I remember that when I went to

school in Russia, our history teachers used to hammer this into our heads. They told us that Russia's future would remain limited until she secured the greatly needed, direct warm-water outlets to the world's open sea lanes. They gave us problems to work on how these outlets could be best obtained. And invariably our answers pointed to the Persian Gulf as the only logical fulfillment of Russia's most important need.

As a matter of fact, Russia had been pushing in that direction during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It was only when England firmly barred the way to the Persian Gulf for fear it would carry Russian influence to the front door of India, that Russia turned her eyes to the Far East, negotiated a lease with China that gave her a foothold on the Yellow Sea, and started pressing into Korea for additional warm-water facilities. The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 completely wiped out these gains. Again Russia found herself thrust back from the open ocean, this time by an ally of England. But today Russia once more has these facilities in her hands, and she is not likely to let them go again. Even at that, it is an outlet for only the eastern third of her empire.

As time went on, Russia's hunger for warm-water ports developed into an obsession. She knew she was being economically strangled by this denial to her of sea outlets which many smaller nations possessed in abundance. Societies were formed all over the country advocating the acquisition of an ocean coast, by force if necessary. Funds were collected among school children, workers, and peasants for the building of a navy and merchant marine. All through Russia was heard the loud cry: "Give us the open sea!"

Then came World War I. Under the secret clauses of the Treaty of London, Russia was promised by England and France complete control over the Dardanelles with a free

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outlet into the Mediterranean, as well as "other outlets to be decided upon at a later date," which was presumed to mean bases on the Persian Gulf; or at least the Russians so interpreted it. The war over, not only were these commitments waved aside, but in addition Russia was deprived of virtually all her Baltic coast through the creation of buffer states there. Resentment among the Russian people over this treatment kept smouldering through the years between the two great wars. Russia told herself that once she regained her power, as she was convinced she would, she would never again let herself be cheated in that way.

Today Russia is pressing for the open sea in all directions. She has taken possession of the entire southern shore of the Baltic. Through her Yugoslav satellite, she is perched on the Adriatic. By pulling Turkey into her political orbit, she expects to reach the eastern Mediterranean, thus by-passing Greece. Her late but advantageous entry into the war against Japan has given her Port Arthur, Dairen and part of the north Korean shore. And she is slowly working her way across Iran in the direction of the Persian Gulf.

Popular Russian enthusiasm is being shifted, by every propaganda device at the Government's disposal, from the Red Army to the Red Navy and the merchant marine. Russian school children and factory workers are no longer being urged to collect money for the building of tanks and planes. Instead, they are being urged to subscribe funds for the construction of submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and merchant vessels. Russia is out to have a navy and merchant fleet "commensurate with the Soviet Union's greatness and importance in the affairs of the world," as *Pravda* expressed it. She has accelerated her training of an officer corps for the navy and merchant fleet by establishing eleven new naval colleges—six in Leningrad, two in Vladivostok, one in Baku, one in Taganrog, and one in Viborg. Additional naval

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schools are to be established in Talinn, Riga, Murmansk, and several Black Sea ports.

Generalissimo Stalin availed himself of the occasion of the Potsdam Conference to serve notice on the world that Russia intends to become a great seafaring nation. In an order of the day issued from Potsdam on July 21, 1945, he declared: "The Soviet peoples wish to see their navy still stronger and mightier. Our people will create new fighting ships and new bases for the navy. The task of the navy is tirelessly to train and improve the cadres of seamen, to master fully the experience gained in the Fatherland War, and to raise still higher the naval skill, discipline and organization."

Russia wants the open sea, and she intends to have it. She will brush aside all opposition to this pressing demand of hers.

CHAPTER XXIV

Stay Out of Our Pasture

AT THE SAME TIME THAT SOVIET RUSSIA ADVISED THE Western Allies of her intention to establish a Russian sphere of influence in Europe, reaching from Luebeck on the Baltic Sea to Trieste on the Adriatic, she also decided to organize that great region as she saw fit. Americans would rise in horror if Washington selected an American citizen and gave him the office of President of Cuba or Mexico. The Soviet Government made two Russian citizens—Bierut and Tito—chiefs of state in Poland and Yugoslavia, respectively. The Russian people thought that this was only as it should be. They saw no earthly reason why not, for Russia has done the same thing innumerable times in the past. It is one of the many instances where Russian and Western conceptions stand poles apart.

Russian methods today are as simple and as effective as they were one hundred or even five hundred years ago. As soon as Russia's armies occupy another country, she forms a new government of that country with people devoted to Russian interests in control. In ancient days it used to be a pro-Russian khan, or prince, or king; today it is a pro-Russian premier with pro-Russian ministers. So long as this new government keeps running the country along lines prescribed by Moscow, it remains unmolested. But the minute it develops a tendency to look in another direction, Russia steps in and absorbs the country in question. In the days of Czardom, it was done by the simple device of making the

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Russian Czar simultaneously King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, Khan of the Tatars, etc. Today it is even simpler: the other country decides to join the Soviet Union as an autonomous soviet republic. We in the United States would regard any such procedure as interference in the other country's internal affairs, and this we do not stand for; it is our conception of democracy. The Russians believe that it is in the other country's interests to join with her powerful neighbor; it is the Russian conception of democracy.

Russia has always taken the view that any and all territorial adjustments within her sphere of influence are her sole concern, and not that of outside powers, even if these powers were her partners in a common war effort. American public opinion would rise in arms if we took a part of Mexico and gave it to Guatemala, or carved a slice out of Colombia and handed it to Venezuela. Russia takes a part of Czechoslovakia and incorporates it with the Ukraine. She takes large chunks of German territory and hands them to Poland. She dismembers Transylvania from Hungary and turns it over to Rumania. The Western Allies are not so much as consulted; they are simply invited to subscribe to accomplished facts.

Russian diplomacy is farseeing at all times. At Dumbarton Oaks, Russia insisted on inserting a clause in the United Nations Charter stipulating that "any disputes arising out of matters which . . . are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned" cannot be taken up by the Security Council. This meant in effect that the other nations must keep out of the Russian sphere of influence where Russian decisions alone would prevail. Needless to say, this provision can be stretched *ad infinitum*. Thus, if at some future date Poland, for instance, should decide to join the Soviet Union, the Security Council has nothing to say in the matter.

At the Yalta Conference, Russia agreed to admit American

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and British representatives into the Balkan countries occupied by the Red Army. These representatives were admitted. They were installed in their respective legation quarters, and there they stayed. The Secret Police saw to it that they were as isolated as Allied representatives are in Moscow and even more; that they had no chance to look into matters or sound out the actual status of public opinion in these countries. Likewise, in Finland an Allied Control Commission was created. But Colonel General Zhdanov, Russia's second political figure after Generalissimo Stalin, was appointed Chairman of the commission; he is virtual boss of Finland. No American representative was accredited to the commission, and the sole British representative was immediately reduced to a mere decorative figure.

Russia's foresight at the time of drafting the United Nations Charter quickly paid dividends. When Sayed Hassan Taquizadeh, Iran's chief delegate to the United Nations Organization, brought a complaint before the opening session of the UNO Assembly to the effect that the Red Army of occupation in northern Iran had sponsored the setting-up of a rebellious autonomous government in that part of the country in violation of the Teheran Declaration, which guaranteed Iran's independence and territorial integrity, Russia promptly ignored it. She maintained that the matter was a "domestic Iranian affair" and therefore not subject to UNO jurisdiction. Likewise, Russia rejected any consideration of her claims on Turkish territory by either the UNO or an international conference, insisting that it was a matter strictly between herself and Turkey to settle.

In whatever country Russia gains a firm controlling foothold, she insists upon having her own way. Again, that is the Russian interpretation of democracy.

CHAPTER XXV

Liberation

SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL, THE RUSSIAN ARMY HAS BEEN AN army of conquest that has planted the Russian flag over conquered neighboring countries. Similarly, the Russian army has always been the great army of liberation. Whenever in a neighboring country there developed a political faction of malcontents dissatisfied with that country's established regime, the Russian army moved in and "liberated" that country from its "reactionary regime of oppressors." If no such faction developed, it was created by artificial means, and then the Russian army was called in as the liberator. Needless to say, the liberator was at all times prepared to follow the call.

The neighboring countries, especially those on Russia's western border, came to fear the Russian "liberator" who had such enormous masses of manpower at its disposal in the *little gray cattle*. To hold the Russians within their borders, these western countries tried to prevent the shipping of modern arms into Russia. A Polish king, for instance, threatened with death English sailors who would attempt to carry on an illicit trade in arms, on the ground that "the Muscovite, who is not only our opponent of today but the eternal enemy of all free nations, should not be allowed to supply himself with cannons, bullets, and munitions or with artisans who manufacture arms hitherto unknown to these barbarians." But the Russians kept pressing westward, principally to acquire the skills which would enable them to gain a superiority of

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arms, as well as man-power, over their weaker neighbors.

In 1572, Czar Ivan the Terrible set out to "liberate" the Estonians, a people of Finnish origin, who, fearing their Russian neighbor, had placed themselves under Swedish protection. The war with Sweden lasted eleven years and the Russians were repulsed. But in 1701 Peter the Great again decided to liberate the Estonians. This time Russian arms were successful, and Sweden went down in defeat. Estonia was promptly incorporated into Russia.

In 1654, the Ukrainians rebelled against Poland. The insurrection went badly, and the Ukrainian Hetman, Bogdan Khmelnitzky, appealed to Czar Alexius of Russia for help. This help was promptly given, the Poles were defeated, and the Ukraine was annexed to Russia. Ever since then, there have been numerous attempts on the part of the Ukrainians to free themselves from the "liberator," but these all proved futile; today the Ukraine is still a part of Russia, and destined to remain as such. The Russian Bear never lets go of what he once gets hold.

In 1772, Catherine II of Russia decided to liberate Poland from the "oppression of its king and nobles." But here she met the ambitions of Austria and Prussia. The result was that Poland was partitioned among her three neighbors. Similarly, in 1768 the same Czarina proceeded to liberate the Crimean Tatars from the "Turkish yoke," although the Tatars had never complained about it; the Crimea has been Russian to this day. Alexander II liberated the various peoples of the Caucasus from their native princes; and his son, Alexander III, liberated the Moslem peoples of Central Asia from their native khans. All these vast territories have remained solidly Russian.

The recent war presented Russia with her greatest opportunity to act as liberator. She made the most of it. In quick succession her armies liberated Finland, Poland, Rumania,

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Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Just as quickly she installed in the liberated countries minority police dictatorships which the great majority of the people in the countries in question had neither wanted nor requested.

Today Russia has at her disposal a sure-fire liberation device that is bound to succeed whenever put to effective use. Russia is no longer one national state but a cohesive union of national states. Along her western and southern borders is a chain of constituent national republics whose regional nationalism is promoted by every possible means. The history and traditions of each such nationality are extolled side by side with the history and traditions of Russia as a whole. The regional language, such as Armenian, Turkmen, Tadzhik, etc., is taught in the schools of each such constituent soviet republic and also Russian, which is the over-all state language. The peoples of these republics are thus being imbued with a fiery nationalist feeling together with an exalted sense of being part of the militarily powerful and industrially strong Soviet Union.

A clever policy lies behind the fostering of this regional nationalistic spirit. Many of these nationalities are only in part within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. There are considerable numbers of Armenians, Georgians, Azerbeidjans, Kurds, Turkmen, Tadzhiks, etc., living across the border in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and China. All these peoples will have to be liberated in due time and united with their co-nationals who belong to the Soviet Union. Nationalistic propaganda toward this end is already in full swing within these border regions. It is only a matter of time for the new liberation moves to be launched.

Russia has been the great liberator of history. She has been also the great assimilator of liberated peoples. It is her great national urge, one that she has not been able to resist.

CHAPTER XXVI

The Secret Police Marches On

EVEN A THOROUGH STUDENT OF RUSSIAN HISTORY FINDS it difficult to establish just when the Secret Police became a fixture in Russian government. It is known that many of the ancient Russian princes maintained their secret spies and informers, but the first direct mention of a Secret Police whose exclusive function was the maintenance of the existing political order occurs about 1660. It was then that Czar Ivan the Terrible organized his *Oprichniki* under the command of a man of humble origin, by name of Adashev. For decades the *Oprichniki* held all Russia in terror. Ever since, the Secret Police system was improved and extended until it has reached its apex under the Soviet Government. Curiously enough, the Soviet Government has elevated Ivan the Terrible to the status of one of Russia's great national heroes.

With the idea of extending the system into other countries, the Russian Secret Police gave employment to a considerable number of foreigners upon whom it conferred Russian citizenship and trained them for their future tasks. The first important member of the Russian Secret Police to be sent out into the world with an all-important assignment was Josip Broz, who later assumed the name Tito, and gave himself the rank of Yugoslav marshal.

As soon as the Germans were driven out of Yugoslavia, Tito organized his own secret police, the OSNA, on the same principle as the Russian NKVD, which had given Tito his basic training. The OSNA is all-powerful. It has a parallel

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chain of command completely independent of either the civil or military authorities. Its chief, Major General Alexander Rankovich, a fanatic Communist and veteran of the Partisan movement, is responsible only to Tito. The OSNA discourages all intercourse of the populace with Westerners, following the established Moscow principle. Even Yugoslavs who feel friendly toward us are frank in their admission that they cannot afford to mix with Americans and others of "fascist" tendencies.

Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, abounds with stories of OSNA excesses and of the fear under which the people live. The atmosphere is heavily charged with suspicion and hostility. Yugoslavs are afraid to visit the United States and British Embassies except on official business because if they do they are almost invariably picked up by the Secret Police and questioned as to the reasons for their visit. Many of the city's inhabitants live in constant fear of denunciation for crimes they may or may not have committed. It is the story of the Russian *Cheka* all over again.

Another pupil of the Russian Secret Police is Boleslav Rutkovsky, who assumed the name of Bierut when Russia installed him as President of Poland. Of Polish extraction, Bierut took Russian citizenship when he went to work for the Comintern many years ago. Later he became a section chief in the GPU. His present Minister of Public Security (meaning the Secret Police) is Stanislaw Radkiewicz, a pupil of the GPU. Like its counterpart in Yugoslavia, the Polish Secret Police has made countless thousands of arrests and deportations among Poles opposed to the policies of the Bierut regime. They were all classified as "undesirables" and deported to concentration camps in Siberia and elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

As in Yugoslavia and Poland, so it is in all the other countries which have fallen into the Russian sphere of influence.

The Secret Police Marches On.

Everywhere the Secret Police with its ruthless methods of political persecution has held its entry. In Rumania the Minister of Police, Teochari Georgescu, is a Russian-trained Communist. So is Lucretiu Patrascanu, the Minister of Justice and head of the Rumanian Communist Party, who is also in direct charge of the great political purge of all Rumanian "undesirables."

In Bulgaria, Anton Jugov, likewise a Russian trainee, is the Communist Minister of the Interior and head of the Secret Police. But the real power in Bulgaria is wielded by Teola Dragoytchova, woman Secretary General of the Bulgarian Communist Party. She is forty-six years old, has spent years in Russia and is a hot-headed fanatic who goes by the rule that whoever is not 100 per cent with her is against her. The Secret Police, here known as the *Militia*, is at her disposal. The very word, *Militia*, sends shivers down everyone's spine in Bulgaria today. It is not uncommon for the *Militia* to arrest an innocent man whom they merely happen to suspect. He then may be kept in jail for weeks without receiving a hearing, while his family is kept in absolute ignorance of his fate.

Even in the highly civilized nations on the western fringe of Russian influence, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Secret Police system has been introduced and is busily at work. The Czechoslovak Police Minister is Vaclaw Nosek, a Communist miner who has helped in the roundup of about a quarter million Slovaks accused, rightly or wrongly, of collaboration with the Nazis and in their deportation to Russian concentration camps.

Even Finland, the model democratic nation in Europe before the war, has been presented with the blessings of the Secret Police system. Yrjoe Leino, an old-time Communist trained in Russia, is Finland's Minister of the Interior, while Aimo Aaltonen, head of the Finnish Communist Party with

whom I had the pleasure of personal acquaintance years ago, has had himself appointed chief of the political police. The Finns, used to expressing their political opinions without fear of anyone, must now hold their tongues.

And so the Russian-trained Secret Police as originated by Ivan the Terrible has blanketed all Russian-dominated Europe. Dr. Vladimir Matchek, well-known leader of Yugoslavia's famous Croatian Peasant Party and one of Europe's outstanding democrats, has found political asylum in Paris, fleeing from the Secret Police after he had been held a prisoner of the Nazis for years. This is how Dr. Matchek expressed himself:

"Tito's Government is trying to introduce a complete Communist dictatorship. One thing is certain—it is just contrary to democracy. The Croatian Peasant Party is being considered as Enemy Number One in Croatia. I probably would have been arrested by the Partisans had I not left in a hurry. During the four years while I was interned in Croatia by the Germans, I saw how the Partisans were lowering an iron curtain over Yugoslavia so that nobody could know what went on behind it.

"I received news of continual Communist attacks on me in their press, and I became convinced that it would be better in front of the iron curtain than behind it. Now I have no information on what they are doing behind the iron curtain, but obviously they would not need such a curtain were they doing good."

CHAPTER XXVII

Land for the Peasants

ANYONE WHO HAS PERSONALLY LIVED THROUGH THE BIRTH pains of the Bolshevik system in Russia does not require much in the way of political perception to see that virtually the same tactics of Communist penetration are being repeated all over Eastern Europe today. The general pattern is exactly the same, and one of the principal phases of the pattern is the land-hungry peasantry.

In order for his revolution to succeed, Lenin needed the support of the countless millions of Russian peasants. He obtained that support by simply telling the peasants to grab all the land of the large estate owners and divide it among themselves. It was the simplest kind of agrarian reform ever carried out, but then the Russian peasant of those days was a simple soul who simply believed that once he had the land he had everything.

The Politburo planners in Moscow had drawn up their plans long before they sent their armies into the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. They knew that, as in Russia, the great majority of the population in these countries were peasants. But these peasants were used to a better standard of living than was the Russian peasant of 1917—or of 1945, for that matter. Also, having had democratic institutions of sorts before the German occupation, these peasants were smarter, politically, than was the Russian peasant. They would not accept deceptive Communist slogans so readily. Besides, quite a few of them owned their land, had

worked it for generations. If the Russian-appointed satellite governments came forward with a farm collectivization drive along Russian lines, the peasants were likely to rise in revolt, which was the very last thing the Politburo wanted. And so it was decided to win the peasants over by giving them more land.

The Moscow-sponsored Provisional Polish Government had jurisdiction over only a tiny strip of Polish territory (the rest of Poland was still occupied by the Germans) when on September 6, 1944, it issued a decree on agrarian reform covering all Poland. All big estates throughout Poland were to be broken up and the land distributed among the peasants, each to receive twelve and a half acres. But since the Provisional Government had not the slightest idea just how much land it would be able to confiscate, or among how many peasants that land would have to be distributed, it added that if the total amount of land would not suffice, the individual peasant allotments would have to be cut down in size.

The Polish decree on agrarian reform was speedily and widely published in order to let the peasant populations of the Balkan countries know that they would become similar beneficiaries as soon as the Russians and their friends took over. At the same time, Edward Osobka-Morawski, acting as spokesman for the Polish Provisional Government, declared: "We do not want collective farming, as under our conditions it would be harmful." This was a propaganda statement designed to dispel the peasants' fear of collectivization on the Russian model and make them receptive toward the Russian-sponsored regimes. But it was *not* incorporated in the decree itself, and for a very excellent reason.

The soil in the agricultural countries of Eastern Europe is not nearly so rich and productive as that of many parts of Russia. This, in addition to the mechanized type of farming now the order of the day all over Russia, will inevitably

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result in the snowing-under of the individually operating peasants in Eastern Europe by the centralized Russian agricultural production. Hence, in order to be able to keep anywhere near the Russian production standard, they will have to adopt the Russian production principle. Collective farming in Russia makes the same outcome inevitable in all Russian-dominated countries.

As in Poland, agrarian reforms were announced in every other country as soon as the Red Army marched in and a Russian-sponsored regime took over. Everywhere the large estates were broken up and the land apportioned among the peasants. Everywhere an oral promise against collectivization was given, but in no case was it made part of the law. Today the land goes to the peasants because Communism needs their support. Tomorrow—well, that will be an entirely different story.

CHAPTER XXVIII

Po Nemnozhku

THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE HAS A SIGNIFICANT EXPRESSION. *Po nemnozhku* means, step by step. Hitler had erected the great bugaboo of Communism throughout Europe and had instilled in the European peoples a great fear of what would happen if the Russians were permitted to take over Europe. Even among Russia's Western Allies, the fear was widespread that Russia would impose Communism wherever she entered. Moreover, the Russian armies came, ostensibly at least, as liberators. Under the circumstances it would not do to have the great fear confirmed, at least not immediately. Let time do the work.

Besides, Russia was more than moderately exhausted from her own tremendous war effort. She needed a period of rest, of political reorientation toward world power. If she had tried at once to communize the countries of Eastern Europe, they would have promptly risen in open rebellion. Russia would have had to fight them as well as the Germans. The Politburo wanted no part of that. Furthermore, Russia needed economic help from the Western democracies, principally the United States, for her own speedy recovery. To impose Communism at once wherever the Red Army went would definitely jeopardize that help. There was no percentage in it, not for Russia. And so the Politburo gave the order, "*Po nemnozhku*" (step by step).

At the Yalta Conference, Russia joined Great Britain and the United States in a declaration that promised all sorts of

advantages for the liberated countries. Among other promises, each of which contained the word, *democratic*, the signatories agreed to assist these countries to "form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people."

There was just one trouble with this declaration and that was the completely different interpretation of the democratic concept on the part of Russia as compared with that of the United States. We Americans consider everyone a democrat who believes in government of the people, by the people, and for the people. According to the Russian conception this is positively stupid; whoever opposes Communism for whatever reason is a fascist, and a fascist cannot possibly be a democrat. Consequently, only one who supports Communism wholeheartedly is a democrat.

In accordance with this conception of democracy the Russians proceeded to carry out the Yalta Declaration by sponsoring a *National Democratic Front*, or its equivalent, in every country they occupied. The key positions in such a government—usually the ministries of Police, Education, and Justice—were given to veteran Communists who had received their basic training in Russia. The other governmental positions went to non-Communists willing to take their orders from the Communists. Such a National Democratic Front starts by purging all elements of the population capable of providing a political leadership opposed to it—meaning, opposed to the Communists. This purge may extend over a considerable period of time—*po nemnozhku*. When finally all opposition leadership has been liquidated, free elections are held as promised in the Yalta Declaration. They are strictly democratic elections, the same as in Russia. There is no more opposition. The election in Yugoslavia which,

under the doctored electoral laws, produced a 90 per cent majority for Tito and his supporters, was a typical example of how the system works.

As to the method of holding such elections, the method of staging popular demonstrations in favor of the National Democratic Front may be accepted as indicative. Leigh White, in a report to the *Saturday Evening Post*, explains how it is done. He writes: "Workers and white-collar employees were paid a full day's wages if they participated. They were docked a day's wages the first time they failed to do so, and fired if they failed a second time to demonstrate in favor of the National Democratic Front. School children and university students were told that their grades would depend on the enthusiasm with which they demonstrated."

Rumania is an excellent illustration of how *po nemnozhku* works in practice. As direct neighbors of the Soviet Union who had firsthand knowledge, the Rumanian people were more afraid of Communism than possibly any other people in Europe. Knowing this was so, Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov declared in April, 1944, that the Red Army's entry into Rumania had been dictated solely by military motives. He added, "The Soviet Government does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of altering Rumania's social or economic status as it exists at present."

To uphold Mr. Molotov, *po nemnozhku* was put in operation. General Sanatescu was appointed Prime Minister of Rumania. For a while everything went smoothly; there still was a war to be won. American and British correspondents were invited to Rumania to see for themselves that the Russians left everything as it had been before their entry. But a few months later large numbers of Russian-trained Communists arrived. One of them was Anna Pauker, fifty-two years old, a veteran Communist agitator and a close friend of Dolores Ibarruri, the *Pasionara* of the Spanish Civil War.

Like her Bulgarian counterpart, Tsola Dragoytchova, Anna Pauker is a Russian citizen, but she quickly became the real power in Rumania. The new arrivals charged that the Sanatescu Government was unsympathetic to the aims of the National Democratic Front—meaning the Communists—and therefore was guilty of fascist leanings.

In December, 1944, the Russian Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, came to Rumania to investigate the charges. He conferred with King Michael, and it was decided to appoint General Radescu as Prime Minister in place of Sanatescu. The new Prime Minister was hardly in office when the Communists went into action. Army officers and police officials who refused to "play ball" with the Communists were removed and arrested without recourse to law. Bloody riots were instigated, the murdered victims invariably being political opponents of the National Democratic Front. Communist workers armed with machine guns invaded labor union meetings and compelled the election of union officials from lists prepared by themselves. When the Peasant Party staged a demonstration for the Radescu Government, automobiles sped through the crowd, machine-gunning the demonstrators. All newspapers and periodicals which did not support the National Democratic Front were suppressed, their printing plants taken over by the Communists. The *Citizens Militia*, in collaboration with the Russian Secret Police, arrested thousands of people accused of opposition to the policies of the National Democratic Front. *Po nemnozhku* had gone to work. And while all this was taking place, Stalin affixed his signature to the Yalta Declaration which promised to assist the liberated countries, of which Rumania was one, to "solve their pressing political and economic problems *by democratic means*."

Unfortunately for himself, General Radescu, having a Western mind, did not understand the Russian definition of

democratic. When he read the Yalta Declaration, he took it to mean what it would have meant in the United States. His patience exhausted, the Prime Minister delivered a broadcast to the Rumanian nation in which he accused "a handful of nationless and godless individuals led by two foreigners, Anna Pauker and Luka, the Hungarian, who set fire to the country and bathed Rumania in blood. . . . Under the mask of democracy—a democracy which at every step they trample underfoot—these frightful hyenas hope to gain control of the country."

It proved Radescu's undoing. The "hyenas" stalked him, and he had to seek refuge in the British Legation. He was promptly branded a fascist by the Communists, although both he and his predecessor in office had spent two years in a concentration camp during the Nazi occupation. Vice Commissar Vyshinsky arrived posthaste from Moscow and gave King Michael exactly two hours to remove Radescu from office and appoint Petru Groza as Prime Minister. Groza was the head of a Communist organization that called itself the *Plowmen's Front*, although he, himself, was a wealthy banker and hotel owner who had never had a plow in his hands. When the King hesitated, Vyshinsky lifted a corner of the veil over the future design, warning that refusal of Groza's appointment would be considered a hostile act against the Soviet Union which would make it *impossible for Russia to guarantee the further independence of Rumania*.

There was nothing left for the King but to submit. The Groza Government, consisting almost entirely of Communists and their direct supporters, was formed. The next day Vyshinsky expressed Russia's satisfaction by announcing that Stalin was giving Transylvania back to Rumania. He concluded his speech by saying: "Our Red flag brings independence, prosperity, and glory to all freedom-loving people who join with the Soviet Union to build a new world without

oppression and wars. The Soviet Union is the liberator of Europe from Hitler."

The Groza Government went to work promptly, as was expected of it. Within its first month in office, it deported more than a quarter of a million people from Rumania to slave labor in the Karaganda coal mines in Siberia. For his submission, King Michael was given the jeweled Soviet Order of Victory, the Soviet Union's highest award, and two Russian-made airplanes. In making the presentation on behalf of Russia, Marshal Feodor Tolbukhin said that the friendship of Russia and Rumania was becoming "closer and closer." That is how *po nemnozhku* works.

Po nemnozhku entails also an occasional policy of appeasement toward the Western Powers wherever such appeasement is of a purely transient character and does not infringe upon the basic design of the Politburo blueprint. Under *po nemnozhku* Russia does not contemplate pressing the Western Powers too hard, at least not at an early juncture. If an occasion arises for the governments of the United States and England to need a bit of face-saving before their voting public at home, *po nemnozhku* is prepared to contribute to the theatricals. Thus, at the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, Russia agreed to let two representatives of the *democratic* elements of the population join the governments of both Rumania and Bulgaria. That *democratic* elements should have to join these governments both of whom sail under the *National Democratic Front*, is a conundrum in itself.

But even this part of *po nemnozhku* was more easily agreed upon than carried out. When, in the Rumanian case, the suggestion was launched to turn the key ministerial posts over to technical experts and insert political party leaders merely in an advisory capacity as Ministers without Portfolio, Anna Pauker, the power behind the Rumanian Communist Party, declared: "The formula of government composed of

technicians, with party heads as Ministers without Portfolio, is not only unworkable but dangerous for Rumanian democracy. The constitution of such a government would be a new chance for reaction to put its tools in control of the country, so that Rumania's people must begin again the difficult road over which they struggled until last March 6." (It was on March 6, 1945, that the pro-Communist Groza Government was put in power.) When the Allied representatives, W. Averell Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, arrived in Rumania to carry out the face-saving formula of the Moscow Conference, their democratic candidates for ministerial posts, Bebe Bratianu and Ion Mihalache, were promptly rejected by the Groza Government. The American and British representatives shoved two nonentities into a couple of obscure ministerial posts and quickly departed, glad to be rid of their part of the deception.

In Bulgaria, the situation proved even more difficult. Nikola Petkov, secretary of the National Agrarian Party, meaning the peasants, and Kosta Lulchev, representing the Social Democratic Party, were picked as the democratic representatives to enter the Communist government. The democratic elements, erroneously believing that in this case democracy meant what they had always believed it to mean, asked for a reshuffling of the government; they particularly objected to leaving the Ministries of Justice and the Interior in Communist hands. They also asked for a dissolution of the National Assembly, which had been chosen under the Communist-promulgated electoral law, and new elections. Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, A. Y. Vyshinsky, who conducted the negotiations, turned the request down, declaring that it went beyond the scope of the Moscow agreement. He told the democratic representatives to accept the minor ministerial posts offered them or to forget about the whole affair. Speaking at a farewell banquet given in his honor on January

10, 1946, Mr. Vyshinsky stated the Soviet position by saying: "Those who put their groups' interests higher than the interests of their country, who don't wish to help the Bulgarian democratic government and its creative work for the revival of the country's life, don't represent the people's interests, and history will pass by such people and will follow its course." On this note the Bulgarian negotiations ended, without even a *po nemnozhku* result.

But even the inclusion of some democratic elements in the government does not sidetrack the Communists. It is a purely transient affair; *po nemnozhku* takes care of that. Yugoslavia presents a case in practice. Under the terms of the Yalta Declaration, three Yugoslav democrats, Dr. Ivan Subasitch, Dr. Juraj Sutej, and Milan Grol joined the Communist Government of Marshal Tito. Their tenure of office was purely nominal. The Communist majority of the government simply continued its highhanded dictatorial methods over their protests. When these protests became too voluble, the three men were deposed and arrested. According to the official language, they "resigned." The Yalta Declaration, so far as it concerned Yugoslavia, thereby became nul and void. Once again, *po nemnozhku* had done the job assigned to it.

Po nemnozhku was put into successful operation in all the countries of the Russian sphere of influence. Here are a few items taken at random from press dispatches during 1945, the year of the Yalta Declaration; they give a good idea of how the policy of *po nemnozhku* circulates. On February 6, the three foremost Bulgarian democratic leaders, Nikola Mustanov, Athanas Burov, and Dimiter Gitchev, were sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for "suspected fascist" tendencies. The three had been in a concentration camp during the Nazi occupation; but they refused to show enthusiasm for the Communist rulers of Bulgaria and for that crime were sent back to a concentration camp, this time in Russia.

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On June 7, Czechoslovakia announced that her foreign policy henceforth would be based on her alliance with Russia. Her heavy industries and big banks would be put under State control to prevent their endangering the internal unity of the State. (I read the identical phrase in Russia in 1917.) The government program would be executed by decisions of the national committee. The interests of the farmers would be safeguarded and the big landowners eliminated. Farm co-operatives would be supported fully, but collective farming would not be enforced by compulsion.

On June 8, the Finnish Government Radio announced that the Russian language had become a compulsory subject in all Finnish schools. All street signs in Finnish cities would be in Russian, in addition to Finnish. Radio lectures on Russian history, geography, and people, would be broadcast regularly.

On June 20, an agreement was concluded between Rumania and Russia by virtue of which all Rumanian oil, including that from wells owned by British and American companies, was to go exclusively to Russia. In exchange, Russia was to supply an "indefinite quantity of commodities of use" to Rumania.

On July 16, all naturalized Finnish citizens of Russian extraction were arrested throughout Finland on orders of Colonel General Zhdanov, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission. These people had emigrated from Russia in 1917 or before, had acquired Finnish citizenship, and had become an integrated part of the Finnish nation. They were deported to Russia, to be punished there as traitors because during the war their sympathies were on the Finnish side.

To grasp the full significance of this last item, let us suppose we have something like a million naturalized Americans of Russian extraction, among them many Jews. Let us suppose that Russia demands of the United States that they arrest all these naturalized Americans and deport them to Russia,

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to be dealt with as Russia sees fit. And let us further suppose that the United States complies with this Russian demand. That is exactly what happened in Finland under the banner of democracy as interpreted by Russia and put into application via *po nemnozhku*.

On November 12, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Education and Public Enlightenment (the latter is a term taken over from the late Dr. Goebbels, and the Minister of Public Enlightenment is Dr. Vaclaw Kopecky, former editor of the Prague Communist organ, *Rude Pravo*) ordered that all rooms in school buildings open to the public, such as classrooms, lecture halls, and offices, must be decorated with pictures of President Benes and Generalissimo Stalin.

On October 14, a Polish Government decree authorized drafting of men eighteen to fifty-five and women from eighteen to forty-five to labor for "the general economic welfare of the country." Prison terms of three years were provided for refusal to report to an assigned task.

Speaking of *po nemnozhku* in Poland, on July 5, 1945, American newspapers carried, under banner headlines, an announcement by President Truman that the Polish question had been settled and that the new Polish provisional government of national unity had been recognized by the United States. This was just another face-saving device for the United States, arranged by *po nemnozhku*. Actually, there was no new Polish government, much less one of national unity. It remained the same Moscow-appointed Bierut Government of Communist composition and Secret Police methods to which the United States had objected all along, with the mere addition of several men in positions where they had not a thing to say. At any time these men failed to endorse the Communist program wholeheartedly, they would be deposed, just as the democratic government elements in Rumania, Yugoslavia, and other countries in the Russian sphere of

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influence had been. The most deplorable part was that in the Polish case the President of the United States was used as a dummy for *po nemnozhku*.

In this connection, a report by Gladwin Hill to the *New York Times* on October 12, or more than three months after President Truman's announcement of the Polish Government of National Unity, casts quite some illumination on conditions in Poland under that government. Wrote Mr. Hill:

"There exists throughout the war-torn country today a condition approaching a subtle reign of terror in which there is no assurance of what may happen to critics of the present regime. . . . Government officials have acknowledged to me that there were between 60,000 and 80,000 political prisoners in Poland today. . . . The belief is widespread in Warsaw that there are 10,000 in Cracow alone and some responsible observers think the total may be nearer 100,000. The former German concentration camp at Ozwiecim, whose name to any Pole is synonymous with horror, is operating again under Polish auspices, and its wire fences have been charged with electricity.

"The roundup of persons whose only evident offense was suspected opposition to the current Communist-dominated regime was in any case extensive enough to have netted in recent days a number of individuals with claims on American citizenship, most of whom are still locked up under no specific charges and without trial.

"One institution in Warsaw and other cities these days is 'The Well,' a Gestapo-like operation in which the police keep a guard for days on end if necessary at a block, a building or part of a building, seizing indiscriminately anyone who visits the place. This might be excused as an ordinary manhunt, except that it happens curiously often, involves the detention of innocent people and has spread such fear that I know of innocent people who have stayed away from home nights on end because they had been told that 'The Well' was working in their neighborhood.

"I will give other examples of incidents that have contributed to what I have been forced to describe—only after considerable thought and with considerable regret—as a near reign of terror in a country whose regime takes pride in being 'democratic.' On Sept. 16 the Polish Peasants

party, principal opposition threat to the present regime, held a rally at Cracow. One of its most prominent regional leaders was a man named Rjeszow Kojder. The day after the rally I was informed authoritatively that four uniformed men had appeared at Mr. Kojder's home and had taken him away. Three days later he was found shot to death.

"On the recent anniversary of the Warsaw uprising the Polish radio had prepared a broadcast script that was full of digs at the former Warsaw resistance movement so unpopular in Moscow. The announcer protested and a woman program director, a former underground campaigner, said that she could not, in all conscience, ask him to read it. A program of phonograph records was substituted. A few days later the woman was called to account for the substitution and then discharged on an accusation that there had been a discrepancy of \$10 in her accounts.

"A responsible official told me that an employee of the Polish Foreign Office had been discharged simply because he had lunched too often with foreigners. . . .

"Any of these incidents may be verbally justified by the Government and some may actually be justified. Nevertheless the fact is that they and thousands of incidents like them that do not occur under an American-idea democracy have engendered a reign of fear—a situation in which the people dare sing the songs of the old Warsaw underground only behind closed doors; in which the *Deutsche Blick*—glance over the shoulder before one says anything—is becoming a universal habit; in which the press uniformly abstains from criticism of the Government and opposition is found only in the illegal underground press, and in which in city after city across Poland I encountered ordinary people afraid to say to what political party they belonged. . . .

"What is the purpose of this reign of fear? There are two obvious possible answers. One is that the police measures were taken to preserve order. If this be the aim, the measures are failing notably. . . . The other obvious answer is that the present 'provisional' regime is going to these extremes to suppress opposition and perpetuate itself. The official attitude is that sweeping measures were necessary against the 'reactionary' and 'Fascist' elements at large in Poland who jeopardized national unity—an argument curiously as old as authoritarianism itself."

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Po nemnozhku is active not only in the political sphere but in the economic as well. Whenever the Red Army occupied another country, Moscow each time announced pompously that there would be no interference with either the political, social, or economic order of that country. In particular, there would be no collectivization of farms and no socialization of private enterprise. That was the original Moscow promise. Then *po nemnozhku* went to work. Early in January, 1946, Bohumil Lauschman, Czechoslovak Minister of Industry, returned from Moscow and promptly promulgated a sweeping nationalization decree under which all production industries with more than 500 workers and with fewer than 150 workers are taken over by the Government. Private industrial enterprise in Czechoslovakia was thus practically wiped out. Among the nationalized industries are many American enterprises which operated in Czechoslovakia for twenty-five years or more. Mr. Lauschman explained that his country "expects to compensate foreign capital for nationalized industries as favorably as possible." Beyond that vague promise he did not commit himself—*po nemnozhku* will again do the rest.

Czechoslovakia is not the only country which has to obey the master's voice from Moscow. On January 4, 1946, Hilary Minc, Polish Minister of National Economy, returned from a journey to Moscow (where, incidentally, he was a Soviet official for twenty-three years before being appointed to his present post) and promptly promulgated a sweeping economic measure that nationalized all basic industries employing more than fifty persons. Here again a great number of American enterprises were affected, in outright violation of a commercial treaty between Poland and the United States.

Similar decrees nationalizing private industrial enterprise have been promulgated in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania.

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The great cleverness of Russian policy lies in making the United States responsible for everything that goes on in the Russian zone of Europe, no matter what it is. By affixing our signature under the various declarations of policy such as the Yalta one, we not only endorsed in advance the Secret Police System, and all the oppression of true democracy that goes with it, but accepted full responsibility for it. And because of this advance endorsement, we have no kick coming. *Po nemnozhku* has us all tangled up, hand and foot.

The irony of the whole thing is that while we share the responsibility, we have not the least thing to say in the carrying out of the policy. Our representatives in the various countries are just so much window-dressing; they are merely advised of what has been done, after it was done without their knowledge. At that, American representatives are better off than the British; for while the British are treated by the occupying Russians with unconcealed distrust and suspicion, almost like representatives of a hostile power, the Russian attitude toward Americans is rather like that toward inoffensive, harmless nuisances who have to be tolerated.

As for the genuinely democratic elements in the Balkan countries and elsewhere in Eastern Europe—and there still are quite a number of them in spite of the Secret Police—they have formed a new opinion about us. They contend that after we had encouraged their opposition against the Nazis throughout the war with glowing promises of democracy, American brand, we deliberately and unreservedly turned them over, lock, stock and barrel, to democracy, Russian brand. We sold them out. The fact is that never in history was American prestige so low in that part of the world as it is today; it has reached the vanishing point.

In the meantime, *po nemnozhku* continues to carry on in the approved, time-honored manner. It has found even new pastures: Iran, Manchuria, and Korea.

CHAPTER XXIX

Dva Shaga Vpered, Odin Nazad

THERE IS AN OLD RUSSIAN AXIOM, *Dva shaga vpered, odin nazad*—two steps forward, one backward. It is also an old-established Russian method of always securing what is wanted. Russian philosophy has always been to take twice what is wanted in order to proclaim a spirit of compromise by relinquishing half of what was taken and still remain in possession of what was originally wanted.

There is the old Russian folk legend about Ilya Mourometz, Russia's legendary national hero, the greatest of the *bogatyr*s. Mourometz, symbolizing the Spirit of Good, fought the devil, symbolizing the Spirit of Evil. Mourometz bested the devil and took both the earth and hell away from him, only to find hell a most uncomfortable place. When the devil complained he was deprived of everything in the way of power, Mourometz told him, "I'm going to prove to you what a good fellow I am compared with you. I'm giving hell back to you."

There is also the modern story of the Russian soldier who was billeted in the house of a Czechoslovak peasant. When the Nazis confiscated all metal utensils the peasant managed to save a silver samovar—a family heirloom—and an aluminum kettle. When the Russian soldier saw the two pieces, he promptly confiscated both as war booty. The peasant complained that now he was no longer in a position to prepare tea and cook meals. To which the soldier replied, "That's right. I was too greedy. Here, I'm giving you the kettle back. Now go and cook a meal for me."

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What tends to confuse both statesmen and the general public in the western world, and especially in the United States, is the issue of Communism. Russia is now believed different from what she used to be, because of Communism. This is rank delusion, a result of the unquestioned superiority of Russian propaganda methods over those of the western democracies. In actual fact, Russia has remained the same grasping animal, the same striding bear which the cartoonists have so tellingly presented for generations. The marriage of Communism with Russianism has returned Russia to the same old bear trail. The western world faces the same traditional Russian policy of expansion by conquest. It is conducted with new, confusing methods; it is spiced with new social and economic aims; but it still pursues the same old geographical and military goals.

When the United Nations Organization was discussed at the Yalta Conference, Stalin demanded sixteen votes for Russia in the proposed world setup, one vote for each of the sixteen constituent republics of the Soviet Union. When President Roosevelt got over his surprise, he countered the Russian demand with a request for a vote for each of the forty-eight states composing the United States. Eventually Stalin compromised on three votes for each, Russia and the United States. While doing this he knew very well that American public opinion would reject the three-votes idea for the United States. His prognostication was correct: Russia now has three votes in the UNO while the United States has just one.

Again, at Yalta, Russia fixed the German reparations figure at twenty billion dollars of which she demanded half, or ten billion. Prime Minister Churchill protested the figure as being utterly fantastic. But President Roosevelt, pursuing as always a policy of appeasement toward Russia, sided with Stalin. However, during the deliberations of the Reparations Com-

mission in Moscow, the American Commissioner, Edwin W. Pauley, came to the conclusion that Churchill had been right and that the Russian claims were impossible. When the Potsdam Conference convened, the Russians still insisted on their original figure, but in the meantime the American representatives had discovered that the Russians for months had been removing everything dismountable from their zone of Germany—industrial machinery, bathtubs and plumbing, furniture and household goods, boats and yachts, livestock, locomotives and rolling stock; in short, everything for which transportation could be found. Commissioner Pauley personally took colored motion pictures showing the extent of this looting, and was almost arrested by Russian military police. The Russians calmly claimed that these removals were not reparations but war booty, a claim that almost blew the conference sky-high, with President Truman hurling stormy language at Stalin and later on declaring that he would never attend another such conference. Eventually the Russians halved their reparations claim and agreed to count all *future* removals from Germany as reparations. But they already had the other half safely tucked away.

The atmosphere at Potsdam became such that all other decisions, with the exception of the temporary German settlement, had to be postponed for the London Conference of Foreign Ministers. There, Russia bluntly demanded the Italian colonies of Tripolitania in North Africa and Erithrea on the Red Sea, as well as bases in the Dodecanese Islands and the annexation of Trieste by Yugoslavia. On this subject Generalissimo Stalin expressed himself as follows: "Now everybody recognizes that the Soviet people by their sacrifices have saved civilization in Europe from the Fascist invaders." The Moscow *Novoye Vremya* added to this: "The decisive role that the Soviet Union played during the years of the greatest catastrophe that has ever threatened humanity

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naturally defines the place our country has a full right to occupy in the postwar period." When the demand aroused a storm of indignation in Great Britain and the United States, Foreign Commissar Molotov led them to believe that Russia might be satisfied with Tripolitania and Trieste.

At the same time Russia demanded six hundred million dollars in reparations from Italy for herself and her ally, Yugoslavia. Now it was perfectly obvious that Italy could not pay any reparations unless she borrowed the money from England and the United States. In other words, the western allies, after having defeated the Nazis in Italy, were to foot Italian reparations payments to Russia, who had had no part in the Italian campaign. When England and the United States protested, Molotov halved the reparations claim to three hundred million and gave them to understand that Russia might accept Tripolitania and Trieste in lieu of reparations.

Similarly, in the Pacific, Russia demanded the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin, partial occupation of Korea, Port Arthur and Dairen in Manchuria, and the Chinese island of Formosa for a naval base. This brought angry protests not only from the United States and England but from China as well. Russia then compromised by dropping her claim on Formosa but retaining all the rest.

And so it goes. Whenever Russia wants anything, she demands double what she wants, then compromises by accepting half of what she had originally demanded. It was that way in the days of the czars and it is still that way today. *Dva shaga vpered, odin nazad* remains the basic policy of Russian diplomacy.

CHAPTER XXX

The Slavic Era

THE RUSSIAN DREAM OF COMPLETE DOMINATION OVER THE entire Balkan Peninsula was one of long standing. It really started with the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. The Byzantine Empire had been composed in part of Slavic peoples towards whom the Russians, another Slavic people, were drawn not only by affinity of race but also of religion. When Byzantium was conquered by the infidel Turks, the Czars of Russia considered themselves the logical heirs to the Byzantine throne. To strengthen this claim, Czar Ivan III married the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, Constantine Paleologus. At the same time the Grand Prince of Moscow assumed the title of Czar, a Russian corruption of Caesar.

A doctrine developed among the Russians according to which they considered themselves the chosen liberators of all Slavic peoples from the Turkish yoke. This conviction was strengthened by numerous Slavic refugees from Turkish-dominated areas who looked upon the Russian Czars for the liberation of their peoples. The first refugee to give expression to this dream was Yuri Krzanich, a Serb, who about 1676 wrote a series of manuscripts the principal topic of which was the union of all Slavic peoples into one great nation, a doctrine that has since become known as Pan-Slavism.

Russia's numerous wars with Turkey were largely motivated by the former's assuming the role of great protector of all Slavic peoples. Eventually Russia succeeded in freeing a large

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section of the Balkan Slavs from Turkish domination, while another section was freed by Austria. However, while the Austrians succeeded in attaching their part to the Austrian Empire, the Russians failed to do so, largely because of England's opposition for imperial reasons of her own. The Russian-liberated Slavs were set up as independent countries. Whereupon, since part of the Slav peoples had fallen under Austrian domination, Pan-Slavism directed itself against Austria, and later against Germany, when the latter became the spokesman for the Germanic peoples.

With Communism emerging triumphant in Russia, the Pan-Slav movement seemed ready to die out. The other Slavic peoples, being more advanced in civilization than the Russians and having absorbed the democratic teachings of the West to some extent, wanted none of what they considered a barbaric ideology.

But the planners of the Politburo conceived a tremendous idea. They had already merged Communism with Russianism. If by reviving Pan-Slavism they could draw all Slavic peoples of Europe into their orbit, they would have a great tool with which to undertake the next task. They restored the Orthodox Church, which gave them a common religious tie with the Slavs of the Balkans; they then proclaimed themselves the liberators of the Slavs, a role which they have already boosted to that of liberators of all Europe.

Russia has created a new spokesman for the Pan-Slav movement. It calls itself the All-Slav Committee and has its seat in Moscow. Like everything in Russia, it is subject to the Kremlin's orders. It has affiliates in all Slav countries and represents what the government-owned Russian press calls "Slav democratic circles" in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia as well as the Soviet Republics. Through it Russia expects to accomplish a mighty union of all Slavs under the Soviet banner. It is to be the great

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Slavic Era—the first step toward world domination.

At a banquet tendered him by the Bulgarian Government in Sofia on January 10, 1946, Soviet Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs A. Y. Vyshinsky stated: "Never more will the Slav be under the conqueror's yoke. The Slavic nations, united around the Soviet Union, will make all efforts for the establishment of peace throughout the world." Mr. Vyshinsky did not elaborate on what sort of peace it was going to be.

This new Pan-Slavism goes to some strange lengths that are very reminiscent of the Pan-German movement sponsored only a few years ago by the Nazis. For instance, some twelve hundred years ago an ancient Slavic tribe, the Wends, fleeing from Polish persecution, settled in what was known as Lusatia on the upper Spree River. In the course of centuries they were completely absorbed by the surrounding Germans, accepted German culture, thinking and language, and for many hundreds of years nothing was heard of them. But Czechoslovakia evidently nourishes a desire to annex this part of Germany, and so on July 1, 1945, a voice speaking over the Prague radio announced: "Wends, listen! Victorious Marshal Stalin, liberator of all Slavs, has also freed the Lusatian Wends."

The British have a new reason for sleeping uneasily. In their zone of occupation, around Hanover, another ancient Slavic tribe, the Polabs, settled likewise 1200 years ago. Nothing has been heard of them for centuries, but that was equally true of the Wends. Perhaps the Polabs, too, will be "freed" in a not too distant future, to join the "Slavic Brotherhood of Nations."

Not satisfied with the larger part of Europe, the new Pan-Slavism of the Politburo has already reached out across the ocean into the United States, using for its purposes the Orthodox Church of Russia, now the Politburo's obedient tool.

The Slavic Era

The Russian Orthodox hierarchy of the United States and Canada had cut loose from Moscow in 1917. In December, 1945, the Orthodox churchmen met in Chicago. There they heard a delegate from Patriarch Alexei of Russia who demanded complete resubmission to Moscow by all Orthodox believers on this side of the Atlantic. Patriarch Alexei even issued a ukase in which he ordered all Orthodox churchmen in North and South America to "abstain from all political activity directed against the Soviet Union."

The American churchmen refused to heed the words of the Patriarch's delegate. But the attempt had been made, and it probably will be repeated at the next favorable opportunity.

Disarmament—An Illusion

AT THE END OF WORLD WAR I, THE ENTIRE WORLD WAS tired of war. The peoples of the world had a deep craving for peace. Hand in hand with peace goes disarmament, and so the whole world was buzzing with talk of disarmament. Special disarmament clauses, to be applied to all nations, were injected into the Versailles Treaty; the disarmament of Germany was to be the beginning of universal disarmament. No longer would man forge the weapons of war; he would henceforth produce the implements of peace. The United States took a leading hand in the movement by calling the Washington Disarmament Conference in 1921. The thesis was that continued armament inevitably leads to war.

Today, too, the world is tired of war. Everyone wants to look forward to a long era of peace. Heroic efforts are being made to put the structure of peace on a stable international basis, the United Nations Organization being one of them. But in all this talk of universal peace, of the great era of mankind, the very word "disarmament" is studiously avoided.

Quite to the contrary, everyone speaks of peace by force. All over the world, armaments are to continue. Large navies, larger air fleets, large standing armies are to be maintained. The very first thing the liberated nations of Europe did was to organize new armies. France, as soon as the Germans were driven from her soil and faced inevitable defeat, asked for arms from the United States before she asked for food and other civilian supplies. And atomic bomb research goes on at

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a frantic pace throughout the whole civilized world.

The nations of Western Europe cry for security, and in the same breath, decry disarmament. France wants to be heavily armed as a security measure against Germany; at least so she claims. So do Belgium and the Netherlands. So does Great Britain. So, for that matter, does the United States, as witness our atomic bomb tests. A great fear encircles the world. But if the nations were to speak bluntly, they would admit that the fear is not of an utterly vanquished Germany; it is a fear of the new Russian Communist colossus.

On July 19, 1945, Harold Callender reported to the *New York Times*: "The French believe that the British are so obsessed by the problem of Russia's intentions in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East that they are not keen to come to an agreement with France. This belief, coupled with the suspicion that the British are considering a restored Germany as a possible buffer between themselves and the Russian zone in Europe, appears to be shared by those authorities whose ideas are reflected by the Moscow radio, which accuses the British of seeking to strengthen Germany as a barrier against Russian influence."

Are these fears of Russia justified? Let us see. On June 22, 1945, General Alexei Antonov, Chief of the Red Army Staff, spoke before the Supreme Soviet in the Great Hall of the Kremlin. Said he: "Our armed forces must remain on a level commensurate with our country's greatness," and added, "We cannot rest on our laurels."

The identical phrase was spoken by Hitler before the Reichstag after the Polish campaign, the difference being that Hitler was at war with France and Britain at the time; Russia is now at peace.

Two days after General Antonov's speech, Marshal Gregory Zhukov, the conqueror of Berlin, spoke from the steps of Lenin's Tomb on Red Square. This is what he said: "The

Soviet State has emerged even more mighty from the grim struggle we waged, and the Red Army is the most modern and powerful army in the world. But for us Soviet peoples it is unseemly to become conceited or complacent. In the future, too, we must strengthen the economic might of our country, unceasingly perfect our military skill, study the abundant experience of the Fatherland War, and develop our military science."

A few days later, General Bohumil Bocek, Chief of Staff of the new Czechoslovak army, on his return from Moscow, made a momentous statement that may be of immeasurable importance to the future status of Europe. He declared in Prague that the new Czechoslovak army would be both armed and trained by the Red Army, and a permanent Soviet military mission would be attached to it. This created a form of military co-operation far stronger than any diplomatic or economic ties.

Reports from the other countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans are of an identical character. Everywhere the story is the same. Everywhere the young men of the nation are being drafted into new military cadres, trained and drilled by Red Army officers. There cannot be the slightest doubt that in the future the Red Army will be materially assisted by the armed forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

I certainly do not hold with those who make a profession out of pointing the finger at Russia and crying "Wolf! Wolf!" Nor do I hold with those who claim that we shall be fighting Russia before our boys are all back from Europe. I venture to say that Russia is not in a position right now to fight another world war with any chance of success, nor will she be for quite some time to come. History proves that there have always been periods of rest between Russia's great war efforts. To claim that Russia is prepared to pounce on us is ridiculous.

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But it is ridiculous also to bury one's head in the sand and play ostrich. It is ridiculous to babble meaningless peace slogans and just hope piously that sometime, somewhere in a better world, they will come true, somehow. It is ridiculous not to look the future straight in the face. It is ridiculous to remain a die-hard idealist in an out-and-out realistic world. And it is not necessary to be a wizard or a superspy to read the signs. The facts are there, in plain sight, to look at for all who want to see.

It is quite true that the Red Army has been demobilized in part. No nation on earth can continue to maintain an armed force of some 18,000,000—the approximate size of the Red Army at the time of the German surrender—and at the same time continue to eat. But let us take a closer look at the demobilization figures. By the end of 1945 the following categories were ordered demobilized: All women privates, corporals, and sergeants, except women specialists who wished to remain in the army. All men with three or more wounds. All soldiers and noncommissioned officers, *but not officers*, between the ages of fifty-five and thirty-two. In short, the Russian demobilization measures apply largely to age groups which, in the case of the United States, had never been drafted, much less sent into combat. The younger age groups, the real combat forces, remained in the army. So did all the officers. And the young recruits are pouring in. According to an official Moscow announcement, boys from fifteen years and up now receive military training. It is reminiscent of the *Hitler Jugend*.

Not only have the officers remained in the army, but they have been promoted into a privileged class, the same as during the Czarist regime. Buck privates are no longer admitted in Red Army clubs, which have been renamed *Red Army Officers Clubs*. Special improvements in living conditions have made the military profession more attractive for officers. Red Army

officers now receive a *free* food ration in Category 2 in addition to the regular officer's food ration; this means that officers now have considerably more food and a much greater variety of it than most Soviet workers. Generals and colonels have been given permanent orderlies to relieve them from tedious menial tasks. The war tax has been abolished for officers. The army newspaper *Red Star* declared in this connection: "The Party and the Government are doing their best to continue improving the standard of living of generals and other officers to increase their material welfare and release them from the tiresome concern about everyday needs."

Why has Russia placed her officer corps on an economically privileged basis? The same newspaper *Red Star* gave the reply on September 15, 1945, in stating: "The Soviet officer must and can answer with only one thing, to increase even more his fruitful work in strengthening the might of our armed forces for the welfare of the Socialist Fatherland. . . . Officers now will be able to devote more time to persistent and serious combat training. They will increase the combat training of their units, day by day." The emphasis everywhere is on *combat training*.

Significantly enough, the numerical strength of the Red Army continues to remain a closely guarded secret, so entirely different from the numerical strength of the U. S. Army which is being officially announced almost day by day. But it is known that Russia has elected to keep an effective fighting strength in such areas as Bulgaria, Armenia, Azerbeidjan, northern Iran, Turkmenia, Mongolia, and in the Manchurian littoral, among others. I know that figures are tedious to the reader and I will not bother him with an involved tabulation of the Russian national budget. Suffice to say that Red Army appropriations comprise more than one-half of the entire budget of the Soviet Union for the current year—the first year of peace. When one stops to consider that the Soviet budget

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includes expenditures that never enter the national budget of the Western countries, such as government upkeep of the nation's entire communications system, industry, and trade, the percentage set aside for military needs becomes enormous. Also, the new Five-Year Plan, now in effect, is repeatedly described as a method to "develop the military and economic strength of the Soviet Union."

On the surface it appears that Russia is paying practically no attention, in a strictly military sense, to Hungary and Austria. However, a glance at the map furnishes a clear explanation. Russia is building up the armed strength of her two principal satellites in Europe, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; she is virtually integrating their armies with the Red Army through general staff agreements and the maintenance of very large military missions in both these countries. The two form a pair of gigantic pincers which can completely cut off both Austria and Hungary whenever Russian strategy dictates any such move.

Russia is building a great navy, a navy which, as Stalin expressed himself, is to be "commensurate with the Soviet Union's new position in world affairs." She has compelled Finland to build a string of fortifications along her western coast, all the way from Tornea to the Gulf of Finland and the Aland Islands. She is building strong coastal fortifications all along the Baltic Sea and a strong air base on the Danish island of Bornholm.¹ She insists on being given air and naval bases along the Dardanelles and in the Dodecanese. She has officially announced that she is building new fortifications on the Kamchatka Peninsula, opposite Alaska, as well as on the twenty-odd islands of the Kurile chain, formerly Japanese, to transform them into "veritable bastions forming a screen of steel" protecting Russian Pacific waters and "assuring freedom of the Pacific Ocean for the Soviet Fatherland." All

¹ With the Russian evacuation of Bornholm, this air base has been transferred to the island of Ruegen in the Russian occupation zone of Germany.

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these intensively pushed measures can be directed only against a great naval power. There are but two such powers today: Great Britain and the United States.

Russia is actually erecting a *cordon sanitaire* of her own against the rest of the world, one that controls strategic bases as far from the Soviet Union as possible; as part of this *cordon sanitaire*, she is fostering pro-Russian Communist parties in other countries. At the same time she is building up industrial, economic, and military self-sufficiency while maintaining a totalitarian dictatorship within her borders. The truth is also that Russia is remaining a strictly closed corporation as well as a grimly guarded fortress into which the Western World is not permitted so much as a glimpse. The Politburo stands on the premise that armed strength and ruthlessly applied power form the only really effective instruments of policy in both domestic and foreign affairs.

Such are the clear, indisputable facts. In the face of these facts, is it thinkable at all that Russia will agree to disarm? Is it thinkable that she will permit an international disarmament commission or its equivalent to look into the status of her armaments, to peer into the secret arsenals of the vast Soviet realm where Soviet might and power are being forged? The facts certainly do not allow the least premise that she will.

CHAPTER XXXII

Bad Germans and Good Germans

IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE SUPREME SOVIET IN NOVEMBER, 1943, Stalin said: "History reveals that a short period of time, from twenty to thirty years, is enough for Germany to recover from defeat and re-establish her might."

Politicians everywhere are opportunists, but the level-headed hierarchs of the Politburo have proved themselves the greatest opportunists of them all. In their well-laid plans they always provide for not just one loophole but for a number of them. These plans are so prepared that they can be made to fit almost any eventuality.

From the Communist point of view, there are just two kinds of people—good and bad. The good ones co-operate with the Communists, whereas the bad ones do not. Equally, there are two kinds of Germans—bad Germans and good Germans. According to the Russian conception, this does not mean Nazis and anti-Nazis; if a Nazi is prepared to co-operate with the Russians he is still a good German, and if an anti-Nazi refuses to co-operate, he becomes a bad German. In this respect the Russians are not so particular as we Americans, who count all Nazis among the black sheep and all anti-Nazis among the white ones. It is just another of the many instances where Russian and American conception are poles apart; the Russians, being totalitarian themselves, understand the Nazi character much better than we do.

The Russian and the German are much closer to each other, fundamentally, than the vast majority of Americans

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realize; I was born of a German father in Russia, I ought to know. Certainly they are much closer to each other than either of them is to the American. The American's basic conception of the rights of the individual is as foreign to the German as it is to the Russian; both are born to obey. When Hitler modeled his Gestapo after the GPU, it was not just a similarity of method; it was an affinity of the mind. The Russian is a blood mixture of Slav and Finn. The German, Hitler and his racial nonsense notwithstanding, is a blood mixture of Slav and Teuton. It is the Slavic part that connects the two.

I was very much surprised while talking with a high Russian official when he told me: "In a way, we should be thankful to Hitler. He made us realize our own strength. We did not know we really had it in us. And if he had not attacked us, we would not be in the powerful position we are today."

That is what may be called the *non plus ultra* of realism. But then the men of the Kremlin have shown on innumerable occasions that sentimentalism and idealism are not their weaknesses. There are uncounted thousands of splendid democrats in Poland and the Balkans who spent years in concentration camps because of their refusal to collaborate with Hitler, and who today are either dead or in jail or in Siberia for their refusal to collaborate with the Communists. On the other hand, there are thousands of former Nazi collaborators in the same countries who today are in privileged positions because they went over to the Communists as soon as the Russians marched in.

I remember a meeting between Russian and German engineers in January, 1914, at the Engineers' Club of what was then St. Petersburg and is now Leningrad. One of the visiting Germans said, "What couldn't we accomplish if we had your Russian masses at our disposal," to which one of

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the Russian hosts replied, "What couldn't we accomplish if we had your scientific and technical skill at our disposal." Seven months later the war was on, and they were at each other's throats, much to the regret of both.

There once was a great German who understood the Russian-German inter-relationship only too well; he was Count von Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor. When his great-grandson, Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, was captured at Stalingrad, he walked up to a Russian microphone and broadcast the following message: "A war between Germany and Russia is hopeless and senseless. My great-grandfather believed that, and every soldier can see it more clearly every day."

There is today a great Russian who entertains ideas along somewhat similar lines. He is Stalin himself, who declared: "We do not pursue the aim of destroying Germany. Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain."

The war produced an endless number of stories about the deep hatred which the Russians felt for the Germans. All these stories were the product of war psychosis. The realists who conduct Russia's destiny smiled at them. When war correspondent Ilya Ehrenburg took them too seriously, he was promptly censured by the powers-that-be. Actually, Russians still feel that Germans are their friends if they are *good* Germans.

The Russians set out early in the war to make good Germans out of bad Germans. At first they did not have much material on which to work. But then, beginning with Stalingrad, the German prisoners started to stream in by the thousand. The Russians did not kill them or put them behind barbed-wire enclosures. They knew the value of technically skilled human material. The Russian approach was that the captured enemy soldier must earn his eventual freedom by

going to work for a Russian victory, by fighting for his freedom against the very leaders in whose cause he lost it.

Americans would be surprised to learn how many important war industries in Russia were, and still are, run by German foremen and technicians who were former prisoners of war. Because of their higher production capacity, these Germans, in many instances, receive better pay and higher food allowances than the native Russian workers. By the middle of 1944, there were already more than 150,000 of these trustee workers in the war plants of the Urals and Siberia, and more kept pouring in.

The total number of prisoners was of course incomparably greater, but many had to start in unskilled work or on reclamation projects. A prisoner's reliability was thoroughly tested before he was admitted to the better jobs. It was not so much whether he had been a Nazi or a member of the SS, but whether he was wholeheartedly prepared to work for the Soviets. The Secret Police knows how to deal with saboteurs, but it would rather not have any with which to deal. Only after the prisoner had proved himself a good German was he advanced to a position of trust.

His mental reactions to his surroundings were constantly being watched. When he was believed to be fit for bigger things, he was made a still better German. He was sent for training to a special political school. After graduation from it, he was considered ready to take up whatever political duties that would be assigned to him in Russian-occupied Germany. In the meantime, he was being used to convert and re-educate others like himself.

These re-educated Germans made up the bulk of the *Free Germany Committee* and its local affiliates in the various prisoner camps. The top leadership of the Committee consisted of "very good" Germans who, for the most part, were drawn from the German membership of the former Comin-

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tern, with a few military names thrown in as special flavoring. All these men had definite ideas as to what Germany should really be, and had had them before the advent of Hitler. And these ideas closely coincided with the Kremlin's ideas on the same subject.

The Western Allies entertained their suspicions about good Germans made in Russia. They had even graver suspicions about the Free Germany Committee. They were not going to free Germany from the Nazis only to have her turned over to the Communists. And England, especially, was not going to have a Moscow-sponsored government in Germany that would make common cause with the Soviets economically, politically, and militarily.

At the Yalta Conference, England, backed up by the United States in this particular instance, staged a showdown on the Free Germany Committee issue. She demanded assurances from Moscow that the Committee was not going to be installed by Russia as a puppet regime in the Russian-occupied zone of the Reich. Assurances on this point were readily given, but Moscow refused to have the Committee disbanded. The Politburo certainly would not part with a political weapon of great potentialities. The good Germans were to convert bad Germans into more good Germans; they would keep on doing it until all Germans became good Germans, Moscow definition.

When the Red Army moved into Germany, the Russian Secret Police entered in the army's wake. Together with it came a German section of the Secret Police, deftly trained by the NKVD. And right behind the Secret Police came the good Germans.¹ These good Germans were used to weed out the bad Germans inside Germany. The bad Germans were

¹ Walter Ulbricht, former Communist *Reichstag* member and the real power in the *Free Germany Committee*, returned to Germany as principal political adviser to Marshal Gregory Zhukov. He stood beside Zhukov when Field Marshal Keitel signed the German surrender in Berlin.

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not all Nazis by any means, nor were all Nazis considered bad Germans. There is ample evidence that many Nazis turned into good Germans overnight and were promptly accepted as such. The task of these good Germans then became to convert the great mass of indifferent Germans into good Germans.

But that is only part of the picture. A good many of these good Germans, Moscow style, originated from areas within the occupation zones of the Western Allies. It is fully expected that in due course they will be permitted to be repatriated, as quite a few already have been. They will then have an excellent opportunity to convert the Germans in the Allied zones into good Germans. It will be a long task that may take many years. But Russia, secure behind her Eastern European satellites, can afford to wait.

The Russian view is that politically the German people are much closer to the Russian conception of things than to that of Great Britain and the United States. And competent German testimony—such as that of Pastor Niemoeller, for instance—confirms the Russian view. While it is perfectly true that certain German circles, principal among them the industrial faction and the General Staff, created in Germany an atmosphere of fear of the Russians and of compliance to the Western Allies, this was nothing more than a political trick designed to sow discord between the two groups. The Russians were quite aware of this situation. They insisted on having all members of the German General Staff imprisoned, and the Western Allies promptly complied with this demand. Yet the Russians on their part never touched the ranking German generals who had become good Germans.

Although at Yalta a Russian pledge was given not to install the Free Germany Committee as a pro-Russian government in Germany, the Kremlin gave its own interpretation to this pledge, just as it does with all its pledges. The Committee

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was officially disbanded with the German surrender; however, late in June, 1945, all its ex-members, headed by the German Communist Wilhelm Pieck, former chairman of the Committee, turned up in Berlin. A week later, in the name of the newly formed German Communist Party, they issued a manifesto calling for a government of Germany by good Germans, meaning themselves. The manifesto, signed by the same Wilhelm Pieck,² promptly received the official blessing of Marshal Zhukov, administrator of the Russian-occupied zone.

For some time thereafter the Politburo patiently awaited the results of the Potsdam Conference. When these failed to satisfy Russian expectations, Moscow busied itself at once. On September 12, the Russian occupation authorities announced the formation of a German Government for their entire occupation zone, and the men who were to pull the strings of this German Government were none other than the former office holders of the Free Germany Committee.

Three months later, several American correspondents were admitted into the Russian-occupied zone for the first time. Reporting on the results of this trip, Gladwin Hill wrote in the *New York Times* on December 26: "While the zone is far from 'communized,' Communism is being organized as a political entity and is making more spectacular strides than the institution of democracy in the western zones. . . . Not nearly all the high German officials are Communists, although Moscow strategy in planting its representatives—many of them trained in Russia—in many key posts is evident."

At about the same time, Robert D. Murphy, our State Department's political adviser in Berlin, reported to Washington, saying that the best indications are that the entire governmental machinery in the Russian zone is in the hands

²Wilhelm Pieck was pushed to the forefront but the propelling power behind him was Walter Ulbricht, a personal friend of Andrei Zhdanov and the Politburo's hatchet man in the Russian occupation zone.

of either the Russian military, Communist-dominated trade unions, Communist party officials, or Communist-front committees, with newly appointed civil office holders having shadow powers only.

When the German Communist Party issued its manifesto in July, it came out flatly for the "development of private enterprise on the basis of private ownership" and rejected the Soviet system for Germany, "because such a course does not correspond with the conditions of the development of Germany *at the present moment.*" Yet already at the turn of the year, the introduction of a planned economy after the Russian model was quite evident. All farmers were working under tight controls and could be jailed for failing to meet government-fixed production quotas. Industrial enterprises were being nationalized at a rapid pace. The entire press was operated either by government institutions or by Communist-dominated organizations. *Po nemnozhku* was doing excellent work in Germany, as everywhere else in the Russian sphere of influence.

Unlike American observers in the Soviet Union, Russian observers in the United States have free access to all sources representing American public opinion. They are keen analysts of American public opinion. I met some of these Russian observers in the United States and was surprised by the astuteness with which they judged American public opinion. Their view is that the American public is quickly losing all interest in German affairs. They believe that as time passes, the American public will become irked by the fruitless attempt to establish a popular democracy, American style, in Germany and with the continued spending of American taxpayers' money for a futile purpose. The Russians are convinced that before long the Americans will abandon the attempt and pull out of Germany. Then the Russians will have only the British to deal with, and by that time they expect to have many

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good Germans, Moscow brand, in the Allied zone. Either way, Russia has nothing to lose. The good Germans will do the job, just as the good Poles, good Bulgarians, and good Czechs are doing theirs.

Not only the Russians, but also the Germans themselves, are keenly concerned with developments in the American zone of occupation. When in January, 1946, thousands of GI's demonstrated turbulently in favor of going home, both Russians and Germans nodded their heads wisely. Their expectations were coming true even more quickly than they had anticipated. Yet, trained in unquestioned obedience to the appointed authority as they both are, they simply could not understand how our soldiers could protest against their superiors. They interpreted it as a quickly spreading demoralization of our armed forces.

American prestige throughout Germany promptly dropped to an incredible low. So low, indeed, that Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner, Social Democratic Minister President of Bavaria, in the American occupation zone, predicted that from 35 to 40 per cent of the voters would stay away from the polls in the first free elections since 1933, ordered by the American occupation authorities throughout their zone. He added that many Bavarians preferred to remain "unpolitical" and "careful" for the present. They were afraid, he said, that "some day a change may come and then they will be in trouble for having declared themselves" at the polls.

In the meantime, the *good Germans* are preparing to take over when the expected change comes.

CHAPTER XXXIII

No Western Bloc!

TO THE AMERICAN MIND IT SEEMS PARADOXICAL, TO SAY the least, that Russia and Great Britain, having signed a twenty-years military alliance with each other, should at the same time watch each other's actions with open suspicion and distrust, which at times assume the proportions of thinly disguised hostility. The European mind finds nothing contradictory in this situation. For example, while American boys and girls usually marry for love, Europeans of all nations as a rule marry for convenience or, to be more specific, for financial or other economic considerations. And the European conception of marriage for convenience equally applies to intercourse between nations. When Russia and England signed their treaty of alliance, they needed each other badly, the common necessity being the defeat of Germany, who was threatening both. As Winston Churchill frankly declared, "I will sign a treaty with the devil himself if it helps to save England." This does not mean that he would continue living with the devil after England was saved. And so, once the common objective had been achieved, the two nations started drifting apart. To the European way of thinking, that was a perfectly natural method of conduct.

Strange as it may seem, Hitler and the Russians shared one fundamental political belief: namely, that Great Britain always strove to dominate the European continent by the simple expedient of pitting the leading Continental nations against one another. As a matter of fact, leading British

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statesmen of the past and present have frequently stated that England's principal defense lay in not allowing one powerful nation to dominate the rest of the European continent. When in 1943 Great Britain, having corralled all the European refugee governments in London, came forward with the proposal that the countries of Eastern Europe, from Poland down to Greece, should form an Eastern European Federation, Russia immediately reached the conclusion that the proposed federation would have as its principal objective the halting of Russian expansion westward in the interests of England.

Russia wanted none of that. She took action for the protection of her historic interests in the traditionally Russian manner. She sent her Communist-trained emissaries into some of the countries in question, such as Tito to Yugoslavia and the ELAS leaders to Greece. She formed a Polish group of her own to move in behind the advancing Red Army and set up a Russian type of government in Poland. And through her emissaries in England she exerted pressure on the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, reminding it of the Munich betrayal.

The Czechs were first to break away from England. President Benes went to Moscow and signed an ironclad treaty of alliance with Russia. Then, through clever political maneuvers, Russia undermined the prestige of the other governments-in-exile. Intensive propaganda represented the exile groups as having lost all influence upon their peoples at home. Whether true or not, the Russian version was accepted, whereupon Russia boldly declared that henceforth the countries of Eastern Europe would be in her sphere exclusively. And that was that.

Having suffered a complete diplomatic defeat in Eastern Europe, England turned her eyes to Western Europe and the Mediterranean. In 1944, the so-called *Empire Scheme* came into being. France, Belgium, Holland, and possibly

Italy and Greece, though retaining their national identity, were to join the British Empire. Thus, Europe would be divided into a Russian bloc and a British bloc, with defeated Germany in between.

No sooner did Russia get wind of the scheme than she reacted with customary promptness. A bloc as proposed by Great Britain, especially if the United States sided with it, might easily draw a defeated Germany within its orbit, which in turn would endanger, perhaps even nullify, all Russian plans for future expansion. Russia made up her mind that there was going to be no Western bloc, not if she could help it. In December, 1944, General de Gaulle was invited to Moscow and there induced to sign a twenty-year treaty of alliance with Russia. By the terms of this treaty, France cannot join any combination of powers with interests inimical to those of Russia. With France thus removed from the picture by Russian diplomatic action, the British plans were no longer practical. The *Empire Scheme* was blasted to pieces before it ever got beyond the blueprint stage.

But a treaty alone is not enough. Russia knows from practical experience that treaties can be scrapped as easily as they can be drawn up. She knows also that the French Communist Party is both strong and pro-Russian; she intended to keep it both strong and pro-Russian. As soon as the Red Army liberated any French Communists held in Germany, the latter were promptly sent back to France with the utmost dispatch, to spread there the story of Russia's greatness and her friendship for the French. Thus, early in February, 1945, Jean Le Du, a veteran French Communist leader, was sent to Paris by Russian plane immediately upon his liberation from a German prison camp. When asked on his arrival how the French were treated by the Russians, Le Du replied instantly, "We got a tremendous welcome. Any Frenchman is greeted cordially everywhere. I was

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treated like a king. You cannot imagine what fine fellows these Russians are."

What Le Du entirely forgot to mention was that many thousands of liberated Frenchmen, non-Communists, were held back in Russia until Allied ships could be spared for their repatriation. There were no Russian planes for them to come home in royal style.

But England is not the only nation possessed by a fear of the new Russian colossus. Frenchmen of all political shades, with the sole exception of the Communist Party, are casting longing eyes across the Channel. In Italy, Guglielmo Gianini, ex-theatrical producer, has made great strides in organizing a union of the *uomo qualunque* (the common man) to steer his country away from Communism. Public opinion in Holland is strongly in favor of an alliance with England. Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium has come out repeatedly for a Western bloc comprising, to begin with, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Holland.

The very idea is anathema to Russian ears. Without delay, Moscow sent out instructions for countermeasures. In Italy, the Communist Party rose vociferously against Gianini, branding him "a reactionary profiting from the prevailing confused state of mind." The Communist Parties of France, Belgium, and Holland are voicing continuous violent opposition against the very thought of any Western bloc, declaring the idea itself an overt act of aggression against the Soviet Union. The Communist and affiliated press in all countries, including the United States, is printing long tirades against any Western bloc scheme.

When Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak was proposed by Great Britain for the post of President of the United Nations Assembly, Russia marshaled her forces for his defeat. First she opposed a secret ballot and demanded a show-of-hands vote; she wanted to know exactly what nations would line up

against her wishes. But the motion lost. Then Russia advanced her own candidate in the person of Norway's Foreign Minister Trygve Lie. To defeat Spaak, an advocate of the Western Bloc, Russia moved her supporters on the ballot box as Marshal Zhukov had moved his tanks in the assault on Berlin, even managing to pull the United States over on her side. Still, Spaak was elected by a narrow margin, and Moscow did not like the setback.

The Western Bloc idea is far from dead. Great Britain considers it a virtual necessity to form a group of states around herself and to permit them collectively to play a role in international affairs commensurate with that of Russia and the United States, especially after the disappointing results of the Moscow Conference in December, 1945. That conference emphasized the superior importance of the other two great powers in the scheme of world affairs. In fact, it completely neglected the all-important British interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. It did worse than that to France, who was not even permitted to participate.

But Russia is constantly vigilant of a revival of the Western Bloc scheme in any shape or form. Whenever there is even the faintest whisper to that effect, Russia's government-controlled press is given instant orders to sound the trumpet call for Communists the world over to rally around Moscow. Thus *Pravda* declared grandiloquently: "The Soviet Union is a great, democratic power capable of assuring the security not only of its own borders but also of the peoples of Europe, and the sooner this is recognized the better it will be for humanity."

The army newspaper *Red Star* stated the same case in even more definite terms: "British plans to form an alliance with France, Belgium, and Holland are designed to set Western Europe against Eastern Europe and recreate German imperialism. This is definitely not in the interests of Europe."

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Certainly it is not in the interests of the Soviet Union to be faced with a bloc of states that would counterbalance Russia's own intricate system of satellite states and military alliances, and also preclude the possibility of a future Russian hegemony over all Europe, to which *Pravda* referred in thinly disguised terms. For this reason, Russia is firmly determined that there shall be no Western Bloc.

CHAPTER XXXIV

What About World Revolution?

THE GREAT RIFT BETWEEN TROTZKY, THE PROTAGONIST OF immediate World Revolution, and Stalin, the advocate of building a strong Communist State in Russia before World Revolution is attempted, is historic knowledge. When Stalin won out, the Trotzkyite faction, joined by Zinoviev and Kamenev, plotted Stalin's overthrow and was ruthlessly liquidated. The Comintern, devoted to fostering World Revolution, lost its militant leader in the person of Zinoviev; Stalin entrusted its actual leadership to Andrei Zhdanov, his closest associate.

Zhdanov maintained, and even extended the political activity of the Comintern abroad, including the financing of Communist parties in foreign countries. But essentially he looked upon the Comintern as a defensive rather than offensive weapon. It was to be used to create domestic trouble in those countries which remained hostile to the Soviet Union. This did not mean that the idea of World Revolution was completely given up; it was merely deferred. During the purge trials A. Y. Vyshinsky, now Russian Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, declared emphatically: "Two worlds face each other as irreconcilable and deadly enemies—the world of capitalism and the world of socialism."

When the Hitler-Stalin Pact was negotiated in August, 1939, it contained a provision to the effect that all Comintern activity in Germany should cease. The Nazis in those days were regarded as socialist allies. Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, now

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Foreign Commissar of the Ukraine, prophesied at the time: "Not a stone will remain standing of the cursed capitalistic structure!" Vyacheslav Molotov was even more direct. He denounced both England and France for opposing Hitler in what he labeled a criminal war which, he contended, the two capitalist countries had directly instigated.

Germany's going to war on Russia changed all this, of course. The "criminal" war of the Western countries suddenly became a war of liberation. Russia found herself desperately in need of help to turn back the German onslaught. In exchange for this help, she was prepared to give concessions, just as previously she had given them to Hitler. And so the Comintern was officially dissolved. The World Revolution, for the time being, was confined to enemy countries.

But this did not mean the end of World Communism. It meant only that Moscow no longer accepted political responsibility for the actions of the Communist parties in the various Allied countries. However, a certain harmony of views between the Russian Communist Party and the parties in Western countries was preserved. All these parties had been organized and built up under Moscow directives, and there was no reason for destroying a weapon that might come in handy at some future time. There is today a continuous stream of "directives" flowing from Moscow to the Communist leaders in other countries.

Nor was the elaborate apparatus of the Comintern dismantled. Its highly trained experts in the field of international affairs were distributed among the various sections of the Russian Foreign Office to assist in its work until the time arrived when they could resume the activity for which they were originally trained. Among them were such experts as Bulgaria's Georgi Dimitrov, Finland's Yrjoe Leino, Yugoslavia's Tito, Poland's Boleslav Bierut, Austria's Fischer, Germany's Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, Italy's Palmiro

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Togliatti, Iran's Jafar Pishevari, and America's William Foster, all of whom have gone back to their respective countries, there to complete the good work they had started while with the Comintern. The case of Iran especially has shown the re-emergence of the Trojan Horse of World Communism.

The principles on which the achievement of World Revolution is based have not been changed either. Lenin, whom I heard speak on a number of occasions, emphasized in almost every one of his speeches that a small but strongly disciplined group of professional revolutionaries should lead the working masses which, he insisted, make the revolution. This is precisely the principle followed today in all countries of Europe that have fallen under Russian domination.

Today there is not a country in the world that has not its Communist Party. Compared with the total population, some of these parties are relatively small, numerically, but according to Lenin they must not be large. They are only the leaders of the masses, and leadership is always confined to small, strongly disciplined groups. Even in Russia, the great Communist State, the Communist Party counts no more than 3 per cent of the population among its members.

Although the Comintern is officially dissolved, the Communist parties in the various countries of the United Nations continue their interrelationship, and close contact is maintained at all times with the mother party in Russia. An example of how this is being done without involving Russia directly occurred in the summer of 1945. Jacques Duclos, one of France's Communist leaders, visited Russia, where he received certain instructions. Upon his return to Paris, he issued from there a statement directed against Earl Browder, who then led the Communist Party in the United States, taking him severely to task for his co-operation with American capitalist society during the war and demanding the resumption of class warfare. The American Communist Party

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promptly took its cue, disavowed Browder's leadership, elected as its new leader William Z. Foster, who for many years had headed the American section of the Comintern, and reverted to the revolutionary principle of class warfare. The directives had come from Moscow, but in such a roundabout way that Moscow could proclaim itself blameless.

It would be an error to suppose that Moscow would relinquish a weapon as potent as the World Communist Movement, which gives it a means to create domestic trouble in any country that offers political opposition to Russia. The realistic Politburo hierarchs do not operate that way. At the same time, the people of Soviet Russia are completely immune from any propaganda emanating from Western democracy; the Politburo has seen to that.

The Atlantic Ocean has proved to be no barrier to World Communism. Since the victorious emergence of the Soviet Union as a world power, the Communists throughout the Latin American countries have risen to unprecedented influence. Some influential members of our State Department, including former Undersecretary Nelson Rockefeller, see in the newly arisen situation the possible emergence of an anti-American bloc favorable to Russia and, for this reason, disposed to economic and political relations with the Soviet Union rather than with the United States. We are confronted today with such pro-Soviet and anti-American leaders as Juan Fuenmayor of Venezuela; Lazaro Pina of Cuba; Vincente Toledano of Mexico; and Luis Prestes of Brazil, who sends congratulatory messages to Premier Stalin on every possible occasion. Since Prestes has no official connection with the Brazilian Government but is only the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Brazil, his messages are obviously sent to Stalin as the acknowledged leader of World Communism.¹

¹ Following his election to the Brazilian Senate, Luis Prestes declared publicly, "If Brazil should fight Russia, I would form guerilla bands and

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We have also right here in the United States an outspokenly pro-Communist press which greets every international development favorable to Russia with thunderous approval. For instance, when the Communist-led *Hukbalahaps* of the Philippines formed the heart of the *Democratic Alliance* (democracy, Moscow style), the American left-wing press loudly proclaimed them the great hope of the Philippines.

But the Russian-led Communist movement is especially rampant all over the ravaged continent of Europe. Once before, in 1815, a militaristically powerful Russia erupted into a Europe weakened by the Napoleonic wars. But at that time Russia came up against a fairly strong European bulwark in the form of Metternich's Austria. Today Europe comprises a mere hodgepodge of nations, all chaotic, destroyed, leaderless, and not knowing which way to turn. In the Napoleonic era, the Great Britain of Wellington and Castlereagh was wealthy and at the zenith of her power. But today Great Britain, too, is immeasurably weakened and impoverished. Still clinging to this evaporating glory, Anthony Eden, in his last days as Foreign Secretary, declared in the House of Commons: "The foreign policy of Britain has been based for centuries on determination that no one country shall dominate Europe. We believe in Europe. We are part of Europe. I myself am convinced that no one country is ever going to dominate Europe."

It was a futile speech, one that stubbornly refused to face the actual facts. Today, for the first time in history, one great power dominates not only Europe but the entire

together with my followers I would fight for Russia." Likewise, the Communist leadership of Chile's labor unions stated, "Nothing will be shipped out of Chile if trouble develops between the United States and Russia." As for Vicente Toledano, he visited Moscow in June, 1946; in an article which he wrote in the Moscow newspaper *Trud*, he made a vicious attack on the United States and came out flatly for the introduction of governmental institutions in all Latin America based on Soviet principles, including collectivization of all agricultural land, nationalization of all industry and, inferentially, a secret police.

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Eurasian mainland from the English Channel to the Yellow Sea as well, and that power is Communist Russia.

In November, 1945, Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times* interviewed a number of common Russians with the idea of sounding out the average Russian on his views on another world war. Here are some of the illuminating answers he received. A woman worker told him: "The United States and Great Britain have put an end to Fascism, but now they are afraid of Bolshevism. *All of them are afraid.*"

A Russian writer was even more specific. Said he: "It looks to me that the possibility of a Sovietized Europe is not too remote and by no means a fantastic dream. Anybody would think twice before making war against a Soviet Europe. In general, I would say that *as long as there are two antagonistic systems war is always in the offing.*"

Thus speaks the average Russian living under the indoctrination of the Communist system.

A Russian official expressed himself to me in this way: "It is no longer necessary to promote World Revolution through a central revolutionary body directed from this end. The Soviet Union is now looked upon with unparalleled respect by all nations of the world; she serves as a shining example before the working masses of the entire world. From now on, World Revolution will develop of itself. It will ride high on the wings of the Soviet Union's world prestige."

CHAPTER XXXV

Let's Free the Moslems

IT IS NOT GENERALLY KNOWN THAT RUSSIA IS THE SECOND largest Moslem country in the world. Her Moslem population is in excess of thirty million, which places it next to India's eighty million Moslems. But while India's Moslems are numerically strong, they are politically weak because they are dwarfed by a Hindu population of some three hundred million and are kept within bounds by British imperial policy. Russia's Moslems, on the other hand, have behind them the great centralized power of the Soviet State.

The Politburo is quite aware that religion serves as a more potent rallying point for Moslems the world over than do strictly national or political affiliations. In recognition of this fact, the Soviet Government early in 1944 selected a *Sheik ul Islam* for all Russian Moslems in the person of Ahund Aga Alizade. The new *Sheik ul Islam*, a learned theologian, originates from a humble family in Baku and thus is in every respect a man of the people. But though the office of the *Sheik ul Islam* is empowered to direct the religious affairs of all Soviet Moslems, it is politically subordinated to the Soviet Council of Religious Cults, the chairman of which is Ivan Vasilyevich Polyansky, a veteran Communist Party leader with a background of political achievement. In short, the Moslem Church of Russia, like the Orthodox Church, is subject to political directives from the State and is run strictly in the interests of the State. Because it has the potent backing of the State, the Moslem Church in Russia thus

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presents an excellent gambit for expansionist ambitions within neighboring Moslem countries. And Russia is using this gambit for all it is worth to win political allies from the Arab and Moslem world.

With the same objective in view, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs has set up a large section on Near Eastern Affairs, meaning the Moslem countries. The section is staffed by many ex-employees of the Comintern, including Turkish, Iranian, Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi Communists. It is headed by Sergei I. Kavtaradze, an Armenian, who has the rank of Vice Commissar and is highly trusted by the Politburo. All Russian diplomats in Near Eastern countries, notably Turkey, Iran, and Egypt, are under his personal direction. Ahund Aga Alizade, the *Sheik ul Islam*, is a friend of Kavtaradze's and was selected on his recommendation.

In the years preceding the war, Russia strongly espoused the cause of freedom for the Moslem peoples from what she then chose to call British Imperialism; freedom in the Russian sense meaning affiliation of some sort with the Soviet Union. During the war, this policy was moderated. But now that Russia is no longer in need of British help, it has again gained momentum, to the great embarrassment of English statesmen and political leaders.

Turkey and Iran, being Russia's immediate neighbors, naturally head the list of those to be "freed." In June, 1945, Russia bluntly served notice of her intentions toward Turkey by forwarding an inofficial list of demands—they were called "recommendations"—which included, among others, the formation of a Turkish Government "friendly" toward Russia, although the then Government of Turkey was not known to have committed any acts unfriendly to the Soviet Union. About the only sin attributable to Turkey, if it may be termed as such, is her great fear of being swallowed up by the mighty expansionist neighbor to the north. During World

War I, I was for a time with the Russian Army of the Caucasus which captured Erzurum and Trebizond and penetrated deep into Turkey, and I know from personal observation just what this fear means.

That this fear is justified has been proved by a series of continually increasing demands, a veritable war of nerves, conducted on the part of the Soviet Union against her Turkish neighbor ever since the summer of 1945. It started when Russia expressed a desire to occupy Turkish territory on both sides of the Dardanelles for the purpose of establishing naval and air bases there. When Turkey pointed out that this Russian request stood in direct violation of international agreements of long standing, Russia took the next step in her war of nerves. The Armenian Soviet Republic, a constituent part of the Soviet Union, demanded of Turkey the cession of the vilayets of Kars and Ardahan with adjoining territory in Transcaucasia, contending that the Armenians living there should be united with their "brother" Armenians of the Soviet Union. When Turkey rejected this demand on the grounds that the Armenian population in question constituted but a small percentage of the total population of the areas under dispute, the war of nerves was accelerated. This time the Georgian Soviet Republic, also a constituent part of the Soviet Union, came forward with a claim to some 13,000 square miles of Turkish territory, including 180 miles of Black Sea coast. The motivation for this claim was that at the time of Herodotus (450 B.C.), the territory in question was populated by tribes of Georgian stock which were later driven out by conquerors; for this reason the territory must now be turned over to Soviet Georgia. Turkey's protests that she has been in possession of these lands for more than seven hundred years, and that less than 2 per cent of today's population in the disputed territory is of Georgian origin, were brushed aside by Russia as "irrelevant." At the same time

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Russia increased the pressure by stating she favored the cession of the Turkish vilayets of Antioch and Alexandretta to Syria.

While this war of nerves was being unleashed against Turkey, neighboring Iran was put under similar Soviet pressure. Since 1941, Iran had been occupied by Russian and British troops, which were later joined by American forces, for the sole purpose of speeding up the transit of Allied Lend-Lease supplies to Russia during the critical phase of the war. This occupation was subject to a solemn pledge given by the three powers, including Russia, to withdraw their troops within six months after the cessation of hostilities.

The Russian procedure in the Iranian case is a typical example of Soviet infiltration. Late in 1944, a Soviet citizen from Baku, Jafar Pishevari, arrived in northern Iran where, under the protection of Russian bayonets, he began to organize the communistic Tudeh Party (Party of the Masses). Kurdish tribal chiefs were taken in as party leaders and their wild tribesmen armed with Russian guns. Toward the end of summer, 1945, a sufficient number of tribesmen had been enlisted to stage a rebellion against the Iranian Government. The Government sent its troops to quell the rebellion. The Russian army of occupation refused passage to these government troops. Whereupon Jafar Pishevari charged persecution of his "democratic" movement by the Iranian Government, proclaimed the territory an autonomous state under the name of Iranian Azerbeidjan (to correspond with the Soviet Republic of Azerbeidjan across the border) and installed himself as Premier of the new Azerbeidjan Autonomous Government, in which capacity he was promptly recognized by Russia.¹

¹ When, in the spring of 1946, a pro-Russian government for all Iran came into power under Premier Ahmed Ghavam, with Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov as virtual overlord, Azerbeidjan consented to be reunited with Iran. Thus the original purpose of the Russian infiltration was fulfilled.

But the scheme is even more far-reaching. Kurdish tribes inhabit not only this part of Iran but also large parts of Turkey and Iraq. Mulla Mustafa el Barzani, a Kurd tribal chief in Iraq, was induced to start a rebellion in that country. It proved abortive, and Barzani fled to the Russian-occupied zone of Iran where he immediately planned a national Kurdish state, to be called Soviet Kurdistan and to comprise whatever parts of Turkey and Iraq the Kurds preferred to claim. By sheer accident, of course, this new state would then include among its population some Syrian and Iraqi elements, a situation that would call for amalgamation of all Syrians into a Soviet Syria and of all Iraqi into a Soviet Iraq.

There is actually no limit to this procedure. One national soviet state leads to another. What is more, the process is based on the democratic principle of self-determination as interpreted by Moscow. It is absolutely foolproof. It can go on until it has swept through all Moslem countries and reached the North African shore at the Strait of Gibraltar.

But penetration into Africa, even though Russia has advanced a claim for Tripolitania, is still very much a proposition for the future. For the present, Russian wooing of the Moslem countries has a nearer and more realistic aim. By reaching across Turkey, Russia expects to arrive at the eastern Mediterranean via the most direct route. And by reaching across Iran, she expects to acquire the much desired warm-water ports on the Persian Gulf. Basic Russian policy of very long standing ties in everywhere. It will require quite a bit of political finagling and power politics, of course, but the present rulers of Russia have proved by astute performance that they are unqualified experts in both these lines. And *po nemnozhku* will push things along, here as elsewhere. Also, the Arab peoples entertain a healthy respect for power.

According to the Moscow concept, Russia has set out to "free" the Moslems.

CHAPTER XXXVI

Freedom for the Colonials

DURING THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, THE RUSSIANS insisted on having a number of additional clauses inserted in the United Nations Charter. One such clause concerns the so-called colonial peoples. It is to the effect that powers not holding trustee territories (the new appellation for the mandates of the defunct League of Nations) should, nevertheless, participate in the trusteeship system. This means that Russia, who, at least for propaganda purposes, does not subscribe to the colonial system as being opposed to Communist ideology, is going to be in on all major international organizations dealing with the trusteeship system. On all such questions she is going to have a voice, and, if the past is any criterion, it will be a powerful one.

Communism is an aggressive force. Whatever its final destination, regarding which the present Communist leaders are vague, it cannot stand still. It is a revolutionary force that must fight for continuous change, otherwise it would have nothing for which to fight. It has no appeal for the strong because they are satisfied with their position of strength, and any change would only weaken that strength. Therefore Communism can appeal only to the dissatisfied whose prime objective is to overthrow the strong and take their place. The colonial peoples are counted among the dissatisfied, and so Communism directs its appeals to them.

Russia always wanted to be strong. The fact that she could grow strong only at the expense of other nations made no dif-

ference. It never makes any difference with the ones who strive for greater power. They respect nothing but power and deal unhesitatingly with the weak. Today Russia proclaims herself the most powerful nation in the world. But all her actions indicate that she is out for more power. And she can get this additional power only at the expense of others.

Russia has always considered England as the one nation who consistently opposed Russian expansion toward greater power. The average Russian has nothing against the average Englishman, but Russia as a state has a great many things against England as a state. Russia wants more power, and some of the power she wants is held by England. Since England's power is derived principally from her colonial system, Russia wants to wreck that system. And in Communism, Russia has a weapon ideally suited for the task.

Ever since the Soviet Union came into being, it has been agitating for the freedom of the colonial peoples. For years Russia has been up in arms against British Imperialism in the colonies, against Dollar Imperialism in the Latin American countries. The very fact that the republics south of the Rio Grande ruled themselves made no difference; Communism chooses only weapons it can use to advantage and boldly dismisses all contrary facts as irrelevant.

The question may be asked, what has Russia to gain by stirring up the colonials? The answer is, power for herself in two different ways: first, the breaking away of any colonies from the British Empire would weaken English power and thereby indirectly increase Russian power; second, the colonies that would break away from British rule could hardly remain actually independent, at least not for long. Under the Russian-sponsored system of power that rules the world today, they would have to look for a powerful affiliation. And since the United States is not interested in either alliances or ter-

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ritorial acquisitions, the only powerful affiliation remaining would be Russia. This, then, would mean a direct increase of Russian power.

The great weakness of the British Empire is that England's colonial possessions and dominions are scattered all over the globe. So long as England remained *the* great naval power, this did not matter. But today the United States is a greater naval power than England, and the Russians are working to build a great navy. The continued existence of the British Empire is wholly dependent on the preservation of her lifeline across the oceans of the world; once it is cut, the empire is doomed. Russia today is working diligently and persistently toward the cutting of that lifeline.

Russia, too, is a great colonial power, although very few persons in the United States realize the fact. Actually, Russia's status as a colonial power long antedates that of England. However, Russian colonial policy from its very inception differed radically from that of the British. Russia did not reach out for colonies across the Seven Seas; she picked up colonies along her continental periphery and kept adding to them as she went along. As a result, Russia and her colonies present a compact continental whole. And the extremely important result of this is that while Russia can be defeated militaristically, she can never be conquered, for her continental system is too vast for that. This means, in essence, that the Russian system of colonial expansion has proved superior to that of the British.

The Russian system of colonial expansion today is the same that it was under the czars. In Europe, Russia has added Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to her colonial system. In Asia she has added Mongolia. In the Far East she is sinking her claws into Manchuria and Korea. And in the Middle East she is reaching out for Iran, Turkey, and the Moslem countries

beyond. She continues to annex additional colonies along her continental periphery. Again, Russia and her rulers do not change much.

History testifies that the British, on the whole, have shown themselves to be excellent and successful colonizers. But the Russians have gone them one better in this respect. They gave their colonies the status of constituent soviet republics, introduced full local self-administration and even conceded the right of secession from the Soviet Union. That this right cannot be exercised in practice because of the ever-presence of an overwhelmingly powerful Russian core, is a different story; but in theory it exists. Conversely, the British cannot grant this right even in theory because of the absence of a sufficiently strong British core to prevent the exercise of it in practice.

Politically, Russian colonial policy is far in advance of the British. Russia can state to the world at large that she is the liberator of peoples whereas Britain is the oppressor. And she is stating it continually. What is more, the colonial peoples have begun to believe her. When British troops moved into Java and Indo-China to quell the independence movement in both countries, the Indoneses as well as the Indo-Chinese appealed to Stalin for help. The average man does not stop to think that England simply had to intervene in order to prevent the movement from spreading into her own possessions in Malaya, Burma, India and elsewhere. He accepts at face value the Russian claim of British oppression.

When Russia insisted on having the trusteeship clauses inserted in the United Nations Charter, she merely followed her own long-range colonial program. Not only did she provide a basis from which to continue to undermine the British colonial system, but she also equipped herself with a powerful world rostrum from which to call for the liberation of the colonial peoples.

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Just before the opening session of the United Nations Organization in London, Moscow went on the air with a series of world-wide radio lectures on the subject of colonial peoples. Dr. Lemin, the lecturer, made a number of Soviet attacks on the "reactionary colonial system," calling it an obstacle to the United Nations' war effort of the past five years and a hindrance to world unity. Soviet participation in the new United Nations trusteeship system is the *only guarantee* that the system will work properly, the Moscow speaker asserted. And he added:

"As for the problems of trusteeships, there can be no doubt that the active participation of the Soviet Union, *the greatest progressive force in the international arena*, can see that the trusteeship system functions properly for the good of populations concerned and for the benefit of peace between nations.

"The reluctance of colonial powers to take into account the movement of colonial and semi-colonial peoples for independence, their endeavors to crush the movement by naked force, their attempt to put the movement down to mischief-making or inspiration from without, all this is one of the sources of continued agitation in international relations after the defeat of the aggressors.

"The strengthening of the colonial peoples' national consciousness and their increased efforts to gain independence and to win a tolerable existence are one of the characteristic features of the present-day international situation. It is enough to point to India, Indonesia, Indo-China, and also to a number of dependent or semi-dependent countries in the Middle East."

And therein lies the crux! Russia is pushing into the Middle East, as she has done for more than a century, luring the Moslem peoples into the Soviet Union. She is casting eyes toward India and beyond, as she has also done for more than a century. She is aiming right at the heart of the British colonial empire. And she is sparing no propaganda effort to win the colonial peoples over to her side.

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At the opening session of the United Nations Organization in London, Andrei A. Gromyko, chief of the Russian delegation, declared: "Among the provisions of the Charter there are those concerning the establishment of a trusteeship system for the territories which have not yet been given independence. The trusteeship system, as it is provided for in the Charter, is an instrument designed to accelerate the giving of the status of national and state independence to all such peoples. That is why the speediest carrying out of the principles of trusteeship declared in the Charter is one of the *most important obligations* of the member states of the United Nations which must take practical steps in the direction of the realization of these *supreme* principles of the Charter."

Yes, Russia certainly did not wait long to take full charge of the world-wide propaganda rostrum. She surprised all the other nations, and her rallying cry is—freedom for the colonials! It so happens, strangely enough, that the colonials she wants freed first are all British. It also so happens, again strangely enough, that these same colonials all border on Russia.

The Russian Bear is preparing further expansion. What is England going to do about it? The question, it seems, should be, what *can* England do about it?

CHAPTER XXXVII

China: Our Next Door Neighbor

A SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATED PRESS DISPATCH FROM MOSCOW dated July 29, 1945, read as follows: "The recent conversations between Generalissimo Stalin and Chinese Premier T. V. Soong have paved the way for an understanding heretofore never achieved by the two nations, an informed source said today. This source added that if all went well when the Russian and Chinese leaders resumed discussions after the Big Three meeting they would reach an accord on a broad program of co-operation. This would be a realistic and practical program in which China might find herself in the *closest relationship* with her powerful neighbor, with whom she shares one of the longest common frontiers in the world."

Russia's interest in China is nothing new. Czarist Russia had repeatedly penetrated into Sinkiang, the Central Asiatic border province separated from China proper by the vast stretch of the Gobi Desert and containing a population by race and religion affiliated with the Moslem population of Russian Central Asia, just over the border. Czarist Russia penetrated into Manchuria also, leased the ports of Port Arthur and Dairen from the Chinese, and kept probing into Korea. Russian expansionist aspirations in this quarter were temporarily checked by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.

Communist Russia did not lose much time in taking up where the Czars had left off. The weak Soviet Union could not tackle what had become a powerful Japan. But there

were other ways. Always when Russia was rebuffed in one quarter she pushed forward in another, pursuing a once determined aim with a grim singleness of purpose. There was China, weak and helpless because of internal dissension, unable to resist anyone bold enough to dissect her, providing that it was done under the ever-convenient slogan of liberation. And so in 1921, Russia decided to help the Mongolian people free themselves from China. The Russians promoted a Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party, helped to establish the Mongolian Peoples Republic and signed a permanent treaty of alliance with it.

Mongolia as the central of the three great northern provinces of China and located between Sinkiang and Manchuria, was a strategic keystone, which the Japanese militarists missed. When they woke up to the realization of that, they found it was too late. In 1939, they invaded Mongolia with an army of 50,000 men and five hundred planes. Russia invoked the treaty of alliance and sent a crack Siberian army under General Guriev to the aid of the hard-pressed Mongolians. In the bloody battle of Khalkyn Gol the Japs were utterly routed, losing more than one-third of their invasion force. It was enough; they did not try again. Russia's hold over Mongolia became undisputed.

Moscow took the next step. A rebellion of the Moslem tribes against the Chinese regime in Sinkiang was deftly promoted. Russian troops moved in to restore order, and stayed. Russia had, in fact, just begun to develop the country economically when another setback was forced on her. Germany had attacked from the west and Russia needed every soldier to stop the invader. The Russian troops were withdrawn in 1942 from Sinkiang to the Stalingrad front, and China was allowed to take over once again.

But the Russian Bear, persistent animal that it is, invariably returns to a once trodden track. Germany was on the

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verge of utter defeat, with Russia master over half of Europe. Even before Germany surrendered unconditionally in 1945, another rebellion of the Moslem tribes broke out in Sinkiang. Promptly Russian troops concentrated on the border, ready to strike. In the meantime, Manchuria was being singled out as the next objective.

However, here Russia ran into a power whom she had least expected to take an active interest in this part of Asia; a power whom Russia could not afford to challenge on the field of battle: the United States. President Truman, at variance with his predecessor's policy of appeasement toward Russia, caused a sensation at the Potsdam Conference when he declared that the United States would stand by the obligations which she had undertaken toward China.

Russia took stock of the situation. She could use the Chinese Communists and their armies to throw China into a vortex of civil war and take advantage of the resulting situation in her own way. But such a course might drive the awakening national self-consciousness of the great majority of Chinese to great lengths and rally them around Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's banner. It certainly would bring the United States with her powerful sea and air fleets into the Chinese arena. It would give England an immediate opportunity to form a Western bloc to foment revolutions against the Russians in the Balkans and elsewhere, and perhaps, even to join a war on Russia. The shrewd policy-framers of the Politburo decided there would be no percentage in this course, especially when they had *po nemnozhku* to fall back on.

Accordingly, the Russian Bear executed one of its tactical retreats. Chinese Premier T. V. Soong was invited to Moscow to sign a "treaty of friendship" with Russia on terms which had already been defined by President Truman at Potsdam. Under the terms of this treaty, Russia recognized China's

sovereignty in Sinkiang and withdrew her troops from the border. Russia recognized China's sovereignty over Manchuria also; in this case, however, she insisted on joint ownership with China of the Eastern Chinese and South Manchurian railways as a steppingstone for future infiltration through the policy of *po nemnozhku*. Also, Russia was given the use of the warm-water ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, the last-named as a naval base jointly with China, who had no navy. In return, China recognized the independence of Mongolia and its twenty-three-year-old affiliation with the Soviet Union. Marshal Choi Bolsan, the Mongolian Premier, was called to Moscow to participate in the treaty signing.

I met Marshal Choi Bolsan only once. He is a wise old man of stocky stature, with a chubby weather-beaten face that reminds one of old etchings of Genghiz Khan, the great Mongol conqueror and one-time ruler over most of Asia and half of Europe. The marshal speaks excellent Russian. He was dressed in a Red Army uniform, with the Soviet Union's five-pronged star for a cockade. His chest was emblazoned with the Soviet Order of Lenin and the jeweled Soviet Order of Victory, the Soviet Union's highest award, which he had won during the Stalingrad crisis by leading the Mongolian army to the help of his Russian ally. He and other Mongolian leaders all pointed out to me in our talks that there were close to two million Mongolian tribesmen still living in Inner Mongolia and western Manchuria, and that their eventual aim was to unite them all with their own people into one Mongolian Peoples State.

The ink of Russia's treaty with China was scarcely dry when Moscow began to nullify essential parts of it. The United States had insisted on Manchuria's restitution to China for one principal reason: Japan had built a large number of important industries in Manchuria; these industries, in American eyes, were to help industry-poor China on her road to

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economic rehabilitation. Yet the Red Army had hardly swept into Manchuria when the Russians instituted a blitz loot, removing most of the machinery from Manchurian factories. A considerable part of this industrial loot was turned over to Marshal Choi Bolsan, whose Mongolian cavalry spearheaded the Russian advance into Manchuria, for the purpose of building a Mongolian military arsenal toward future exigencies.

Furthermore, when the Red Army started withdrawing from North China and parts of Manchuria, it turned captured Japanese war equipment over to Chinese Communist armies and allowed them to occupy a number of strategic key points. Moscow even went so far as to refuse landings in Port Arthur to Chinese troops, despite the fact that this port had been intended as a *joint* Russo-Chinese naval base, according to the treaty just concluded. As a direct result of these Russian actions, China was plunged into civil war.

Again United States diplomacy was called into action. President Truman wrote a personal letter to Generalissimo Stalin which reached the Soviet Premier while he was ostensibly vacationing at Sochi on the Black Sea, but actually holding important conferences dealing with Russia's future course. In this letter the President is said to have restated firmly that the United States *insisted* on Russia's conforming with the obligations she had undertaken in her treaty with China. At the same time, the President sent General George C. Marshall, who had just resigned as U. S. Army Chief of Staff, as U. S. Ambassador to China with instructions to assist China's quick unification under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Seeing that the United States definitely meant business this time, the Russian Bear again took a step backwards. The Chinese Communists ostensibly were told to pack up and get out of Manchuria. The country, or what was left of it after

the looting, was to be gradually turned over to the armies of the Chinese National Government. The Chinese Reds, left to fend for themselves, came to terms with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, for the time being, at any rate.¹

But the matter did not rest there. *Po nemnozhku* was again taken from the political shelf and put to work in Asia. First it was Sinkiang. On January 1, 1946, China had to sign an agreement with the Moslem Kazakhs of Sinkiang, granting them a high degree of autonomy. Significantly enough, the agreement was signed in Moscow, not in China, and there was much secrecy about it. Needless to say, it was intended as the first step toward Sinkiang's eventual independence and affiliation with the Soviet Union.²

Manchuria was next in line. According to the original treaty, all Russian troops were to be withdrawn from Manchuria by January 1, 1946. After the complication with the Chinese Communists, engineered by the Russians themselves, the new date of February 1 was set. Then the Russians extended the time for still another month, claiming that heavy snows and the lack of coal for troop trains occasioned the delay. (However, there had been no lack of coal for the endless number of trains removing looted Manchurian industrial equipment.)³

The truth was that Russia presented China with a new series of demands. The original Russo-Chinese treaty stipulated joint ownership and operation of the South Manchurian Railway by Russia and China for thirty years. The United States and China took it to mean just that. Not so the Russians; they gave it another interpretation of their own. Dur-

¹ This truce was broken by the Chinese Communists two months later, and by the end of July, 1946, China was again in a state of civil war.

² An additional agreement was forced on China in May, 1946, by virtue of which she conceded to the Sinkiang Moslems an independent army of eight divisions.

³ When Red Army troops finally withdrew in May, 1946, they turned the greater part of Manchuria over to Chinese Communist forces, supplying the latter with arms and also with Red Army "military advisers."

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ing Japan's rule over Manchuria, the South Manchuria Railway Company, owned by Japanese interests, had vastly enlarged its scope to include the ownership of important mines and industrial enterprises as well. The company had acquired control over practically all Manchurian heavy industry. Specifically, it included shipping concessions on the Sungari River, timber concessions in the North Manchurian forests, telephone and telegraph lines, the great Anshan iron and coal mines and foundries, electric power plants, the Kirin-Heilungkiang gold mines, and many other industries. The Russians demanded joint ownership in all these, plus commercial air rights and the construction of air fields throughout Manchuria. This meant the complete exclusion of Western interests from Manchuria; but more than that, it gave Russia a complete stranglehold on China's most vital industrial region, as a sort of forerunner of a stranglehold on *all* China. *Po nemnozhka* was working again.

Russia currently concedes that the United States has a great stake in China. But she also claims that whereas the American interest in China is exclusively economic (which is not true), her interest is strategic, since China is her next-door neighbor; this makes the Russian interest more direct, Moscow contends. The underlying truth, which both countries cover up with discreet silence, is that we want a strongly democratic China, American style, while Russia is striving toward a democratic China, Moscow style.

Regardless of what balance will eventually be struck in this jockeying for a preferred position, the prospect is none too promising for China and her people. But this is nothing new for a China who has long suffered from her unhappy role in the middle of an international tug of war. It is just a new phase of a game long played in China, with Russia taking the place of Japan as one of the principal protagonists.

Japan once set out with the idea of subjugating the count-

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less masses of Chinese as a preliminary for a Japanese conquest of the world. If Russia should eventually succeed in adding the 400,000,000 people of China to the 300,000,000 or more over whom she now holds undisputed sway, the Western World will have something to think about.

The *Fait Accompli*

RUSSIA HAS HER OWN IDEAS ON THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL co-operation, and these ideas in no way duplicate those of the Western World on the same subject. The Politburo knows this only too well. It knows that because of the basic, unbridgeable differences of conception between Russia and the West, the Soviet Union will find herself heavily outvoted by the Western World in all international conferences. Of course Russia can always insist on not having any given subject brought up by any international conference, as she has done so often. But this sort of obstructive policy only serves to delay matters; it does not get things done. And Russia wants to get things done in her own way.

With that purpose in view, Russia could use the method so often employed by Hitler with signal success: the threat of force. But for a nation to emulate a method which it has so volubly and violently condemned during the war would constitute something of an impolitic maneuver. And so the Politburo has adopted another method to get things done its own way: the *fait accompli*.

Not that the *fait accompli* is anything new in international power politics. King Louis XIV of France, the coiner of the phrase, used the policy extensively as an instrument of expansionism; one notable instance, which had grave repercussions for centuries, was his seizure of then German Alsace-Lorraine in the midst of peace. The Hapsburgs of Austria employed it frequently, notably in the case of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, which eventually led to World War I. England indulged in it whenever a pressing situation demanded its use. Czarist Russia went for it strongly on every possible occasion. And the Soviets have taken over where the Czars left off, which only goes to prove once again that Russia and her rulers do not change.

Reduced to everyday language, the *fait accompli* simply means to take what you want before the others become aware of your intentions. After that, possession is 90 per cent of the law.

Transferred into the realm of international power politics, it is just as simple. When Russia wants anything—part of a neighboring country, or that entire country, or strategic bases, or far-reaching economic and political concessions—which she is rather certain that an international conference will never award her, she reduces the matter to the simplest possible form; she takes what she wants. Then, when the conference convenes and the other conferees protest Russia's unilateral action, the Russians say: "We're sorry, but the thing is done. Surely, you do not expect a powerful country like the Soviet Union to lose face by renouncing an action already committed? So let's forget all about it."

So long as the war was in a critical stage and Russia desperately in need of all the help the Western Allies could give her, she adhered strictly to the letter as well as the spirit of all agreements concluded between the Big Three. But as soon as it became evident that the war was won, the Politburo started going in for unilateral action through the *fait accompli* on a grand scale. Let us examine some of the most flagrant examples.

The Politburo had made up its collective mind that it would not ever allow any pro-English government in Poland. Yet throughout the negotiations with the Western Allies, Russia continued to recognize the Polish exile government

The Fait Accompli

in London and to deal with its representatives. When the Yalta Conference drew near, Moscow picked a group of Polish-born Soviet citizens who had for many years been working on the Comintern and the GPU, and installed them as a Provisional Polish Government in the few square miles of Polish territory which the Red Army had reconquered at that time. Churchill and Roosevelt protested vigorously at Yalta against the *fait accompli*. Stalin said: "You cannot expect the Soviet Union to disband a Polish government that has just been installed with the Soviet Union's consent. But we'll do this. We'll merge our Polish government with the Polish government in London at the proper time." Much against their better judgment, Churchill and Roosevelt were forced to accept the compromise. What happened later on to the Polish government in London is history.

At Yalta also, Russia agreed that the *Big Three* were to create in the Balkan countries democratic governments representative of the broadest elements of the population. Churchill and Roosevelt were still on their way home when the news reached them that Moscow had thrown the democratic Rumanian government out of office and installed a Communist-dominated minority government in its place. A few days later, the same thing happened in Bulgaria. The Western Allies protested vigorously, but it did not the least bit of good. Russia took the view that she could not possibly dismiss a Rumanian government which she herself had selected.

Again, immediately preceding the Potsdam Conference, the Politburo decided how it was going to carve up the eastern half of Germany. Arbitrarily, and without even notifying her allies, Russia turned over to Poland a tremendous chunk of purely German land which had never been inhabited by Poles. President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, learning of the new *fait accompli* on their arrival in Pots-

dam, protested energetically. Stalin merely shrugged his shoulders and repeated: "It has been done. You cannot expect us to undo it; the Soviet Union's prestige is at stake."

Next, immediately preceding the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, Russia compelled Hungary to conclude with her a five-year economic pact which in effect gave Russia complete control over the exploitation of Hungary's main industries, natural resources, agriculture, and transportation. The Western Allies were not even consulted in the matter. Britain and the United States protested so tempestuously over this and similar cases of Russian highhanded procedure that the conference was terminated. But the Hungarian pact remained in force.

And again before the Moscow Conference, Russia confronted the Western Allies with another of her *faits accomplis* by carving out of Iran the Autonomous State of Iranian Azerbeidjan, in complete violation of the Teheran Declaration by the Big Three, including Russia. When Britain and the United States started to protest, Russia bluntly refused even to allow the matter to come up for discussion, claiming it was a purely domestic Iranian affair.

The above are just a few of the many instances where Russia has confronted her allies with unilateral action, with the *fait accompli*, without even bothering to consult them. And the Western Allies have not been able to alter the situation.

How Many Divisions Has the Pope?

THE ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION APPEARS SOMEWHAT apocryphal. Russian official sources insist that it was never asked, but then Russian official sources have a way of evading embarrassing moments of history. I talked to several Americans who were present at Yalta, and they all contended that the question was asked. According to the story as I have it, the late President Roosevelt, when discussing Poland, pointed out that due consideration had to be given to the Vatican as a moral force. Whereupon Stalin asked bluntly: "How many divisions has the Pope?"

Now it is perfectly true that Russian policy is based predominantly on power. It is also true that the Soviet Government and the Vatican have had, and still have, some stiff arguments. But at the same time, the Soviet Government realizes that religion exerts a potent influence upon the masses. It has restored the Orthodox Church in Russia. It is also prepared to co-operate with the Roman Catholic Church—specifically, by restoring religious facilities for the eighteen million Catholics in Russia who are still without a single church—provided that the Catholic Church will support the policies of the Soviet regime instead of opposing them. The principal grievance which the Politburo has against the Vatican is the Pope's historic claim of being undisputed shepherd of the peoples' souls. Moscow does not oppose the Pope's spiritual guidance; what it wants is to have the Papacy conducted under the Politburo's supervision.

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Russia's new domains in Eastern and Central Europe contain a Catholic population of more than forty million, and the Soviet Government is loath to leave these millions entirely under the spiritual influence of the Vatican for fear that it might be turned into political influence. This fear was expressed by *Pravda* when it wrote on April 9, 1945, that Catholics under the leadership of the Vatican formed the main obstacle to the formation of a National Democratic Front (under Communist control) in Austria. The government-owned Russian paper added that the Vatican is trying to promote a "Catholic wall" in Western Europe. Such a wall, the Russians consider, would be a menace to their plans of a new European democracy patterned after Communist ideas. Thus the Pope might rule over a good many divisions after all, and so Stalin's question was neither rhetorical nor humorous from the Russian point of view.

Naturally, so long as the Pope refuses to support the Communists, he is a Fascist, according to the Russian philosophy. Thus Dimitri Melnikov wrote in the Russian periodical *Novoye Vremya* (New Times) on July 5: "People have seen the Pope not on the side of the fighters against Fascism, but in the opposite camp. During the prewar period, the Vatican unchallengingly supported reactionary forces all over the world. The plans of the Vatican in regard to Poland and other Central European countries are built around the plan of forming a bloc of Eastern and Central European countries as a new *cordon sanitaire* against the Soviet Union."

The Russian press campaign against the Pope has, like everything planned by the Politburo, a deep political purpose. The Russian Communists realize that to be successful in their plans for a new Europe under their aegis, they must secure control over the Vatican. This could be obtained in a roundabout way, through control of the Conclave of Cardinals, which is called upon to elect a new Pope. The Pope was

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expected to appoint thirty-two new Cardinals toward the end of 1945; Moscow wished to have a large number of these chosen from among Catholic ecclesiastics in Poland, Hungary, Austria, and Eastern Germany—that is to say, the countries under Russian domination. Numerous indirect hints were given to the Papal Secretary of State that the nomination of Catholic ecclesiastics known for their “democratic” views would go a long way toward smoothing over the current difficulties between the Kremlin and the Vatican.

But the Vatican was not interested. Of the thirty-two new cardinals, only two were from the Russian sphere of influence. And of these two, Archbishop Stephen Sapieha of Cracow, was strongly identified with Polish nationalism, and Archbishop Joseph Mindsenty of Hungary was regarded as a monarchist. Certainly neither could be considered as coming under the Moscow conception of democracy.

The Pope went even further in his disregard of Moscow’s wishes. In his Christmas message immediately following the new appointments, he declared bluntly that among the moral essentials for a true and lasting peace was due protection for the individual and the family “against the pretensions of every policy of brute force, against the arbitrary totalitarianism of the powerful state.”

Four weeks later the Pope issued an encyclical which constituted one of the most outspoken criticisms of Soviet religious policy voiced during the pontificate of Pius XII. He charged that the Catholic Church in Ruthenia—a province annexed by Russia from Czechoslovakia in 1945—was being systematically persecuted and that Russia was trying to stamp out Catholicism in Ruthenia by forcing the Catholics to join the Russian Orthodox Church. This, the encyclical said, was in direct violation of the war promise given by Russia, together with other nations, never to attack any religion.

The Soviet Press published two-column editorials (the

Yalta Conference had been given only one column) denouncing the Vatican as an archreactionary force and a citadel of Fascism. The world, contended the Moscow papers, would have no lasting peace until this archreactionary force was erased.

But the Politburo had come to terms with archreactionaries before. It had come to terms with Winston Churchill whom the prewar Soviet press had branded the greatest archreactionary of all times. It had even come to terms with Hitler, although it prefers not to be reminded of this painful subject. The Politburo is prepared to come to terms with the Pope if only the Pope proves amenable. The question is how to make the Pope amenable.

When I was in Moscow, I was given a story that sounded positively fantastic until one recalled the many turnabouts which the Politburo has executed when faced by stubborn facts. It was the story of a potent bait that Moscow was in a position to offer. The Holy See is believed to desire nothing better than a reunion of the Catholic and Orthodox churches under the papal banner. Moscow was reported as toying with the idea of such a great extension of the Pope's spiritual leadership, provided that the Pope in return would accept the political leadership of the Kremlin, as the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church had done. In this manner, the divisions over which the Pope might rule would accrue to the Politburo. All the Politburo has to do now is to bring the Pope around to its point of view.

CHAPTER XL

Industrial Might—The Key to Power

A GREAT DEAL HAS BEEN SAID ON THE SUBJECT OF POSTWAR trade between Russia and the United States, but all of it thus far has remained in the realm of pure speculation. Some speak of an annual two billion dollar American export trade to Russia. Others have gone even beyond this figure. Moscow has asked for an eight billion dollar postwar credit, then reduced it to six billion. Beyond this, Russia has announced no intentions of any kind. Some American trade experts contend that we *must* sell large quantities of goods to Russia on credit in order to keep up postwar employment in the United States. Others claim that we could sell incomparably larger quantities to the world outside Russia if we are content to accept nothing more than IOU's.

Russia today concedes to the United States—and *only* to the United States—an almost equal voice in world affairs. Russia gives us this distinction not because of our army, which Russia considers much inferior to her own and utterly demoralized; nor because of our navy, which cannot penetrate the Russian continental vastness; but only because of our industrial might. The production achievements of the United States during the war positively amazed the wielders of power in the Kremlin. And the Politburo is firmly determined to build up Russian industrial might to a point where it will dwarf that of the United States.

That Russia's natural resources in many instances exceed those of the United States is an acknowledged fact. What is

more, Russia does not scatter the product of these resources with a lavish hand all over the world, as the United States has done on numerous occasions and still is doing. Russian resources are being conserved strictly toward the pursuance of Russia's future plans. What Russia still lacks are industrial plants of sufficient capacity to put her resources at the disposal of these plans. Russia expects to create such plants with the help of the United States.

It goes without saying that Russia could eventually create such industrial plants without American help. There are various means at her disposal. She has already confiscated the machines and tools of virtually all German factories in her zone of occupation and shipped them to the Russian interior. She is also receiving a considerable part of the industrial machinery that has remained unimpaired in the Allied zone of occupation. She disposes freely of the industrial output of the countries now dominated by her, Czechoslovakia and Hungary being the most important in this respect. She has stripped the Japanese-created industrial empire in Manchuria of its machines. And Russia has her own unimpaired, capacity-producing plants in the Urals and beyond; none of these was ever reached by German bombing fleets. All of which gives her a good start. But to build up the kind of industrial might which the Politburo wants, with these means alone, would require a long time. Russia wants to save a good deal of that time, for reasons her rulers know best. Therefore she wants American help in building up a mighty industrial empire equal to none, and she is prepared to pay for that help. For the time being, she is perfectly willing to let American private enterprise reap profits from Russian requirements; her gain in time will be more than worth this concession.

But not all American industry can share in these profits. The Kremlin knows exactly what it wants and will take nothing else. High-pressure American salesmanship is com-

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pletely wasted on the Politburo. Russian requirements have been compiled and listed, and they accord a good insight into what Russia actually has in mind. The first category of requirements is headed by turbogenerators and other generating equipment; this, to build a large number of Russian power plants as a source of energy. It is followed by mining machinery and equipment, especially coal mining; oil drilling equipment of all sorts; machines for the manufacture of trucks, automobiles and tractors; machinery for the chemical industry, especially for the production of synthetic rubber and plastics, in which lines Russia wants to become entirely independent of the Western World.

Then follows the second group. This one comprises railroad equipment, particularly locomotives; machines for the construction of plane motors and aircraft parts; radio and telephone equipment; highway construction machinery; commercial refrigeration equipment; machines for the meat packing and canning industries; and a few specialized items such as machinery for the production of optical equipment, fine instruments, etc.

General consumer goods are entirely out. Russia does not want any American-made passenger automobiles, home refrigerators, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, stockings and lingerie, clocks, electric fans, and other articles that have become American household bywords. The Russian people can do without these things. They are not going to be pampered, softened, and accustomed to a life of luxury. There is still a future task ahead of them towards which they must preserve all their physical prowess.

To assure the future preponderance of her industrial might, irrespective of whether she receives American help or not, Russia has gone beyond her own borders to harness the national economy of other nations for her own needs. She has forced Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland to conclude

treaties with her which actually make her the controlling partner in the exploitation of all economic resources in these countries, and her armies of occupation see to it that these treaties are rigidly enforced. In Rumania, for example (and the same picture prevails in all the other countries), all Rumanian oil resources were turned over to joint Russo-Rumanian companies which formed an absolute monopoly for the exploration, exploitation, processing, and marketing of petroleum and its products; in short, the monopoly covers the entire field. All Rumanian agriculture and industry has to work for Russia exclusively, with the "participation of Russian capital." All sea and river traffic in Rumania, including all harbor installations, shipbuilding, and repairs, has become the monopoly of another Russo-Rumanian company called *Sovromtransport*. Still another such company controls all air transport. There is not a single phase of their country's economic life that the Rumanian people can use for their own benefit, and the same thing is true of the other countries in question.

Russia has concluded a number of similar economic accords with Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, which guarantee her the major portion of the agricultural and industrial production of these countries. She has secured a stranglehold on the former Japanese industrial empire in Manchuria by means of which she can extract further economic concessions from China. She has assumed control over virtually all industrial activity in Korea.

To discover the origin of such ruthless exploitation tactics, it would be more fruitful to consult the pages of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* than those of Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*, which the Communists claim as their rule book. Hitler introduced economic slavery in Europe by compelling the satellite nations to work largely for Germany. The Politburo's tactics differ in no way from Hitler's except that they are even more com-

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plete. The Politburo tolerates no exemption anywhere.

Russia today has just one creed: that of power. The satisfaction of this creed demands the building up of the world's greatest industrial might. And the Politburo's actions reveal only too plainly that it has made up its mind to have that industrial might.

CHAPTER XLI

Twenty-Four Million Fascists

AT NO TIME DID THE GREAT DIFFERENCE OF POLITICAL philosophy between the Russian mass mind and the American way show itself so vividly as during the Presidential election campaign of 1944. To the average Russian, the very idea of the American election was utterly inconceivable. He saw no reason why there should be an election in the United States, especially in the middle of a great war.

One Russian said: "Roosevelt is your great national hero, just as Stalin is our great national hero, isn't he? Then why all this nonsense of an election? Why should Roosevelt undergo the strain of an election campaign? Why should a great national hero be subject *to the humiliation of an election?* Roosevelt is Russia's friend, he is holding the American fascists in check. Why shouldn't his tenure in office be perpetuated?"

The Russian mass mind has been educated to regard as an enemy of Russia anyone who does not fully and unreservedly declare himself a friend; neutrals do not exist. Roosevelt was a friend of Russia. Consequently, he should remain President of the United States in perpetuity. The very idea that an opponent of Roosevelt—and therefore, so the Russian mind reasoned, an opponent of Russia—should be permitted to run for the Presidency at all, was so preposterous that the Russian mind refused even to consider it.

When the election results were announced, the Russian mass mind was shocked. *Pravda* wrote instantly. "There still

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are twenty-four million fascists in the United States." The fascists were, of course, all those Americans who voted for Governor Dewey, the Republican candidate. Since they had voted for an opponent of Roosevelt, they were opponents of Russia; consequently, they were fascists. That was the unanimous verdict of the Russian mind.

We have in Washington a group that is emotionally committed to support the Russians all the way, regardless of the consequences to the United States as a nation. We have also a group that considers it a sacred duty to oppose the Russians at every turn, even if it should drag our country into another devastating war. But in between the two extreme groups is the great American public, desirous of honest solutions in the interests of the United States and the peace and progress of the world; solutions that will conform both to the realities of world politics and the principles of the American people. Yet if these patriotic and honest Americans should by chance oppose a solution contrary to Russian desires for more power at the expense of other nations, the Russian mass mind would promptly classify them as fascists.

This typically Russian logic leads to some curious reasoning. When American public opinion reacted favorably to the Pope's Christmas message of 1944 which dealt with the subject of a fair peace, Russians took issue. On January 7, 1945, *Pravda* wrote: "The Pope's message was aimed to distract the minds of believers from the vital question of war and peace. The New York *World-Telegram* offered an article about the 'claims of the Pope for a fair peace' and the 'guarantee of equal rights for defeated nations and vanquishers.' If democracy means support of a fascist regime, the Pope is a democracy."

In Russian eyes, not only should all Americans wholeheartedly support all Russian aspirations of any nature and scope, but the very discussion of a contrary opinion among

Americans should not be permitted, or even countenanced.

Apart from considering as fascists all Americans who do not wholeheartedly subscribe to Russian expansionist plans, Russia entertains some singular ideas about the United States. One of these ideas concerns the Pacific war. Russia was always convinced that England would confine her part in that war to the reconquest of her lost territories in Malaya and the East Indies, leaving to the United States the task of defeating Japan. This task, the Kremlin was equally convinced, the United States would be unable to accomplish without Russian help. And for that help Russia wanted adequate compensation, both in Europe and Asia.

This singular Russian conviction continued beyond the Japanese surrender; in fact, it is still being maintained and has already found expression in some singular Russian actions. On August 14, 1945, Edward R. Murrow, CBS correspondent, reported from London that an American—General Douglas MacArthur—was chosen as supreme commander of Japan over vigorous Russian objections. Mr. Murrow said the argument occurred in Moscow, with Russian Foreign Commissar Molotov and U. S. Ambassador Averell Harriman exchanging "some very blunt words on the subject."

Two days later, on August 16, the official newspaper of the Soviet Government, *Izvestia*, sarcastically referred to the atomic bomb as "a sensation miracle" and ridiculed Allied claims that the bomb could have won the war against Japan without Russia's vigorous offensive in Manchuria and Korea. For her victory over Japan, Russia is determined to extract full payment; and that is why she is securing for herself an economic stranglehold over Manchuria and assuming an overbearing attitude toward Americans in Korea.

Here is a press account of the arrival in Seoul of the Russian commander for northern Korea, Colonel General Terenti

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Shtykov, to negotiate with the American commander for Southern Korea, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge:

The sixty-odd members of the Russian delegation steamed in, in their own special train. The U. S. commander in Korea, grim-jawed Lieut. General John R. Hodge, was doubtless impressed by the Russians' three sleeping cars, five flatcars to carry their Lend-lease limousines, a radio communications car. Colonel General Shtykov, head of the delegation, went with his immediate aides to the Chosen Hotel. The lobby telephone disappeared; General Shtykov had to have it. The Russians ordered all cars cleared out of the hotel garage to make room for General Shtykov's cars. The harried hotel keeper refused because General Hodge kept his own car there. A few minutes later came a telephone call from General Hodge: "Take my automobile out and give the garage to the Russians." General Shtykov gratuitously announced before he had even seen a reporter that he "did not wish to be annoyed by the United States press."

The United States command requested American correspondents to "play ball" by not insisting on talking to the Russians and affecting the tranquility of Soviet-American relations. In return for this courtesy, what did the Russian general, a guest in the American zone, do? He promptly held a *secret* conference with representatives of the native Korean press and told them:

Korean newspapers published in southern Korea under the American Military Government are spreading incorrect news about the decision of the Big Three Foreign Ministers on Korea. Russia makes it her fundamental policy to have a deep sympathy for liberated peoples and have them live independent lives. In the American plan for Korea not even a word was spoken for the establishment of a Korean provisional government. Southern Korean newspapers have been sacrificed by the American Military Command to incorrect and unconscionable information.

This perverted picture which the average Russian has of the United States is not anything that he has conjured up himself; by character the Russian is friendly, mild-tempered,

and easy to get along with. It is the direct result of the propaganda diet which he is being fed. The Russian press presents the United States as a country where the workers have only theoretical and not actual social and economic rights. The postwar wave of strikes in the United States was explained to the Russian people as the direct result of "the most ruthless exploitation of starving American workers by an overbearing capitalist society." American society in general is pictured as degenerate, utterly hypocritical, and paying mere lip service to democracy while actually practicing Fascism at its worst. American popular customs are "below the dignity of the common man, the product of emotionally unstable minds." As for American world policy, it is "grasping, imperialistic, and calculated to rob the Soviet peoples of the richly deserved fruits of their great victory over Fascism."

With this kind of calculated indoctrination, is it any wonder that the average Russian is beginning to believe that an armed showdown with the "ruthless and imperialistic" United States is inevitable and that he must prepare for such a showdown with every available means?

CHAPTER XLII

Democracy vs. Democracy

AN OLD AXIOM SAYS THAT EVERY MAN WHO WANTS TO GET ahead in life must be an opportunist. Perhaps that is true. But of all the opportunists who ever walked this sinful earth, the policy framers of the Politburo are unquestionably the greatest. They know how to twist facts and truths for their own machinations as no one ever knew before them. Here is the prime example of their sophistry.

On August 22, 1939, Hitler and Stalin signed a pact which in reality constituted an agreement to descend upon the small nations of Eastern Europe, all the way from Finland to Rumania, and divide them up between the two signatories. For twenty months thereafter, there issued an endless series of denunciations against British and American democracy from the lips of high Russian officials, the chorus being led by Foreign Commissar Molotov himself. Whenever Hitler trumpeted one of his periodical blasts against "fat-bellied, boot-licking, and defunct" Western democracy, there came thunderous applause from Moscow, followed by a seconding blast against democracy. The Molotov of those days contended that the Western democracies could never stand up against the "young, virile socialist nations" like Russia and Nazi Germany. And Dmitri Manuilsky, Foreign Commissar of the Ukraine, pronounced, "Not a stone will remain standing of the cursed capitalistic structure!" Russia was not a democracy; she was a dictatorship of the proletariat. The very word "democratic" was taboo in the Soviet Union of

those days. Its use meant the concentration camp.

But then, in 1941, Hitler attacked Russia. The Soviet Union was in desperate straits, in need of urgent help from the "cursed capitalistic structure" of the democratic West. And Russia became a democracy overnight. Said Mr. Molotov this time: "The Soviet Union is fighting shoulder to shoulder with the other great democracies of the world to insure the complete defeat of Hitlerism."

The end of the cycle left Hitler defeated and Russia no longer in need of help from the Western World. Let us see what the same Mr. Molotov had to say this time, at the twenty-eighth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution on November 6, 1945: "All this reveals a flourishing of true democracy of the people that they did not know in the old days and that *cannot exist in any other states, divided as they are into classes of oppressors and oppressed*, a thing that Soviet power has long put an end to in our country. . . . We have brotherly mutual assistance among the equal Soviet peoples—a thing that *does not exist as yet in other countries under either monarchies or republics*. In this we discern the all-conquering force of Soviet democracy and its great value for the truly progressive development of the peoples."

Something had happened. Somewhere along the road all the other democracies had dropped out, with Russia emerging as the only democracy in the world today. In an editorial *Pravda* explained how this had come about. It appears that the whole thing had been a misunderstanding from the beginning. The Western capitalistic nations, to be saved from conquest by Hitler, "attached themselves to the great Soviet democracy." They were expected to emerge from the baptism of war as real democracies. But they did not. They remained pseudo-democracies, the nearest thing to Fascism.

The cycle has run out, and at the end of it the world is presented with a truly amazing equation. The first part of the

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equation reads: totalitarianism equals democracy, the democracy in this case being Russia. The second part of the equation states: democracy equals Fascism, Great Britain and the United States representing Fascism in this case.

The world has been turned so topsy-turvy that statesmen no longer understand what it is all about, much less the common people. Russia is promoting the topsy-turviness for all its worth, not allowing the war-weary minds any rest, deliberately confusing the issues as a means of using the broad terminology of treaties and international agreements to further the ends of a well-planned, coherent, aggressive Soviet policy.

In this aggressive policy, Russia shows not the slightest compunction in her choice of weapons, just so long as these weapons cause so much confusion among the rest of the world that it completely loses track of what is what. Hitler belittled and vilified democracy, and then the Western democracies turned on him and decisively defeated him. Russia was an eyewitness to it. She saw how the slogan of democracy won World War I and then came back to become even more victorious in World War II. She most definitely did not want this twice-successful slogan used against her. So she expropriated it for herself by simply proclaiming to the whole world that she was the only true democracy and that all others were mere pseudo-democracies containing all the seeds of Fascism. She did it with such boldness and audacity that she still has the rest of the world bewildered by her chameleon-like turnabout.

Ever since V-J Day, Russia has had Western statesmen and diplomats running in circles, and trying vainly to guess what sort of bombshell she is going to toss next into the international picture. While Hitler concentrated his war of nerves against one place at a time, the Politburo has its war of nerves laying down a running barrage all over the world.

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Russia's ever-recurring *faits accomplis* explode like so many hand grenades, and each time that she tosses another, she claims that she is doing it in the interests of true democracy and against the vicious forces of Fascism that still survive in the Western World.

Hitler's *Mein Kampf* featured the great axiom: Keep drumming a slogan incessantly into people's ears and soon they will start to believe it. We have many people in the United States today who are ready to believe the Moscow version. I do not mean the American Communists and their fellow travelers who at all times repeat whatever line the Politburo is handing out. I speak of honest-to-goodness Americans who love their country but who have become utterly confused by the welter of contradictory propaganda that is being hurled at them daily, hourly. They tell themselves, "Why, if these Russians are so sure of their ground, perhaps theirs really is the true democracy, and our brand of democracy is the fake they claim it to be." And the average American might well be confused when even statesmen in Washington and London are no longer sure what to believe and what to disbelieve.

Russia has taken over the great weapon of democracy and is using it against us, one of the world's leading democracies. It is one of the neatest tricks that the Politburo has ever performed.

CHAPTER XLIII

Divide Et Impera

DIVIDE AND RULE WAS THE MAXIM OF ANCIENT ROME, AND was a policy first applied to the other Italian republics. When it had made her mistress of Italy, Rome applied the same policy to all other countries until she became unchallenged mistress of the entire civilized world.

Divide et impera was attempted on numerous occasions throughout history, but never with such success as in the case of ancient Rome. Only when England adapted herself to the practical use of this maxim, was she able to build an empire. By the same token, it was the lavish application of this maxim to her European policy that permitted England to remain the balancing, and therefore controlling, power of Europe for the past two hundred years.

After World War I, it was a German statesman who recognized the necessity for Germany to employ the same maxim. I was on friendly terms with Walther Rathenau, having worked before that war in a confidential capacity for his father, Emil Rathenau, who then was head of the powerful German electrical trust and a personal friend of Kaiser Wilhelm. When Walther and I met again after the war, he was just about to become Germany's Foreign Minister. He showed me a booklet he was writing on the subject of Germany's future foreign policy. I quote from it:

World power is held by the two English-speaking nations, Great Britain and the United States. So long as these two nations maintain a close understanding and stand by each other in the pursu-

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ance of their world aims, Germany will be unable to achieve her legitimate world aspirations. It is only when Germany has succeeded in driving a firm wedge between the two Anglo-Saxon nations—a wedge that will keep them permanently apart—that she will be able to take her rightful place in the sun.

Because he was Jewish and a German democrat, Rathenau was assassinated by the Nazis. But when Hitler came to power, he appropriated the maxim proposed by Rathenau, despite the latter's background. However, Hitler's tactics in applying the maxim in practice were so blundering and obvious that they did not fool anyone for long. As a direct result of those blundering tactics, Germany was defeated.

The booklet written by Walther Rathenau occupies a prominent place on the shelves of the Kremlin library. Russia knows very well that she can go just so far, and no farther, so long as Great Britain and the United States stand together. Since the Politburo has never exhibited any particular scruples in the choice of its weapons, the fact that the idea of driving a permanent wedge between the two English-speaking nations was launched by a German has not prevented the Politburo from adopting it to its own political ends.

The Politburo naturally knows better than to believe the nonsense about twenty-four million American fascists which it successfully sells to its people. Its action is strictly an aggressive policy of power politics in which no holds are barred. Today Russia applies *divide et impera* in her relations with the United States and England, her chief political objective being to split the two leading Western powers.

Russian efforts in this direction have already made considerable progress. The first great Russian success along this line was achieved at Teheran. Great Britain, always concerned with keeping the Russians out of the Balkans—even while fighting Germany in the same sphere—had pre-

pared a grandiose plan for the invasion of the Balkans by Anglo-American armies, the great American supply base in Erithrea then being part of that plan. Stalin knew that American generals were in favor of staking everything on a cross-Channel invasion from England. This tallied nicely with the Russian aim of keeping the British out of the Balkans until Russia herself was safely ensconced in that quarter. Stalin promptly supported the American plan and insisted on the Second Front in France to keep the Allied armies busy where they could not interfere with Russia's own designs. As a result, Russia today has undisputable control of the eastern half of Europe, while England has suffered a tremendous diplomatic defeat.

At the Quebec Conference, Winston Churchill tried to correct the mistake while there still was a chance. But the late President Roosevelt refused to co-operate and insisted on standing firm on the Teheran agreement. Churchill had to go to Moscow alone, and, without American support, he returned empty-handed. It was then that British public opinion broke out in recriminations against the foreign policy of the United States. For a time, relations between the two Western Allies were definitely cool; and Russia, benefiting from the situation, strengthened her hand immeasurably.

While meeting with Roosevelt in Malta prior to the Yalta Conference, Churchill pointed out the gravity of the mistake committed at Teheran. At Yalta both exerted pressure on the Russians to keep the Balkans open to all three nations. Russia pretended to agree and affixed her signature to the famous but now utterly dead Yalta Declaration in which the Big Three undertook *jointly* to assist the liberated peoples "to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create *democratic institutions of their own choice.*" But the Russians, professing their own singular interpretation of democracy, backed away from the Yalta agreements as soon as

these had been proclaimed, and England was again left holding an empty bag. And the United States, thanks to clever diplomatic manipulations on the part of Russia, unexpectedly found herself the villain of the piece, at least in British eyes.

It was at that time that the *Economist*, one of England's leading weeklies, wrote: "If there is more to be gained by taking Russia's side in the game of politics that is being played in Europe now than in gambling on American promises of postwar collaboration, Britain should go ahead, heedless of any outraged cries from Washington. And if Americans should find this attitude too cynical or suspicious, they should draw the conclusion that they have twisted the British lion's tail once too often." An attitude of this kind, shortsighted as it is on the part of Great Britain, is that much more grist on the mill of Russian power politics.

Russian "needling" is applied to the United States also. When the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference opposed the Russian stand on certain questions in favor of the British, the official organ of the Soviet Government, *Izvestia*, carried prominently a dispatch from its correspondent, Evgeni Zhukov, which said: "In the opinion of a number of persons, the policy of mediation which was successfully carried out by Roosevelt has now changed to a policy of 'drifting,' which in many cases reduces the foreign policy of the United States to a subordinate role." The obvious implication was that the United States under President Truman was playing second fiddle to Great Britain, and that American policy should be completely detached from British policy.

Divide et impera as now applied by the Russians aims not only at driving a permanent wedge between the United States and Great Britain, but also at splitting the nations within themselves. In this field too, it is meeting with success. We have today in the United States a numerically small but

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extremely vociferous section of public opinion which on every suitable occasion demands a continuation of the American policy of appeasement toward Russia. Significantly enough, while being unreservedly pro-Russian, this section is also pronouncedly anti-British. Again I do not refer to the American Communists, to whom Russia means everything and the United States next to nothing; but to otherwise intelligent and patriotic Americans.

For instance, at a pro-Soviet rally at Madison Square Garden in New York on December 18, 1945, Edward C. Carter, president of Russian Relief, Inc., who had just returned from a journey to Moscow where he was lavishly entertained and feasted, declared he favored a loan to Great Britain *only* "provided the money is not used partly to keep the American people in partnership with the imperialistic side of British life." At the same time Mr. Carter said also that if the British loan were granted, "the American Government and people should have sense enough and self-interest enough to make *an even larger loan* to the Soviet Union." Significantly, no conditions of any sort were attached to the advocacy of an "even larger" loan to Russia.

Russian prestige is skilfully used in applying propaganda pressure over and over, always with ample funds and expert advice. When necessary, agents are always available. The pro-Russian propaganda in the United States reiterates the great achievements of Soviet democracy. And in the same breath it continually censures British imperialism in all quarters of the globe, demanding that the United States detach herself from British imperialist tendencies. *Divide et impera*.

There are signs that Great Britain, at least, is waking up to this Russian policy. On Dec. 23, 1945, C. L. Sulzberger wire-lessly from London to the *New York Times*: "A certain amount of anxiety is being openly voiced here to the effect that clever Soviet diplomacy is seeking to split the hitherto

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joint Anglo-American diplomatic front and achieve territorial and strategic gains by making reluctant concessions to the United States in the Far East while edging deeply into the Middle East, which is still in many respects the heart of the British Empire."

Mr. Sulzberger, a keen observer of the European scene, then quotes from the London *Observer* in saying: "Britain is as interested as any power in overcoming the rifts between the Big Three, but she will not be a party to a Middle Eastern Munich."

Once a high Russian official told me: "I do not think the Soviet Union should have cause for objection if the United States absorbed Canada, or even Australia. Somehow, they seem to belong together." He gave it as a strictly personal opinion. But even as an opinion it is of deep significance. A development of that sort would be tantamount to the breakup of the British Empire, with Russia gobbling up the most desirable morsels. Then the United States would stand all alone.

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CHAPTER XLIV

Free Covenants Openly Arrived At

PRESIDENT WILSON, A GREAT AMERICAN WAR LEADER, PROCLAIMED the principle of "free covenants openly arrived at" as a guiding beacon for the conduct of international relations everywhere. It is a principle to which Americans have subscribed ever since, or at least until Franklin D. Roosevelt, another war president, matched his diplomatic skill with the Russians' and came out second best. But it is not a principle to which Russia ever subscribed, or is likely to subscribe. The Russian idea of international agreements has always been to issue bombastic communiques couched in high-sounding but actually meaningless phraseology that can be twisted at will to whichever way Russia chooses to interpret it, while the real facts of any agreement are kept secret until the world finds itself confronted with a *fait accompli*. It still is.

This is not some sort of perverse Russian streak. There is a profound reason behind it. As a traditionally expansionist power, Russia simply cannot afford to have her designs broadcast to the world before they have been carried out. Americans do not understand this for the simple reason that, having gained continental self-sufficiency, the United States wants nothing from other nations, and certainly not territorial expansion. It is just another of the many differences of conception between the American and Russian minds.

When an American speaks of democracy, he means one thing; when a Russian speaks of it, he has in mind something entirely different. When an American defines the freedom

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of the press, he means it in the broadest sense of the word; when a Russian, especially a Russian official, discusses the freedom of the press, he refers to the fact that his papers are free to write on anything that the Government permits. When an American refers to "free covenants openly arrived at," he means that the entire text of an international agreement should be immediately released for the whole world to know about it, and that there should be no secret clauses attached to any such agreement. A Russian, too, will speak of open treaties, but he means that the general phraseology of a treaty should be released to all, whereas any oral agreements concluded between the heads of nations should remain their exclusive knowledge; after all, so the Russian reasons, they are the men responsible and they should have no strings attached to their responsibility.

Especially in their conferences with representatives of the United States, the Russians insist on the maintenance of absolute secrecy of proceedings. Not that they single us out for any antagonistic reason; but they know the methods of the American press and its insistence on being told everything that goes on. The Russians take the view that no press in the world should have any such broad rights. As one Russian official once told me, "It is your press that actually rules your country. It even assumes the prerogative of telling your Government what to do."

While the war was being fought, a certain amount of secrecy in the deliberations of the Big Three was necessary for military considerations. For Great Britain and the United States, the need for secrecy ended with the war in 1945; but it did not end for Russia. She still demanded the continuation of secrecy. Rumblings against this Russian demand were already discernible in Potsdam, and at the London Conference the lid blew off. Three men had been sitting on that lid throughout the war years, making the peoples of the world

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believe that nothing was boiling underneath. From the Politburo point of view, that was a perfectly natural state of affairs. Stalin would have been content to continue sitting on the lid with the two newcomers, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, continuing the secrecy and carrying on as if the termination of the war had not changed a thing.

Russians believe in the ability of their diplomats to deal successfully with the diplomats of other nations and to put something over on them; this, to the Russian way of thinking, is the principal objective of diplomacy. But while they believe in their ability to fool a mere handful of more or less inexperienced diplomats, they do not think that they could fool an entire nation such as America with equal facility. If the American people, through their press, should get premature wind of the actual nature of proceedings, public opinion in the United States might easily block the kind of agreement that the Russians want. They hold that it is up to the diplomats to sell the agreement piecemeal to their people *after* it has been concluded, and when there can be no more backing out. Any other method goes against what they consider sound diplomacy.

Americans have often commented on Stalin's insistence that American and British leaders should come to him, and ascribed it to some sort of superiority complex. This is not so. Russia wants a conference held in territory controlled by her Secret Police as the surest means of assuring the absolute secrecy of the conferences. The American press can protest and fume all it wants. It is the way the Russians want it, and it is the way they are going to have it. Otherwise—no conference.

With regard to international agreements and treaties, Russia has her own ideas on how they should be adhered to. Stalin himself expressed this idea when he said: "We know from the history of Europe that whenever treaties are made concerning the realignment of forces for a new war, these treaties

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are called treaties of peace. *Treaties are signed defining the elements of a future war, and always the signing of such treaties is accompanied by a lot of noise about peace.*"

In the light of this declaration by Russia's supreme leader, it is interesting to look at the record—borrowing an expression from a great American, Alfred E. Smith—of Russia's own observance of treaties to which she was a signatory.

Russia had signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with Finland. In 1939, she developed a keen appetite for ancient Finnish territory; and when it was not handed over promptly, she went to war against Finland.

Russia had signed treaties of friendship and nonaggression also with the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In 1939, Russia demanded military bases in these three countries, such bases to be garrisoned by 25,000 Russian troops in each case. The three small republics had to submit, and Russia promptly sent an army of occupation of 75,000 men into each country. A few months later Russia demanded a plebiscite in each country on the question of incorporation into the Soviet Union. These plebiscites were held under the pressure of Russian bayonets and in each *the Russian soldiers of the army of occupation cast their ballots at the polls*, to insure the outcome in Russia's favor.

Russia had signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with Poland also. Again in 1939, Russia sent her armies to seize half of Poland under the pretext that in view of the German-Polish war there was no more Poland, and that therefore the treaty had become null and void. Today all Poland is virtually a Russian colony, ruled over by a government many members of which, including the President, had been Soviet citizens and functionaries of the Russian Secret Police.

Russia's ardent protagonists will contend that this all happened before the war and that Russia's subsequent participa-

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tion in the great struggle on the side of the Western democracies had altered the Russian attitude with regard to treaties. Once again, let's look at the record.

On May 26, 1942, Russia signed a mutual assistance pact with Great Britain. An important paragraph of this treaty on which Britain based her entire war policy, read: "The high contracting parties . . . will act in accordance with the principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves, and of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states." That is what Russia signed. And now, forgetting all about eastern Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States, let's look at East Prussia with Koenigsberg. Let's look at the eastern third of Germany, including Silesia and Pomerania, all ancient German lands. Let's look at Ruthenia.

In November, 1941, Stalin declared from a Kremlin rostrum: "We have not, *nor can we have*, such war aims as the imposition of our will and our regime on the Slavic and other enslaved peoples of Europe, who are awaiting our help. Our aim is to help these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny, and then to accord them the possibility of arranging their own land as they see fit, with absolute freedom." That is what Stalin said when Russia's armies were reeling back under the German onslaught. And now, let's look at the very same nations Stalin spoke about: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.

In 1942, Russia signed the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty, Article I of which pledges that Britain and the U.S.S.R. "jointly and severally undertake to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran." In January, 1943, this was solemnly reaffirmed in the famous and now dead Teheran Declaration engineered by President Roosevelt and considered by him as a great diplomatic achievement. In 1945, Russia tossed both the treaty and

declaration into the fire by separating northern Iran under the name of *Autonomous Azerbeidjan State*, as a first step toward bringing all Iran under her domination.¹

In January, 1944, Russia affixed her signature to the notorious Yalta Declaration which said: "We pledge to assist the liberated countries to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." The ink of the declaration was not yet dry when Russia imposed Communist-dominated minority governments on the Balkan countries and went on to establish there a form of complete economic totalitarianism. From the American point of view, the Yalta Declaration is as much of a scrap of paper as were all the treaties signed by Hitler and torn up at his pleasure.

In August, 1945, Russia signed a treaty with China in which Russia acknowledged China's full sovereignty over Sinkiang and Manchuria. In January, 1946, Russia compelled China to grant widespread autonomy to the Kazakhs of Sinkiang. At the same time Russia reached out for a complete economic stranglehold over Manchuria.

Yet, while Russia chooses to ignore her own treaty obligation whenever it suits her expansionist aims, she demands absolute compliance with the letter of all agreements on the part of the other signatories. When the London Conference of Foreign Ministers broke up, the official organ of the Soviet Government, *Izvestia*, declared threateningly: "If the American and British Governments will in the future insist upon their position, which in no way can be brought into accord with loyalty to the already concluded tripartite agreement, then this will shake the very basis of collaboration among the three powers."

¹ The second step has likewise been achieved by the imposition on Iran of a pro-Russian government under Premier Ahmed Ghavam.

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Such is the Russian treaty record. It should not occasion any surprise whatsoever, since Stalin himself has publicly declared that treaties of peace merely define the elements of a future war. Americans who have so diligently probed into Hitler's *Mein Kampf* should devote some study to Stalin's speeches. They will no longer be unpleasantly surprised.

CHAPTER XLV

The Veto

RUSSIA'S RULERS, THE POLITBURO, STAND ON THE PREMISE that armed might is the only effective instrument of policy. They have stated it often enough, during the war and after the war. Russia is breaking or sidestepping international treaties and agreements, is pursuing an aggressive, expansionist policy that gives the statesmen of Western countries one case of the jitters after the other, and makes the Western peoples ask, "Well, what does Russia really want?"

During the various conferences of the Big Three, Russia has stated, time and again, in plain, unmistakable language what she wants. If the statesmen of Great Britain and the United States have not seen fit to tell it to their own people, that is their fault exclusively, not Russia's. Russia wants to rule the world, with the aid of the other members of the Big Three, if they are willing to co-operate with her. If they do not want to co-operate for this purpose, Russia is determined to go her own way.

Russia is an out-and-out totalitarian country, a rigid dictatorship of the Communist Party exercised through the heads of the party, the Politburo. Her rulers can decide on her policy without having to account to anyone. Not so with the governments of Great Britain and the United States. Their countries are democracies, and in all matters of policy they are accountable, first to the elected representatives of the people, and then to the people. They cannot go before the people and declare: "We are going to rule the world in a

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totalitarian way, together with the totalitarian Government of Russia." If they did, they would find themselves out of office.

Reduced to non-diplomatic language, it is all very simple. Yesterday, Hitler wanted to rule the world, together with Japan, Great Britain and the United States. Between the four of them, they were to exploit all the other peoples of the world for the benefit of the four, and the other peoples were to have nothing to say about it. Great Britain and the United States could not possibly agree to any such monstrous scheme. Hitler went his own way and the result was the most devastating war in history.

Today, Russia wants to rule the world, in partnership with Great Britain and the United States, at least for the time being. Between the three of them, according to the Russian reasoning, they are to exploit all the other peoples of the world for the benefit of the three, and the other peoples are to have nothing to say about it. Again Great Britain and the United States cannot agree to the scheme. Russia is prepared to go her own way, is actually doing it, and what the result of it will be we do not know.

Ever since Yalta, the United States and Britain have been stalling for time, first to win the war, and then to try to work out some sort of international arrangement that would not look like a Russian-sponsored three-nation world totalitarianism. They devised the United Nations Organization and literally foisted it on Russia; crammed it down Russia's throat.

Russia realized that after her recent bloodletting she was not strong enough to impose her will on the other nations, nor would she be strong enough for a number of years to come. Reluctantly she accepted the United Nations Organization, but not until after she had made certain that the Big Three would have all the power in it. Even that was not enough; Russia needed an absolutely ironclad guarantee that

would permit her to go her own way whenever she chose, in spite of hell and high water. And so was born THE VETO.

What is the veto? In plain, undisguised language, it is an instrument which invested Russia with the solemnly underwritten right to annul any and every just and equitable arrangement which the majority-will of the United Nations Organization might attempt. It is an instrument with which Russia can sabotage the United Nations Organization at will, without appearing to do so. It is an instrument which allows Russia to go her own way the moment she feels strong enough to do so.

It will be argued that the United States, Great Britain, France, and China—the other four permanent members of the Security Council—have an equal right to exercise the veto. That is quite correct so far as the theory goes. In practice it works out rather differently. France and China are much too weak to be able to back up with any show of strength a veto which they might attempt. Great Britain has no use for the veto, has opposed it from the very outset as an undemocratic instrument, and her statesmen are demanding its abolition on every suitable occasion.

There remains the United States. What use has the United States for her veto power? The plain fact is that no one in the United States can give the answer, because no one knows. The veto certainly is not necessary to block any Russian expansionist moves, which could be done by a simple majority decision. Russia knew this only too well, just as she knew that this majority decision would always be against her, and that is why she wanted no part of the United Nations Organization without the veto. If the truth be told, as far as the United States was concerned, the veto was inserted into the United Nations Charter to win approval of the Charter by many members of Congress who preach international co-operation without actually meaning it.

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Russia made frequent use of the veto long before the United Nations Organization held its first session. She used it indirectly, but it still remained the veto. Whenever, for reasons strictly her own, she did not want the presence of France and China at international conferences, she simply vetoed their participation. Whenever a topic embarrassing to her was to be brought up at an international conference, she vetoed its discussion. And whenever a British or American delegate opposed Russian views and methods with particular vigor, she vetoed his inclusion in the next conference.

There is no record anywhere that either Britain or the United States resorted to any such tactics. There simply was no need ; it is not the democratic way.

In the United States the President has the veto power. But Congress can override the presidential veto by mustering the required majority. Again, that is the democratic way. In the United Nations Organization, there is no way of overriding the veto, even if the members of the Security Council stand ten to one against it. The veto still holds ; it has the power to stop any measure voted by the overwhelming majority.

Russia insisted on the veto. She has stated flatly, time and again, that she is not going to allow it to be abolished. She needs it for purposes of the blueprint which the Politburo has drawn up for Russia's future course.

CHAPTER XLVI

My Pokazhem Meeru!

THE RUSSIA OF 1946 IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT of 1942, even that of 1939. In 1939, Russia was a nation that looked upon the entire world as her sworn enemy. Russia was then emerging from a sort of political chaos into which the great purges had thrown her. She was beginning a tortuous climb to the world position which she felt was hers by right, and the Western World was opposing her. When she reached out for the Baltic States, part of Poland and Bessarabia—all territories that had been taken from her when she was weakened by war and inner dissension—she found herself branded an aggressor by Great Britain, France, and the United States. She made up her mind to pay the Western World back in like measure when her time arrived, as she well knew it would. It was then that Comrade Manuilsky exclaimed: "Not a stone will remain standing of the cursed capitalistic structure!"

In 1942, Russia was fighting like a cornered animal. The fortunes of war, up till then, had gone heavily against her. Great Britain and the United States, eager to keep Russia in the fight, had promised help, but nothing in the nature of real help had yet been given, and Russia doubted if it would ever come. She made up her mind to do by herself whatever had to be done.

In doing this, Russia had to go to desperate lengths. The thumbscrew was twisted so tight there was no longer any feeling left. Of all the warring nations none was so totally

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mobilized as Russia, not even Hitler's Germany. Whoever did not fight had to work; neither age nor sex made any difference. Children were taken from the schools and sent to the farms and factories; it was not a time for education. Women had to work a minimum of sixty-six hours a week; men eighty-four hours and more. Children had to work harder than adults did before the war. No excuse except a certified case of illness was accepted.

At the same time, the Russian standard of living, never high, touched rock bottom. The average Russian went hungry half the time, but he had to keep on working just the same. He had to do with less than two pounds of food a day, and half of this ration consisted of black bread. The balance was made up of potatoes, cabbage, buckwheat cereal, and a tiny bit of fish. Meat was out. Sugar was an unobtainable luxury. Fats were something to be dreamed about.

To keep up this terrific pace, the Soviet Government had to work the Russian people to the highest pitch of patriotic fervor. They were not fighting Germany alone, they were told; they were actually fighting the whole world, and they had to win against the whole world. Incentive was added to compulsion. Socialist competition was made the order of the day. This competition was driven at an especially fierce tempo on the eve of a Communist anniversary; there was no letup; every factory, every shop, was spurred on to outdo the other. The production leaders became *Heroes of Socialist Labor*. The next best received the *Order of Lenin*, various medals and bonuses in money, and, more important, food. In all this, the Communist angle was stressed as against the capitalist system of the rest of the world. The slogan given to the Russian people was: "*My pokazhem meeru!*" (We'll show the world!)

Sacrifice was glorified. Work, hunger, death—all this was for the *Socialist Fatherland*, with the adjective, socialist, lifted

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above everything else. Russia was going to do what all the capitalist nations of the world, taken together, could not do—defeat Hitlerism. Russia was going to do the bigger and better things which the capitalist world had proved itself incapable of doing.

Today the Russians consider themselves the world's chosen people. Their national leader is the greatest leader in the world. Their generals are the best generals in the world. Their soldiers are the finest soldiers in the world. Their workers are the most efficient workers in the world. Their system is the only great system in the world. They have the right to strut and look down upon all others. Theirs is the great victory, and all the glory. The future is theirs. When bigger and better things are done, the Soviet peoples will do them. And the sordid, decaying capitalist world had better take notice. That is the Russian outlook.

In a preceding chapter, I made brief reference to a poll of Russian public opinion on the subject of another world war, conducted by Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times*. I give it here in more detail because it throws light on the present Russian spirit of belligerency. Mr. Atkinson reported some of the significant replies in detail. A woman factory worker said: "Sure there will be another war. That was clear even before Hitler attacked us. How soon? Within the next decade. *No two political systems can exist side by side.* But I am more inclined to think the war will be between England and Russia. This would also mean between England and the United States on one side and Russia on the other because, despite the differences between the British and the Americans, they have a common language and common capitalist system. The United States would certainly join England, not us."

Another woman also went into considerable speculative detail. "It's possible another fight might occur," she said. "But this time the leaders will have to take into consideration

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the opinion of the people, and the people are now making a sharp turn to the left. See what is happening in France, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The United States and Britain have put an end to Fascism, but now they are afraid of Bolshevism. *All of them are afraid.*"

A writer gave this opinion. "No war now," he said. "This war is still too fresh in everyone's mind, but *war is quite probable within the next quarter-century*. Maybe before that time the Marxian-Leninist system will be dominant in Europe and the European countries, particularly the European Slavic countries, will have voluntarily linked their fate with that of Russia. It looks to me as if the possibility of a Sovietized Europe is not too remote and by no means a fantastic dream. Anybody would think twice before making war against a Soviet Europe. In general, I would say that *as long as there are two antagonistic systems, war is always in the offing.*"

Why does the Russian man in the street reason thus? Because his government constantly tells him that as a citizen of the great Soviet Union he can have anything he wants, and he is being gradually worked up to a point where he will want everything in the world. He says today in fact that another world war is inevitable while there exist two different systems in the world. If we want peace, we can have it only at the price of accepting *his* system. He is ready to fight it out over the system, and he is certain that he will win. Today he speaks of a Soviet Europe. Tomorrow he will speak of a Soviet World.

In October, 1945, an airplane filled with U. S. flyers landed at Poznan in Poland to decorate a fallen American's grave. The local Red Army commandant told U. S. Colonel Walter Pashley, "Theoretically, you should be interned for landing at our airport in violation of the rules of war." Colonel Pashley, through an interpreter, inquired: "Ask him, what war? The war is over." The Red Army colonel retorted,

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frowning at the Americans, "There is a state of war here."

And so there is. There will be a state of war for the Russians until the Western World submits meekly to all Russian demands or is ground to dust. For Americans the war has ended, the job is finished. For the Russians it has only begun.

On January 15, 1946, the Red Army in Hungary seized the oil fields at Lispe, owned and operated by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, an American concern. When the Americans protested that the Russian seizure was illegal, in violation of international treaties and agreements, the Russians simply said that United States development technique is twenty-five years behind the Russian technique. For this reason the Americans must pack up and get out.

Now I have seen Russian industries operate during the high-pitch tempo of wartime when efficiency is at its highest. So have a great number of competent American observers. They all agree that the efficiency of the individual American worker is anywhere from two to three times that of the Russian worker. In Russia human labor is used in the most wasteful way. Yet the Russians contend that our methods are twenty-five years behind theirs. Everything Russian is better.

This self-glorifying Russian attitude can be seen in the shooting of two U. S. soldiers in Berlin by Russian soldiers simply because they admitted being Americans; in the arrogant announcement of a Russian general in the American zone of Korea that he does not wish to be "annoyed" by the American press, while at the same time favoring native Korean reporters with a secret session; in the unwarranted assailing of a U. S. diplomat in Bulgaria by the Communist paper *Rabotnichesko Delo* as a "malicious misrepresenter"; in the personal attack of the Russian government paper *Izvestia* on Archbishop Francis J. Spellman of New York as an alleged pro-Japanese and a stooge of Franco Spain, for no

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better reason than the award to the American prelate of a cardinal's hat, which the Russians had wanted for one of their own ecclesiastics; and in a thousand-and-one similar incidents the world over, wherever Americans and Russians come together, and which are hushed up by American military authorities for diplomatic reasons.

It is quite obvious that there can be no peace in this world as long as Russia wants everything and gives nothing. Neither can there be peace until Russia comes to understand that when other nations feel that Russia is wrong, and say so, they do not do it from just a perverse desire to frustrate and destroy the Russian way of doing things.

We destroyed Hitler and all he stood for because he insisted that the German people as the *Herrenvolk*—the master people—were entitled to everything they wanted. From all appearances so far, it seems as if we, together with the rest of the world, are up against another edition of the world's chosen people.

"My pokazhem meeru!"

CHAPTER XLVII

Your Ubiquitous Press

RUSSIA DOES NOT LIKE THE FREE AMERICAN PRESS. NOT only that, she insists that there is no free press in the United States. I do not mean the great mass of Russian people who do not know the first thing about the American press, never did, and, from present indications, never will, because no American paper is ever allowed to reach them. I mean the Soviet Government, the top layers of Russian Communist society, and, last but not least, the Soviet Russian press, which is part of the Soviet Government. In their eyes the American press is ubiquitous, insolent, highly critical of everything except itself, and a phenomenon of disrespectful behavior that should not be allowed to exist.

While talking one day with a Russian of the middle official strata, I asked him what he thought of the American press. He gave the question a few moments of thought before he answered: "To be frank, I do not know much about your press. I never see any American newspaper or periodical, and if I did I would not be able to read it as I do not know any English. Excerpts from American newspapers appearing from time to time in the Soviet press lead me to the conclusion that the American press is telling the Government of the United States what to do. This, I think, is an archaic situation; it should be the other way around."

Another Russian official, one who had spent some time in the United States and had had ample opportunity to study American customs and mentality, said this: "From what I

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have seen in your country, the American press has set itself up as the direct link between the Washington Government and the American people. The Soviet press fulfils the same function in the Soviet Union. The Government is the head of the nation just as the people are the body; the press represents the neck which connects head and body. We do not allow the neck to dominate the head. In your country, the neck dominates both head and body."

One of the principal Russian grievances against the American way of doing things is the old-established right of the American press to criticize. Russians reason this way: If American newsmen knew anything at all, they would be running the Government in Washington instead of peddling their wares to privately owned newspapers. Furthermore, the United States is an ally of Russia, and allies should always support each other's views. If the United States has any criticism of Russian actions, such criticism should be expressed by accredited diplomats in secret session. It certainly should not be allowed to appear in public print and to poison the American mind against the Russian way of doing things.

Moreover, Russians maintain, the American press is largely owned by private financial interests. It is a class press that represents the views of its private owners, who in turn are dependent on their large advertisers, likewise private financial interests. Thus, in Russian eyes, the American press is the tool of private financial interests directed against Communist Russia and what she stands for. A condition of this sort should never be allowed to exist between allies. Some Russians actually expressed the expectation that President Roosevelt, as a self-acknowledged friend of Russia, would put an end to the "sinister" doings of the American press.

Out of this conception springs the belief universally held in Russia that the American press is reactionary, hypocritical, anti-Russian, and, therefore, largely pro-fascist. Russians

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should have nothing to do with it. For this very reason the few American correspondents admitted to Russia are subject to the special watchfulness of the Secret Police. Russian newspapers give frequent expression of this opinion. Thus *Pravda* wrote editorially: "The reactionary American press consists of friends and protectors of Hitlerism. . . . The Hitlerites hope for indulgence through the protection of their friends in democratic countries, so they later may prepare their own revenge. They have friends and protectors indeed . . . in the reactionary American press."

At times the Russian press pounces on individual American writers and columnists for special castigation. Thus *Pravda* denounced William L. White as a "shady newspaperman" and called his book, *Report on the Russians*, "the standard product from the fascist kitchen, with all the usual aroma of stupid slander, ignorance, and frank hatred."

Hanson W. Baldwin, the well-known military analyst of the *New York Times*, has repeatedly been subject to sharp attack in the Russian press, such as the one published on November 22, 1944, in *Red Star*. The Russian paper said: "It is known that the Red Army's offensive actions have often proved valueless the predictions of the 'military expert' Baldwin, who always underestimated the Red Army's strength and overestimated the strength of the German defenses. For this reason he now has a dubious reputation. Now this woe-begone expert has again started giving instructions to the Red Army and the Allied troops. It is quite obvious that Baldwin does not care about hastening the Allies' victory, but he is worried how to make things easier for Hitler's Germany."

The Russian paper carefully omitted mention that Mr. Baldwin's analyses reflected the views held by American high military authorities. It is of course easier to attack an individual columnist than assail the War Department General

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Staff.¹ The latter might entail unwholesome consequences.

Russian press officials are particularly incensed over the reports of American correspondents on conditions in the Russian-occupied countries of Eastern and Central Europe. This is what the Moscow *Novoye Vremya* had to say on the subject in September, 1945: "American newspapermen who so persistently demand immediate entry to these countries are leaving their readers in complete ignorance of the most interesting processes of rebirth and construction in various social spheres going on there. At the same time these newspapermen are remaining blind and deaf to reality and flood the pages of their papers with fabricated sensations. It is not accidental, of course, that American publishers are endeavoring to obtain release from any kind of control of their activity, which endeavor is being supported by the most reactionary circles in the United States."

Once I asked a Russian press official just what sort of stories he wanted American correspondents to write about Russia and the countries occupied by her armies. Said he: "We do not want the correspondent to make inquiries with reactionary elements who oppose Soviet policy; it is not his business. We do not want him to write about the policies of the Soviet-friendly governments in these countries; such policies are still in the making and will be in the making for some years to come, so there is nothing to report on them. We do not want him to write about seizures of American properties by Soviet military authorities; these are matters for the diplomats to straighten out. We do not want him to describe actions where Soviet military or civil authorities show to disadvantage; it is not friendly to the Soviet Union to emphasize our faults.

¹ When Brooks Atkinson returned from Russia in July, 1946, and wrote a series of articles on his impressions in Russia, *Pravda* instantly labeled him a "pen handit, a savage and an untalented calumniator who was hired to fan enmity in the world."

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"What we want the American correspondent to write home about is this. The popular demonstrations in these countries in favor of friendship with the Soviet Union. The cultural contributions of the Soviet Union in these countries. Take, for instance, the free band concerts which the Red Army is giving almost daily, the equipment of libraries with Soviet books, the lectures given by Soviet scientists and others, the free showing of Soviet films, the introduction of Soviet sports, and many others of the same nature. Here is a really fertile field for the conscientious correspondent."

When I told him that a correspondent who wasted cable money on descriptive stories of this nature would quickly find himself out of a job for the simple reason that American readers do not care for that sort of thing, he threw up his hands and expostulated: "That just goes to show how the American press has poisoned the mind of the American reader. A condition like that should not be allowed to exist in any civilized country."

Some American papers and writers find unqualified favor in Russian official eyes. Foremost among these is the *Daily Worker* because "it is the true mouthpiece of the American working masses." Also high on the Soviet-favored list is Johannes Steel because of "his continued advocacy of genuine friendship and lavish economic aid to the Soviet Union on the part of the United States. He popularizes the Soviet Union among the American public."

Here is an interesting story about an American correspondent written by Vadim Kojevnikov for *Pravda*. This correspondent was a poor immigrant who worked his way into journalism by washing cars and performing other menial tasks. "You Soviet people don't know what the dollar means," the correspondent was quoted as saying. "In America we have a saying 'This man costs so many dollars.' I wrote about things I was permitted to write about, things that paid well."

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I was in Spain and in the Soviet Union. Neither the Soviet Union nor the men of the International Brigade liked my stories, but if I wrote them differently, who would publish them? My boss was not interested in facts but in what his advertising managers thought about facts."

Capitalist journalism for this correspondent, the story goes on to say, was a cross between slavery and prostitution. During his early struggles, he had to work long hours to make ends meet. In addition to news agency work, he wrote under a pseudonym for many newspapers, often taking the opposite point of view on the same story to suit the prejudices of different editors. He never had time to go to the theatre or the movies; the only books he read were the ones from which he could crib material for his articles. When he met the girl of his dreams, it took three years before he could afford to marry her. It took another five years to earn enough money to afford to have a child.

When the war started, his employer offered him so much money that he could not afford to decline an assignment to write about Tito and the Partisans. His employer also agreed to insure his life heavily if he would parachute into Yugoslavia. As soon as he landed, he met Tito and the Partisans, and Tito took personal care of him. Contrary to his expectations and also contrary to his employer's instructions, he found Tito and the Partisans men of noble character and self-respect. "I could not write what I had been told to write," he was quoted as saying. "I wrote the truth, even though I knew it would not be published."

Rather than continue working for the capitalist press, he cabled his employer to go to hell. Then he joined the Partisans. Although he adored his wife, she also appeared unable to make noble decisions. On the assumption that he was dead, the insurance company at home had paid off his insurance to his wife, and she had foolishly invested the money

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in her father's business. "Would the father return the money when cables proved that his son-in-law was still alive?" the correspondent was quoted as asking. "No! He is a selfish capitalist. My wife had no choice but to cable me for the sake of our precious child to remain dead and keep the hell away from America."

Kojevnikov's article concludes that this was a bitter fate indeed for a correspondent of such unusual qualities, but it was probably no more than he deserved for having sold himself to the capitalist press of the United States in the first place.

This story, and many others like it, is the sort of thing that is being continuously dished out to the Russian people as a factual description of life in the United States.

The government-owned Russian radio echoes the sentiments expressed by the Russian press. Since all large broadcasting stations in Eastern and Central Europe have fallen into Russian hands, the bewildered people of Europe, especially those of Germany, Italy, and the Balkans, are being treated to an unbelievably distorted picture of the United States, which is being represented to them as a nation where Fascism and Nazism, promoted by a small but powerful minority, are rampant. American periodicals such as *Time*, *Life*, the *Army and Navy Journal*, and many others, are called the chief sponsors of Nazism and are described as being regretful over the defeat of Hitler.

What can be done about such practices? Obviously nothing. So long as the Russian and Western conceptions of the freedom of the press remain poles apart, as on so many other issues, every effort to conciliate the two viewpoints is bound to remain futile. About the only thing that might appease the Russians on this point would be to place our entire press under a government agency such as the former Office of War Information and erect a tombstone with the inscription, "Here Lies the Freedom of the American Press."

CHAPTER XLVIII

The Atomic Bomb

WHEN THE ATOMIC BOMB BLASTED HIROSHIMA INTO DUST, it also blasted all heretofore established concepts of warfare, especially those of the Russians. Russia, where human life is considered one of the cheapest commodities, has always adhered to her traditional idea of battlefield tactics: to smother the enemy with an overwhelming mass of men without considering the cost in human lives. Hiroshima outmoded this idea; transplanted modern warfare into an entirely different dimension.

There have been numerous publicity stories claiming that Russia had been working on the development of an atomic bomb of her own for years. They are all erroneous. When President Truman told Premier Stalin at Potsdam that the United States had a new kind of bomb ready for Japan, without revealing any details, the Russian leader shrugged disinterestedly. And when the first report of what happened to Hiroshima reached Moscow, high Russian circles met it with utter incredulity. They simply could not believe that the event was at all possible. The government-owned press promptly labeled the story as a "typical American publicity canard."

Only when a Russian military observer had visited the ruins of Hiroshima and promptly sent in his report, the tune of ridicule was abandoned. For the first time dealing with the subject in a serious vein, the *Novoye Vremya* wrote on Sept. 3, 1945: "It is clear to all right-thinking men that the

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discovery does not solve any political problems internationally or inside individual countries. Those who cherish illusions in this respect will suffer inevitable disappointment."

The Russian periodical then bitterly attacked the "Hearst-Patterson-McCormick press" for its alleged arguments that the United States use the threat of the atomic bomb to enforce its will in international affairs, and said, "These flagrant imperialists forget history's lessons. They ignore the collapse of Hitlerite plans for world hegemony, which were based on intended utilization of temporary superiority in technical development."

It was a purely political article, bristling with disappointment and bitterness between the lines. The Russians were bitter at not having been let in on the atomic bomb secret. It was a typical display of the new Russian trait of wanting everything and giving nothing in exchange. As Winston Churchill testified: "I trust we are not going to put pressure on the United States to adopt such a course (admit Soviet scientists to American atomic bomb arsenals). I am sure if the circumstances were reversed and we or the Americans asked for similar access to the Russian arsenals, it would not be granted. During the war we imparted many secrets to the Russians, especially in connection with radar, but we were not conscious of any adequate reciprocity."

To one who knows Russia and today's Russians, their bitter disappointment, bordering on a feeling of humiliation, is quite understandable. It was a terrible blow to their national pride to discover that they had been far outdistanced by another nation in the war's most important scientific achievement. As a matter of fact, during the London Conference, Molotov discussed the subject of the atomic bomb daily with Byrnes, and his resentment about it contributed materially to the utter failure of the meeting.

This resentment was still in evidence at the Moscow Con-

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ference, three months later. Molotov accepted the American-British plan for eventual international control of the atomic bomb almost without question; but his attitude of indifference was due to the fact that Russia is interested in the bomb only if she can get it for herself. Then, in the course of the final Kremlin banquet, Molotov pointedly raised his glass toward James Bryant Conant, Byrnes' adviser on atomic matters, and said: "I hope the eminent Mr. Conant does not have his atomic energy in his pocket, because there is a lot of glassware on the table which might shatter."

Russian resentment is especially bitter over the fact that German scientists and laboratory equipment dealing with atomic research, in the portions of Germany originally occupied by the Americans and later relinquished to the Red Army under the zonal agreement, were first removed from the area. The Russians demanded full information on the subject, but their demand was not granted.

Rumors are being set afloat every so often that Russia has mastered the atomic bomb secret. The most sensational of such rumors was a story accredited to Dr. Raphael Armatoe, of Londonderry, Northern Ireland, to the effect that Russia has produced an atomic bomb that has "rendered the Anglo-American one almost obsolete." It was this story which prompted President Truman to say that he had no reason to believe that Russia possessed an atomic bomb. The origin of all such rumors as well as their purpose seem pretty obvious.

That Russia is doing her best to discover an atomic bomb with at least as much destructive power as ours, goes without saying; but at the turn of the year she was still hopelessly behind. Here are the facts I was able to learn on the subject:

During the last months of 1945, Russia constructed two large laboratories near Mt. Alagez in Transcaucasia, not far from the Black Sea coast. One of these laboratories is under the direction of Prof. Abram Feodorovich Joffe, an authority

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on electronics and molecular physics, who is assisted by a group of scientists taken from Germany, among them Prof. Max Steenbeck, Dr. Gustav Hertz, and Prof. Fritz Volmer, all of whom had been doing electronic research for the Nazis. The other laboratory is directed by Dr. Peter Kapitza, whose specialty is stratospheric cosmic rays, a roundabout approach to the harnessing of atomic energy. Assisting him is another group of German scientists, including Prof. Manfred von Ardenne, Dr. Karl Bernhardt, and Dr. Kurt Mic, all of whom had been working on cyclotrons, another approach to atomic energy, for the Nazis. When Premier Stalin was vacationing at Sochi on the Black Sea in November and December, 1945, causing wild rumors about his illness and even death, he exhibited his personal interest by visiting the two laboratories on a number of occasions. However, the activity of the two scientific groups is confined to research; and from research to the construction of atomic factories capable of producing the bomb or its equivalent, is a far cry.¹

It is known also that Russia has reserved for her own future needs all uranium production in Czechoslovakia. And while Jan Masaryk, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, averred before the General Assembly of the UNO in London that "no Czechoslovak uranium will be used for destructive purposes," he will have little to say about the use to which Russia decides to put the mineral.

¹ In the hope of eventually discovering an atomic bomb of great potentialities, Russia is experimenting in methods of hurling such a bomb over vast distances. She has taken possession of the rocket bomb laboratories and experimental station which the Germans had built near Fuene-muende, on the island of Usedom, in the Russian occupation zone, and with the aid of German scientists captured by the Red Army is perfecting the German V-weapons and their adaptation to atomic warfare. Fiery missiles frequently observed over Sweden, flying northward, in the summer months of 1946, were experimental Russian long-distance rockets aimed at Spitzbergen and the Arctic Ocean, where Russia maintains a large number of naval patrol vessels, with the objective of determining the distance and the accuracy of aim, of rockets released from Usedom Island.

CHAPTER XLIX

The United Nations

THE FIRST CONCRETE PROPOSAL OF A PERMANENT UNITED Nations Organization was launched by the late President Roosevelt at the Teheran Conference. This proposal had been carefully discussed between the United States and Great Britain. The United States had announced she wanted no territorial or other acquisitions, and many Americans were asking what the war was all about. The answer, according to President Roosevelt, was that world peace would be established on a permanent basis. Great Britain, on the other hand, was fearing future clashes between her interests and Russia's which might seriously endanger the empire structure; as a safeguard of the British Empire, the proposed United Nations Organization looked like a fairly good bet.

The Russians listened to the proposal with politeness and reserve. They promised to take it under advisement. Back in Moscow, they turned it over from all angles and found it wanting. They were not going to be rushed. If the proposed world organization was some sort of capitalistic trick designed to rob Russia of the fruits of victory which she had already staked out for herself, they would want no part of it. To be entirely on the safe side, the Politburo decided in favor of a sort of United Nations of its own, just in case the Anglo-American proposal should contain pitfalls. And so the Soviet Constitution was quickly amended, granting the sixteen component republics of the Soviet Union something that, on paper at least, looked like the nearest thing to independence.

They were given various additional rights, including those to their own military establishment and diplomatic representation, and even the right of secession. Needless to say, the all-powerful Communist Party would see to it that this latter right would never be exercised. What the amendment actually aimed for was to smooth the path of eventual entry into the Soviet Union for other nations over which Russia intended to establish her domination.

Having thus provided an ace in the hole for herself, Russia sent her representatives to Dumbarton Oaks to discuss the preliminaries for the proposed United Nations setup. The Russian representatives had strict instructions to which they adhered. Specifically, the Russians wanted no part of any world organization in which the small nations would have an equal voice with the big ones. The Russian point of view was that since the Big Three were winning the war, they should dictate the peace also, and then preserve it by force after they had dictated it. As a matter of fact, Russia would much rather have a plain world alliance of the Big Three, with no hangers-on, than the type of world organization which was being foisted on her. When the Dumbarton Oaks results finally emerged in more or less definite form, they were much closer to the Russian conception than to the original Anglo-American proposals.

As was to be expected, the smaller nations raised their voices in loud protest. The war, so the United States and Great Britain had contended, was a crusade of democracy against the evil forces of totalitarianism as represented by Nazism and Fascism. Was the war to end with the establishment of a ruthless dictatorship of the Big Three over the rest of the world?

A legitimate question under the circumstances, it demanded a convincing answer. And so at Yalta President Roosevelt brought up the matter of a world conference to be

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attended by all United Nations, big and small, on an equal basis. Stalin looked surprised and asked, "Why?" Roosevelt said, "To discuss the security proposals." Answered Stalin, "What is there to discuss?"

The Russians held to this point of view. As they saw it, the Big Three had the force. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals they had found a way to use this force together. That was good enough, so far as Russia was concerned. The small nations could take it or leave it. There was no need to discuss changes. If a world conference was to be held as a magnanimous propaganda gesture, they would attend it, but only to ratify the work of the Big Three. Having said as much, Russia promptly proceeded, by the well-known Secret Police method, to solidify her power over the small states of Eastern and Central Europe. No one, and certainly not a vociferous assembly of small and unimportant countries, was going to expel her from her new sphere of expansion.

Intimates of President Roosevelt agreed that he returned from the Yalta Conference a sadly disillusioned man, and this disillusionment mounted as the Russians promptly went back on even their partial commitments. The high-sounding slogans of the Atlantic Charter which had accompanied our entry into the war had, for the most part, proved to be meaningless. He admitted frankly that future agreements would have to be based on compromises with Russia.¹

In the meantime, the Russians had taken a closer look at the United Nations proposals and found in them a few things they might use to advantage, provided that they could have their own views perpetuated in the Charter. They had already achieved their own expansionist aims in Europe for the time being; if the United Nations Organization underwrote these gains, so much the better. Besides, Russia needed one of the

¹ The late President actually confided to his intimates that the Russians weren't playing fair with him, that they were completely ignoring both the spirit and the letter of secret agreements which he made with them.

breathing spells advocated by Lenin, in the form of an armed truce of the post-Versailles variety, to digest her latest acquisitions; again, if the UNO underwrote that truce, it would be so much more to Russia's benefit. Also, Russia's veto power on the Security Council would prevent any obtrusive outsider from even inquiring into whatever measures Russia was taking within her sphere of influence; the UNO would simply underwrite all such measures in advance, and there would be no more outside interference. Finally, the UNO would provide an excellent world forum for propaganda shaped in Soviet format as well as for causing dissension among the nations of the West.

Having thus decided that the United Nations Organization, chartered the way Russia wanted it, would be beneficial, the Politburo unleashed its powerful propaganda apparatus at home and abroad in favor of the scheme. Speaking on the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Red Revolution, Stalin himself declared that the Dumbarton Oaks system "will be a new, special, fully authorized organization having at its command everything necessary to uphold the peace." Reporting on Stalin's speech, *Pravda* added editorially, "History has shown that weak peoples, defended by nothing but beautiful words and procrastinating treaties, are always the first victims of aggression. Nothing but force permeated by the ideals of democracy can defend these peoples. Only such a force can guarantee the freedom and independence of these peoples."

Unwittingly perhaps, *Pravda* uncovered the profound change which the concept of democracy has already undergone under Russian influence. Heretofore, democracy had been based on the principles of right and justice for the weak. Hereafter, democracy is to be based on the principle of force, to be applied against the weak the moment they raise a voice of protest against oppression. According to *Pravda*, speaking for the Politburo, this new world democracy is to

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protect the weak, but such protection is to be based on ruthless force. Democracy will be a policeman with a club, patrolling among the weak, bullying them into submission to a system organized for the exclusive benefit of the strong. It will be like the Russian secret police agent who hustles a man to the concentration camp the moment he speaks up against the absolutism of the powers-that-be. The Russian conception of life does not believe that people can be decent and orderly without the constant watch of the Secret Police over them. If Russia has her way in the UNO, it seems logical to believe that this system of the police club is to be applied to the entire world.

The utter divergence of basic interests between the Big Three is evident from the reasons for which each of them subscribed to the United Nations Organization. Russia wanted the UNO as a world rostrum for the broadcasting of her doctrines, a preserver of her territorial conquests in the recent war, and as a springboard for future bloodless conquests which both the United States and Britain want to prevent.

Britain wanted the UNO as a medium for the preservation of the British Empire in a swiftly changing world. But England knows also that the UNO can serve as such a medium only if it is run on broad democratic principles and converted into a genuine world assembly. Accordingly, England is trying to abolish the veto and substitute plain majority rule, which Russia and the United States want to prevent.

The United States wanted the UNO for the simple reason of not having to fight in another world war, a reason about which neither England nor Russia is basically concerned.

Again, England and the United States wanted the UNO in order to seal and preserve the status quo. Russia wanted the UNO in order to change the political and economic structure of the world in accordance with her own designs; without resort to a major war, if possible.

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As the various United Nations delegates converged on London for the opening session of the UNO, they still remembered the odium of the cynical political transaction in San Francisco. There Argentina was admitted as part of the notorious deal by which Molotov got three seats for Russia in the Assembly against one seat for each of the other nations. The delegates were conscious of the yawning psychological and ideological gulf between the Russian and Western worlds. They kept their fingers crossed. The silent question on their lips was: what will Russia do?

Russia did plenty. When the delegates were taking their seats in Church House for the first time and England was preparing to make a motion for the abolition of the veto, a radio voice from Moscow blared: "This is an ill-considered suggestion. . . . International co-operation will be the more effective the more real sovereignty is enjoyed by the individual countries, the more free the countries are from outside interference in their internal affairs, and the more capable they are of upholding their independence."

But that was a mere beginning. Bristling with power politics, Russia marshaled her cohorts to defeat British-sponsored Paul-Henri Spaak for the presidency of the General Assembly and missed by the narrowest of margins. Undaunted by this reversal, she plunged into another show of power politics by trying to push Norway, who voted with the Russian lineup, into the Security Council in place of either Mexico or Holland, who voted with the American and British lineups, respectively. Again she missed by a narrow margin.

Then Russia got really going. She sidetracked a request by Pedro Lopez of the Philippines that the General Assembly recommend the immediate convening on an international conference on the freedom of the press, by preventing it from ever reaching the floor. She requested the Assembly to take steps for the ousting of the Franco regime in Spain, who was

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not even a member of the UNO. She urged an immediate solution of the trusteeship problem, so that she could once again advance her claim for the Italian colonies of Tripolitania and Eritrea.

When Iran requested the Security Council to investigate the activity of Russian troops in setting up an insurgent government in the northern part of Iran, Russia promptly acted behind the scenes. She engineered the overthrow of Iranian Premier Ebrahim Hakimi, who had "dared" to present the complaint against Russia, and the installation of a new pro-Russian government in Iran. This new government was to deal with Russia directly, outside the UNO. The police fist had borne down with all severity against the first small nation to ask for redress. As a result of this action, the Moslem states of the Middle East, realizing that Britain and the United States were unable to protect them from Russian encroachments, began edging away from the Anglo-American lineup.

Acting through the subservient French Communist Party, Russia forced the resignation of President de Gaulle of France at the right psychological moment. French Foreign Minister Bidault had to leave London posthaste, and the Anglo-Americans were deprived of another ally.

Lashing out at Great Britain directly, Russia charged that the presence of British troops in Greece and Indonesia was a threat to international peace and security. She accused Britain of supporting the reactionary elements in Greece and Indonesia against the democratic forces, and demanded bluntly that the Security Council put an end to the situation.

Lashing out at the United States directly, Russia, through the government-owned *Tass* news agency, accused the American Military Command in southern Korea of fostering anti-Soviet propaganda. To make the charge official beyond doubt, the Russian commander in northern Korea, Colonel General

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Shtykov, confirmed the accusation to native Korean newspapers during his visit to the American-occupied zone.

Russia railroaded the atomic bomb resolution through the Political and Security Committee without permitting any attempt to get at the substance of the question. Those who opposed this most unparliamentary procedure were told they could discuss the resolution after it had been adopted.

All this Russia accomplished within about a week's time. The only concrete contribution of the United States during the same period was an address by Secretary of State Byrnes in which he said: "Let us not expect feats of magic overnight from the institutions we have created. Let us beware of the diehard enthusiasts as well as the diehard unbelievers. Let us not think that we can give over any and every problem to the United Nations and expect it to be solved. Let us avoid casting excessive burdens upon the institutions of the United Nations, especially in their infancy."

Mr. Byrnes' words and Russia's simultaneous actions stood out in rather sharp contrast.

England? Oh, yes, England decided *not* to make her motion for the abolition of the veto after all.

The delegates had converged on Church House with a silent question on their lips. They received the answer quickly. The aggressive policy of Russia—the only one among the Big Three who had a well-defined policy—was in evidence everywhere.¹

James B. Reston cabled to the *New York Times* from London: "It is easier to construct a machine than create a philosophy. It is simpler to define an objective of peace and security than it is to chart the course to that objective or decide who is going to drive."

¹ At every successive session of the UNO Security Council, Russia has tossed in her veto whenever a majority was lined up against her on any question, thus nullifying all action, including Andrei Gromyko's famous *walk* on the Iranian question.

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Russia provided the answer to that one, too. Without the least hesitation, she swung herself into the driver's seat. *Her* principal objective in joining the UNO had been to become its driver.

CHAPTER I.

Worlds Apart

RUSSIA HAD SET HERSELF UP AS ARBITER IN WORLD AFFAIRS long before the United Nations Organization came into being. While the Yalta Conference was being arranged, Russia vetoed France's participation in it, although only a few months earlier she had signed a treaty of alliance with France. On his arrival in Yalta, Winston Churchill tried to change Russia's mind on the subject of French participation. Drawing on his great oratorical talents, he made an impassioned plea for France, speaking at length of French history and civilization, on French contributions to the civilized world in the form of intelligence, culture, and logic. Throughout Churchill's speech, Stalin looked at him with an openly bored expression. The two men were separated by more than language and nationality. They lived in two entirely different worlds.

If Americans want to understand the first thing about Russia, they must start out with the realization that Russia is a world of her own, a world entirely apart from ours. It is a world different not only in its psychology, its ideology, and its conception of military force as the only reliable instrument of policy, but in its very way of life. When the United States sent a Red Cross expert, Vivian Harris, to England, to supervise orientation classes, including one in the art of make-up for British war brides scheduled to sail for America, Russian papers observed that American civilization has sunk to the low level of teaching women how to paint their faces.

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When President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee of Britain, and Prime Minister King of Canada decided on the atomic bomb resolution at their Washington meeting, *Novoye Vremya* wrote in Moscow: "The atomic bomb is a signal for reactionaries all over the world to agitate for a new crusade against the Soviet Union."

When Secretary of State Byrnes arrived in Moscow to obtain Russian adherence to the atomic bomb resolution, thirty-eight-year-old dressmaker Valentina Popova, another average Russian, declared, "I hope the inventor of the atomic bomb never finds peace on this earth!"

In my discussions of Russia with various American editors, I was told by some: "But what you tell us of your personal experiences applies to Russia when the war was still on. That was before Yalta, before Potsdam, before the various agreements between the Big Three. Now things have changed."

Have they? Let's look at the record again.

Brooks Atkinson, who covered Russia during the post-surrender period and certainly should know what he is talking about, wrote to the *New York Times* on Nov. 25, 1945: "In America fanatic groups of idealistic people are busily engaged in fostering friendship with the Soviet Union, vainly proposing cultural exchanges and trying day and night to understand the dominant nation of Europe and Asia. Most of them are animated by nothing more insidious than intellectual curiosity about one of the most absorbing countries in the world and an earnest hope for peace everywhere."

After citing some of his experiences, Mr. Atkinson continues: "This temperamental remark illustrates about as clearly as anything could *the vast unbridgeable canyon that divides the Soviet Union from the West*. It assumes that the effort toward understanding is to come all in one direction. We are to try to understand Russia. Russia is under no compulsion to try to understand us. Living behind inhospitable

borders Russia dwells in an atmosphere of self-glorification."

Mr. Atkinson said quite a bit in that statement. *We must try to understand Russia so that we can absorb the Russian way of life. But the Politburo does not allow the Russian people to understand us because it does not want them to know anything about the Western way of life. It is to be a one-way street all the way.*

Today, we have the United Nations. Our leaders whoop it up over the United Nations on every suitable occasion. But do we really have a world fully united in spirit, or are the United Nations just another of those dazzlingly beautiful slogans which, like the Atlantic Charter, last only so long as their artificial glow remains and then fade into the great unknown? Do we, in fact, and not just in theory, have one integrated world based on the principle of free men; or is the name, United Nations, just another clever camouflage device behind which to hide the fact that two different worlds are lined up against each other, all the protestations of aspiring politicians and trained propagandists notwithstanding? Let's see once again.

We Americans know the principles for which we stand and in the defense of which we have given the blood of our sons on numerous occasions, or at least we were led to think that we did. These principles are plainly stated in the Bill of Rights. We believe, first of all, in the unalienable right of every person to speak his opinion, to assemble freely with others of his opinion, to criticize the acts of government, and to seek redress from these acts by peaceful means. We believe in the right of every individual to advocate changes in our political, social, and economic structure so long as this advocacy is confined to peaceful means. We believe in the complete and unabridged freedom of the press as the expresser of public opinion. We believe in the absolute freedom of religion without any interference or political supervision

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on the part of the State. We believe in the principle of free enterprise subject to regulation by the government for the common weal. We believe in the right of every man and woman to seek his or her own pursuit in life, provided that this pursuit falls under the definition of our laws. We believe that no person shall be subject to arrest, search or seizure of property without due process of law. And we firmly believe in the rule of the majority of the people and the minority's acceptance of that rule.

These are cardinal principles embodying the rights of free men, according to our definition. In this definition we are joined by all the peoples of the British Commonwealth of Nations, by the peoples of Western Europe—notably those of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries—and, to a certain extent, by the peoples of Latin America. All these peoples comprise what is commonly called the Western World. It is a world that places the rights of the individual over and above the rights of the State.

On the other side of the balance scale, there is the Russian World. It does *not* believe in the right of the individual to speak his opinion; with regard to the expression of political convictions, this right has been completely abolished, and the Secret Police sees to it that it is not resurrected. There is *no* freedom of assembly except under the auspices of the State and for purposes predestined by the State. Neither is there any right to criticize acts of the government and to seek redress; anyone venturesome enough to advocate any changes in the Russian political, social, or economic structure is an applicant for ten years in the concentration camp or worse. There is *no* freedom of the press, which is not only rigidly controlled but actually owned by the government. Religion is supervised by the State and used for the political purposes of the State. The Russian World does *not* allow free enter-

prise. It determines the pursuits of the individual strictly according to the interests of the State. In the Russian World, the Secret Police has the privilege of arrest, search, seizure of property, and conviction by fiat, without any legal procedure. And the Russian World represents a strict rule by a small minority, with the vast majority of the people having nothing to say about that rule.

But all this is just part of the picture. The Western World has reached its peak of expansion. It does not look for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of weaker nations. It believes in the right of other peoples to run themselves as they see fit. It does not attempt to impose its political, social, and economic beliefs on other nations, either by force of arms or by revolutionary infiltration. It remains a good neighbor and takes it for granted that the other nations will react in the same fashion. It is a world that rejects force as an instrument of change.

The Russian World is the exact opposite of all this. By historic tradition, it is a world bent on territorial expansion by conquest. It is now merged with the fighting ideology of Communism, an aggressive world force in itself. It does *not* believe in the right of other nations to run themselves, but imposes its own system on them under the pretext of security for itself. It is a good neighbor only so long as other nations cater to its wishes and subscribe to its demands. And in the various Communist parties of other nations, it has a singular army of its own which opposes the other nations the moment these demands of the Russian World are no longer heeded.

These are powerful differences. What is more, they are not just differences of policy on certain details such as occasionally occur between the United States and Great Britain or between France and Great Britain; they are differences of basic conception embodying two entirely different ways of life. They

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symbolize two worlds completely apart.

Somewhere between these two radically different worlds, we find today the bulk of humanity that has not yet made up its mind which of the two worlds it should join. There, at the crossroads, we find the defeated nations of Europe, including Germany and Italy; the Moslem peoples and the countless millions of colonial India; the equally countless millions of China and the defeated people of Japan. Strange as it may seem to us who now ride the crest of the wave, it is in the hands of these defeated and colonial peoples that the fate of civilization actually rests. If they join the Russian World, they will thereby set our world pattern of the future.

We read about Big Three meetings at Teheran, at Yalta, and at Potsdam. We are told of sumptuous state banquets, of endless toasts. We see photographs in which the leaders of the Big Three exchange handshakes and beam at each other. We read high-sounding communiques about results achieved. But behind these elaborate stage settings the silent struggle goes on in strict secrecy--the great struggle for that bulk of humanity which has not yet made up its mind which one of the two worlds it will join, giving that one an absolute preponderance over the other. We Americans are told that we must tighten our belts for years to come in order to help the peoples of Europe to prevent their embracing Communism. We are told that we must help China to keep her from joining the Communist side. And we are told that by the same men who attend state banquets and shake hands at Yalta, Potsdam, Moscow, and London.

Nor is the struggle confined to Europe and Asia; it is being waged right here in the United States. This is what Earl Browder, then head of the Communist movement in our country, said at a Town Hall forum in New York on May 26, 1945: "At San Francisco the American Government

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departed from the Roosevelt policy, broke the unity of the Big Three, and practically put our international relations into the melting pot for complete recasting. Churchill, who had been a reluctant partner in Tcheran and Yalta, seized the initiative to set the new pattern. It is a pattern polarized around American-Soviet antagonism, the separation of America from the Soviet Union, with the British Empire resuming its ancient role of umpire of the world through balance of power."

American Communists, Browder went on to say, proposed to "arouse and awaken the American people to demand the enforcement of Roosevelt policies," to insist upon the fulfillment of the "basic understanding of Tcheran" which, he contended, "is now threatened with destruction."

It could not have been stated in plainer words. So long as the United States will submit to all Russian wishes, she will be accorded a dubious degree of domestic peace. But the moment our country decides to oppose Russia on any issue, the gates of class warfare will be thrown wide open.

Some idealistic, well-meaning people will say: "But the American Communist Party is not Russia." As a matter of fact, I have been told by people whose education and experiences should make them know better that "Stalin has no use for American Communists; he ridicules them."

There is today in every country in the world a pro-Russian party, a party utterly and completely devoted to the policies and aims of Russia, and that is the Communist Party. It is a party at all times prepared to fight for Russian interests, no matter what these interests are. Would the great planners of the Politburo, the men who have blueprinted every step of their way for years to come, discard, or even ridicule, such a potent weapon? The question is well worth pondering by the men of success in our country who look upon Stalin as the great master of all successes.

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The nations of Western Europe no longer ponder this question. They know the answer. They have been witnessing for centuries Russian expansionism by force. They have seen Russian Imperialism wed to Communism, another aggressive, expansionist force. They used to regard Germany as a sort of bulwark interposed between them and these two expansionist forces. Now that the bulwark is gone, largely as a result of American policy, they see the two expansionist forces, in the shape of a tremendous continental giant, ensigned on their very doorstep. They are deeply concerned.

A Frenchman expressed this apprehension in these words: "You Americans encouraged us to go to war against Hitler because, as you put it, his political realism--his *realpolitik*, as the Germans called it--stood in utter opposition to the basic conceptions of democracy, to the great rule of live and let live. We believed you, and now what? We find that Russia acts along the same lines of *realpolitik*, and we find also that you now heartily approve of it. *Realpolitik* when conducted by Hitler was all wrong. But when conducted by Stalin it is all right, because Stalin is the Great, the Magnificent, the All-Wise. What caused you to make this switch? We can understand Stalin because he typifies the same Russian impulse for expansion which has confronted Europe for centuries. But we cannot understand you."

What this Frenchman and millions of his compatriots do not understand is that Russia and the United States entered the war for entirely different reasons. The Politburo had a political blueprint which it kept secret, just as it has definite plans for almost any eventuality which are kept secret until the proper time. If the Politburo were to lose the war, it would go down fighting to the last breath. But if it won the war, as it confidently expected, it knew exactly what it was going to do and how it was going to do it. The United States, on the other hand, entered the war with a bagful of

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beautiful slogans on the validity of the permanent world peace that was to be won. Beyond these slogans we did not have a single constructive plan. And Great Britain was caught in the middle.

An enumeration of our slogans reads like a galaxy of idealistic concepts. We started out with the *Atlantic Charter*. This we promptly expanded into the *Four Freedoms*, including the *Freedom from Fear*—the very *Fear* which today inhabits every corner of Europe and Asia. Our next slogan was *Unconditional Surrender*; we kept repeating it day in and day out, without having the faintest idea on what was to follow after it. But Russia not only had ideas, she had definite plans. And as a direct result of these plans we have today arrived at a new slogan—*Security*.

This is what Robert M. Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, had to say about *Security* when speaking to his students at the convocation ceremonies in 1945: "The word 'security,' which is the great word today, has no moral significance, for the worst men can, and usually do, want it. . . . The new realism was bound to cause confusion in America, for the new realism is nothing but the old *realpolitik*. It represents the conquest of the United States by Hitler."

Mr. Hutchins was using allegoric language. Hitler did not conquer the United States physically, but his restless spirit hovers over everything; or, rather, the Politburo spirit with its dogma of ruthlessly applied power, which amounts to virtually the same thing. Hitler wanted to upset the existing world order. We did not want the world order upset, and so we fought Hitler. We won. As a direct result of our victory, we find ourselves today face to face with an enormously powerful Russia which wants to upset the existing world order. We have fought and won a bloody war only to discover that we still need *security*.

This continued quest for *security* has led us to something

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that carries a well-remembered name—*appeasement*. Before the war appeasement was applied to Hitler; now it is being applied to Russia. In our policy of appeasement toward Russia for the sake of *security* we have gone to unprecedented lengths. Ever since Teheran we have bowed before one Russian demand after another, have accepted one Russian *fait accompli* after another. In this appeasement policy we have completely abandoned principle, substituting for it the Russian doctrine of realism. In his deference to Russian wishes, Secretary of State Byrnes went to the extent of dropping Assistant Secretary James Dunn and John Foster Dulles from the roster of his aides to the Moscow Conference because they were believed to be “unfriendly” to Russia’s expansionist policies. It is a fact that for fear of “offending” Russia, the State Department has stopped a number of FBI investigations into the activities of Russian agents in this country. This certainly is going a long way on the road to being “friendly,” if we consider that our diplomatic representatives in Moscow cannot take ten steps without being trailed by Secret Police agents.

In return for all this appeasement, what did we receive from Russia? Just this—the government-owned Russian press continues to tell the Russian people daily that our noblest professions are just a cover-up for a new hostility against Russia as a nation.

Where is *Peace*? And where is the much propagandized *One World*?

In his recent book, *The Big Three*, historian David J. Dallin, a renowned student of modern Russian history (*Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, The Real Soviet Russia*), gives the answer by arriving at the grim but inevitable conclusion: “The coming period in world history will be, at best, a period of armed truce.”

CHAPTER LI

What Is It Going To Be?

HOW IS THE WESTERN WORLD GOING TO USE THE PRESENT period of armed truce? Can this armed truce be converted into a period of world stability without ultimate recourse to another Armageddon?

First, as matters stand today, let us ask ourselves what nations can be counted upon as being of the Western World, aside from the United States.

To begin with, there is Great Britain and the British Commonwealth of Nations. We can always count on Britain, unless, of course, we commit the unpardonable sin of selling her down the river by throwing the heart of the British Empire—the Middle East—into Russia's hands. In that case England would strike the best possible deal with Russia and swing into her orbit.

Next, there are the nations of Western Europe: France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, and a reformed Spain. But, although all these nations have long been considered an integral part of the Atlantic community, there is at present a great struggle going on in each of them, with one party urging political adherence to Russia and the other advocating close ties with Great Britain and the United States. Unfortunately, in the absence of any clearly defined American foreign policy, and especially in the absence of any future solid alliance between Great Britain and the United States, the pro-Western advocates have little on which to base their hopes. The people of

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these nations were little impressed by the San Francisco performance, which they considered a mere affirmation of the Russian policy of ruthless power, with just lip service to world democracy. They came to the UNO opening session in London with grave doubts in their hearts, and these doubts increased when they saw how the United States and Britain allowed Russia to occupy the driver's seat. The conviction is growing in them that a small nation's survival depends on its ability to line up with the most powerful friend. With the war hardly over, and with no real peace anywhere within sight, these nations see Europe again divided into two sharply delineated camps, and they want to be sure to get into the right one.

In this struggle Russia temporarily enjoys a marked advantage in that there is a strongly pro-Russian party in each of these countries—namely, the Communists. On the other hand, in the absence of any strong Anglo-American ties, there can be no pro-American or pro-British party worth mentioning, at least not until such ties, or their equivalent in the form of a definite Western understanding, have been formed. On the contrary, in France, the most important of these countries, there is a growing reaction directed against Great Britain and even against the United States; it has found expression in the political defeat of former President de Gaulle because of his insistence on a French democracy based on the American model. In the same measure as American prestige drops, that of Russia rises.

Another part of the Western World is represented by the Latin American countries. But here, too, we discover ominous rumblings, of which the Communist showing in the presidential election in Brazil, the largest of these nations, serves as a definite barometer. The Communist parties in the Latin American republics, like everywhere else, are absolutely pro-Russian.

Balanced on the fence between the Western World and the Russian World, we find a group of nations who, by their prospective affiliation with either Russia or the West, will eventually decide whether the freedom-loving nations of today will preserve their freedom or yield to a world totalitarianism directed from Moscow. Among this group are the Moslem nations of the Middle East, India, the nations of Southeast Asia, China, and Japan. No definite barometer is currently available on this group of nations. They can be rightfully described as being in a state of political chaos. Their present regimes favor the Western conception of things, but unless the West takes definite steps to secure their affiliation, the trend can easily change overnight. And we must never forget that Russia herself is a semi-Oriental nation. If these nations are allowed to throw their lot with the Russian World, the West may well consider itself doomed.

What can be done to insure the stability of the world and steer it clear of another Armageddon?

Two different policies, each of a definite character, stand out clearly. One is, of course, the United Nations Organization. It should be added, however, that the UNO is looked upon by all clear-thinking persons as a purely experimental attempt to bring together two radically opposed ways of life. By all, that is, except the pro-Russian contingent all over the world, and this in itself is a highly disturbing sign. Russia is the exponent of world rule by ruthless application of power, of bludgeoning the small nations into line via the all-embracing police fist. If the Russians, in their present self-glorified role as the world's chosen people, have their cohorts voice strong approval of the UNO, there must be a reason for it. Modern history has proved that whenever Russia and World Communism were vociferously in favor of anything, it invariably turned out to be something from which the Politburo expected to derive special world political benefits. Yet

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it seems certain that unless Russia relinquishes her present trend of using the UNO as a vehicle for her own political ends, the UNO is destined to utter failure, and a universal scramble for position will take place.

In the event of such a condition, the UNO is certain to become a pugilistic arena wherein no holds are barred. In this arena the two different worlds will fight a relentless political struggle for enlistments into their respective ranks. It is a logical development that cannot be halted in an organization with two diametrically opposed viewpoints represented in it, and it will immediately put our side at a great disadvantage. Since the Russian World is a strictly closed one, jealously guarded by the Secret Police, we could not possibly expect any interlopers from its ranks. Conversely, our side, lacking as it does strong political cohesion, would be open to the blandishments and persuasions of an expansion-bent Russian World, backed as it is by an expertly staged display of force that the Western World is not in a position to match.

In a ruthless competition of this type, all the initial advantages are with the Russian side, which is cohesive, strongly organized, and under the command of one central authority. This authority, as has been proved time and again, proceeds with a directness and singleness of purpose which the disjointed forces of the Western World completely lack. That purpose is *divide et impera*. Eventually the United States would find herself standing alone, without friends or partners, facing a steadily growing array of forces avid for her great national wealth, and having to combat erosion from within as well. Looked at from this angle, it is a none too enviable prospect, but nonetheless likely to happen if we put all our eggs into one basket.

Then there is the other alternative, to which many persons in responsible authority in Washington are giving serious consideration. This alternative would entail the abandonment

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of the UNO in favor of a cohesive union of peace-loving nations, with the United States spearheading the movement as the only nation commanding a world prestige commensurate with that of Russia.

As a matter of fact, the United States just now is in an excellent position to undertake such a move because she enjoys the full respect of the two principal nations among the fence-sitting group. Japan, her defeat notwithstanding, is still a nation to be taken into account. The Japanese are more fearful of Communism than are any other people in Asia, and they are on the whole receptive to democracy, American style. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Douglas MacArthur, has done a unique and excellent job in an incredibly short period of time. American prestige is riding high and handsome in Japan, more so than in any other part of the world. The Tokyo paper *Asahi* actually wrote: "It would be better for Japan to have one star added to the flag of the United States than to starve as an independent country. It would be happier for us if Japan would become a dependency of the United States. Isn't it true that such thought is creeping steadily into the minds of the people?"

Another of our top military leaders, General George Marshall, has done a great job in China. A country headed straight for devastating civil war at the end of 1945, China turned toward long-sought unity and national peace, largely owing to General Marshall's effort. He brought the two principal contending factions together quickly and attained in weeks what the State Department had expected to take months. He dealt firmly but justly, playing no favorites, using the diplomatic stick and the carrot, as the situation demanded. The stick, taking the form of a threat of American military help to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was wisely applied to the Chinese Communist faction. The carrot was dangled before both Communists and Nationalists in the form of

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American financial, economic, and technical help to a united Chinese Government. General Marshall's successful activity reestablished American prestige in a China that was almost ready to drop into the Russian lap. Unless the United States commits a grievous mistake in policy, China will be ready to fall in with the Western World.¹

That Great Britain and the British Commonwealth of Nations would welcome such a solution with open arms is hardly worth mentioning, and the same goes for the Latin American countries.

The nations of Western Europe have practiced democracy for generations; it has become part of their way of life. Their doubt and vacillation is due to their great fear of Russia, not to any change in their convictions. They would all come on the run.

There would remain the Moslem peoples of the Middle East. Being Russia's immediate neighbors in an arena where Russian military might can erupt with sudden overwhelming force, they would have to act with caution. Nevertheless, they are quite aware of the side which will serve their best interests, and Britain still retains part of her once great prestige in the Middle East. Besides, some of these nations have shown great steadfastness at times, notably Turkey in the face of potent Russian threats. If the United States would demonstrate that she really means business, and would hold the door open, the Moslem peoples would walk in.

Needless to say, a union of peace-loving nations under the auspices of the Western World would be dependent, at least during the first years, on American economic help, and some people in the United States probably would be uneasy about

¹ Considerable harm has been done since by enemies of Chiang Kai-shek in the Department of State and elsewhere in Washington. By subsequently opposing part of General Marshall's great work, via giving encouragement to the Chinese Communist faction, they have merely contributed to a new flare-up of civil war in China, thus playing directly into Russia's hands and undermining U. S. prestige.

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the great expenditure involved. But let us look at it sensibly, casting aside narrow nationalistic prejudices. We have just spent in the vicinity of three hundred billion dollars for purely destructive purposes. To do that, we had to go heavily into debt as a nation. This debt can be repaid only if our country goes through a long era of unprecedented national prosperity. And what greater chance is there for creating such an era of prosperity than by opening four-fifths of the world to American enterprise, to American creative genius, to the output of America's factories and farms? Moreover, it would raise the standard of living of countless millions of people throughout the world, and thus result in still greater prosperity for all concerned. Even if the outlay should rival the tremendous amounts we spent on the war, it would in this case be bread cast upon the waters; it would return to us a hundredfold. It would be America's great opportunity for world leadership.

How would Russia accept such a solution? What with the blueprint of the Politburo and the present self-glorification of the Russians, Russia certainly would not take it lying down. Beyond any question of doubt she would stir up her Communist cohorts in all the lands, unleash her world-wide propaganda machine and raise a howling hue and cry throughout the world, claiming that the forces of reaction were banding together to destroy the Soviet Union. But she would not go to war; the Politburo is much too wise for that when it knows it stands no chance. With the rest of the world standing firmly together, Russia would stand no ghost of a chance to win an aggressive war; therefore she would not start one. And the United States still has the manufacturing secret of the atomic bomb.

The Western World would leave Russia strictly alone, to do whatever she pleased within her own confine. The Russian exhortations would subside. Russia's Communist cohorts

What Is It Going To Be?

in other countries, recognizing at last that the exhortations were mere words, would desert her to get their share of a better way of life. Russia would find herself isolated, thrust back on her own resources. The Communist Party's prestige at home would drop, and keep dropping. The Russian people would yearn for the genuine friendship of an outer world that was so much better off. In time, they might even do something about it. *And there would be no more Armageddon.*

But of course such a solution would require bold and fearless leadership on the part of the United States. It would require the extirpation of all doubts, and concentration upon a single purpose. It would require willingness to undergo temporary sacrifices for the great benefits to come. Most important, it would require a complete realization on the part of all Americans that the era of strict nationalism and self-containedness is past, and that the peace-loving peoples of the world must work side by side to bring real peace and prosperity to all.

It would require speed as well. There are millions of doubters today, especially among the nations of Western Europe, who no longer believe that the United States is capable of assuming a world leadership of this sort. These doubters look about for the most powerful affiliation and their eyes are cast more and more in the direction of Russia. The forcing out of office of President de Gaulle of France was a straw in the wind. And there are others. If we allow any important defections before the work is even started, the difficulties will be increased. Our ultimate decision cannot be put on the shelf for safekeeping.

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